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Abstract 
 
 
This history of Dostoevsky’s reception in France draws from critical responses, 
translation analysis, and the comparative analysis of adaptations as well as 
intertextual dialogues between fictional, critical and philosophical texts. It begins 
from the earliest translations and critical accounts of the 1880s and 1890s, such 
as Eugène-Melchior de Vogüé’s seminal moralist reading. It then traces modernist 
responses and adaptations from the turn of the century to the twenties. Existential 
readings and re-translations dating from the arrival of émigré critics and religious 
philosophers in the wake of the Russian Revolution are examined, assessing the 
contribution of these émigré readings to emerging existential readings and 
movements in France. Finally, French existentialist fiction is analysed in terms of 
its intertextual dialogue with Dostoevsky’s work and with speculative and critical 
writings of French existentialist thinkers on and around the philosophical 
reflections expressed in Dostoevsky’s fiction. 
 
By following specifically the existential and existentialist branches of 
Dostoevsky’s French reception, an overlooked aspect of the history of French, 
Russian and European existentialisms comes to the fore, reframed within a 
pivotal period in the history of European intercultural exchange, and of 
transmodal literary and philosophical discourse. 
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Note on Translation and Transliteration 
 
  
All translations are my own unless otherwise stated. Russian names and titles 
have been transliterated in accordance with the Library of Congress system, with 
the exception of well-known names (e.g. Dostoevsky) in which case the common 
English spelling has been used. Names and words transliterated in quotations and 
references have been left as transliterated in the source. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Reception history has a somewhat antithetical status in relation to dominant, 
nationalised intellectual and literary histories. This nationalisation itself is 
constructed and reinforced more by institutionalised disciplinary boundaries than 
by the reality of reading and writing, in which translated foreign texts play as 
significant a role as native texts. So long as the task of writing and rewriting 
histories of French literature falls to specialists of French literature understood as 
texts authored in French, causal relationships and linear chains of exchange are 
constructed and reconstructed with a disregard for the fact that translated texts 
operate just as productively within literary discourse and, as such, in national 
literary history. Reception history is therefore a means of questioning monolithic, 
nationalised historical narratives and bringing to the fore the equal significance of 
translated literature in the emergence of new literary movements. 
 
The reception specifically of the 19th century Russian novel in France is a 
phenomenon that stands out from all others. Even Nietzsche’s reception historian, 
Jacques le Rider, has acknowledged that Nietzsche’s colossal wave of reception 
was second to that of les Russes.1 The particular interest of the chronological 
framing of the current investigation, i.e. from the late romantic period towards 
post-modernity and post-colonialism, is significant in that reception history 
permits a microcosmic view of one culture’s perception of another. The 
                                                   
1
 Jacques le Rider’s authoratitive history of Nietzsche’s collosal significance to 20th century 
French intellectual life states: “Le seul domaine qui surpasse, par son ampleur, la réception de 
Nietzsche dans les pays de langue française, est celui de la littérature russe contemporaine 
(Dostoïevski, Tolstoï).” See Jacques le Rider, Nietzsche en France: De la fin du XIXe siècle au 
temps présent (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999), p. 105. 
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translation boom of the 1880s, when the current history commences, was initially 
met with striking hostility and fear of intercultural contamination. The history of 
the gradual and laborious deconstruction of the Volksgeist, the mode of 
envisioning interculturality that dominated 19th century discourse emerges. 
Notions of intercultural clashes subside and cosmopolitanist reading strategies 
come to the fore.  
 
Lefevere’s writings were seminal in approaching the question of translated texts 
in nationalised literary history: 
Literary histories, as they have been written until recently, have had little 
time for translations, since for the literary historian, translation has had to do 
with ‘language’ only, not with literature – another pernicious outgrowth of 
the ‘monolinguization’ of literary history by Romantic historiographers 
intent on creating ‘national’ literatures preferably as uncontaminated as 
possible by foreign influences.2 
Post-colonialist critics, following the structuralists and semioticians, have 
attempted to decentralise intellectual histories via translation studies. Selim 
writes: 
Literary history is one of the most powerful vehicles by which the nation 
state protects its legitimacy and authority within and beyond its own borders. 
[…] Literary history is therefore not innocent of the broader political and 
discursive practices that have shaped the relationship between Europe and its 
others in modernity.3 
The great interest in the Russian context in the period in question is that Russia’s 
status as one of Europe’s Oriental other was in dramatic transition, as was the 
                                                   
2
 André Lefevere, "Translation: its Genealogy in the West," in Translation, History and Culture, 
eds Susan Bassnett and André Lefevere (London: Printer Publishers, 1990), p. 24. 
3
 Samah Selim, "Pharoah’s Revenge: Translation, Literary History and Colonial Ambivalence," in 
Critical Readings in Translation Studies, ed. Mona Baker (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 321. 
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international status of Russian literature. The simultaneity of these processes was, 
of course, no coincidence. Selim has also written that while the legitimacy of 
literary history per se has come into question in the post-structuralist context, the 
reintegration of marginalised histories remains meaningful. 4  To this end, 
reception histories of Russian literature inclusive of marginalised émigré readings 
are crucial.  
 
The present study’s selection of readings of Dostoevsky is by no means 
exhaustive, and by no means arbitrary. Starting from the ‘orientalist’ roots of 
reception in chapter one, and the modern, proto-existential reading of Gide in 
chapter two, a particular branch has then been followed, namely the existential 
branch of reception. This attention was in part attracted by the curious absence of 
Dostoevsky’s name from French histories of existential and existentialist thought 
and literature in France and in French scholarship. The Anglophone and 
Russophone literature on the matter differs greatly in this respect, which roused 
the curiosity at the origins of this project and which resulted in the choice of a 
historical approach to the question. The place and role of Russian émigré 
‘intermediaries’ in this history is also – unsurprisingly, given the historical and 
political context – much emphasised by post-Soviet scholarship and 
Anglo-American comparitists, more often overlooked by French intellectual 
historians, as the literature review below demonstrates. 
 
The reception history of Dostoevsky’s philosophical fiction across this 
                                                   
4
 Ibid., p. 322. 
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‘existential’ period also traces a second, crucial event in the intellectual history of 
Europe: that of a disciplinary breakdown between literary and philosophical 
writings, and between scientific and narrative conceptions of truth. This is a 
question of particular interest when addressing disparities between French and 
Russian cultural discourse from the 19th to 20th centuries and their marked 
institutional differences. In this regard, the existential/existentialist moment in 
intercultural history is a significant one: a meeting point between disciplinary 
cultures and discourses, as well as between national cultures. Languilli, writing a 
history of existentialism around 1970, bemoaned the fact that commentators on 
the movement had done away with the sacred distinction between literature and 
philosophy. Justifying his omission of Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Rilke and Kafka from 
his history of existentialism, Languilli writes: 
There is a hope related to this omission – the hope that the distinction 
between fictional discourse and philosophical discourse remains intact in the 
mind of the reader. The chances against such a hope being fulfilled are great, 
however, because of the blithe facility of this era, or of any era probably, to 
blur distinctions and to ignore differences.5 
Languilli gave no further explanation as to why these differences were so sacred, 
other than that they had already been established. Languilli was mistaken insofar 
as distinctions were disintegrating not from the blitheness he associated with the 
era, but by necessity. The existential moment in intellectual history is significant 
precisely because these movements sought such a disintegration, by generating 
new, composite discourses in literary philosophy and philosophical literature.6 
                                                   
5
 Nino Languilli, ed., The Existentialist Tradition: Selected writings (New York: Anchor Books, 
1971),  
p. 3. 
6
 These disciplinary boundaries had of course been blurred by the likes of Voltaire, however, the 
existential writers and thinkers went significantly further towards an integrated conception of the 
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The literary output of the philosophers associated with existentialism and the 
philosophical output of the writers cannot be seen as a coincidence: the 
movement was a hybrid one, and resulted in an enduring hybridisation. As this 
thesis will demonstrate, intercultural exchange was conducive to this 
deconstruction. 
 
Initial clarification must be made between the usage of the terms existential and 
existentialist throughout this thesis. Ramona Fotiade has consistently underlined 
the distinction that religious existential thinkers emphasised between their own 
anti-systematic philosophies and later existentialist philosophies. 7  The term 
‘existential’ is thus used throughout to denote religious, anti-systematic and 
anti-rationalist philosophies of human existence, while ‘existentialist’ and 
‘existentialism’ refer to the atheist branch associated with Sartre. When referring 
to both collectively, Jean Wahl’s term ‘philosophies of existence’ is employed. 
 
Even with such distinctions drawn, the anti-systematic, ‘literary’ nature of these 
philosophies makes pinning down definitions problematic. Patisson is typical in 
avoiding a definition: 
Let us rather speak of an atmosphere, a climate that pervades all of them. 
The proof that there is such a thing as the philosophy of existence is that we 
can legitimately apply the term to certain philosophies and not to others. 
Therefore, there must be something that is common to these philosophies. 
                                                                                                                                         
philosophical novel, interrogating philosophical questions by means of poetics. Shervashidze has 
set French existential thought apart from contemporaneous German strands in that the French 
branch was concurrently literary and philosophical. See Vera Vakhtangovna Shervashidze, Ot 
romantizma k ekzistentsializmu: Tvorchestvo Andre Mal'ro i Al'bera Kamiu (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo 
rossiiskogo universiteta druzhby narodov, 2005), p. 15. 
7
 Ramona Fotiade, Conceptions of the Absurd: From Surrealism to the Existential Thought of 
Chestov and Fondane (Oxford: Legenda, 2001), pp. 6, 229. 
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That something we shall try to pursue without perhaps ever attaining.8 
The difficulty stems from the fact firstly that the majority of existential 
philosophies were expressly and self-consciously anti-systematic and 
interrogative or even antithetical in nature. Secondly, what Patisson shows an 
awareness of in the above quotation (though speaking of it in terms of an 
‘atmosphere’ is perhaps unconstructive) is that ‘existential’ describes not a 
rigorous system of ideas but a complex of interconnected concerns and a specific 
language and mode of expression, coupled with a specific emotive drive. It was a 
movement, which corresponds to a specific period of history, but as a movement 
it was in perpetual motion. As with any movement, it is the intercommunication 
itself, between various writers and texts, that stitches it together, rather than any 
overarching schema. In intercultural terms, dialogue surrounding Dostoevsky’s 
fiction represented a series of such stitches.  
 
Various aspects of Dostoevsky’s dissemination and penetration in France have, of 
course, been broached by a number of scholars. Due to the broad scope of the 
current study, specific literature reviews detailing the numerous existing 
comparative studies of Dostoevsky and specific French writers and movements 
will be addressed in separate discussions within the appropriate chapters. A 
genealogy only of reception histories with similar objectives to this one will here 
be outlined, followed by an overview of existing studies of Dostoevsky in 
relation to French existential and existentialist movements. 
 
                                                   
8
 George Patisson, Anxious Angels: A Retrospective View of Religious Existentialism (New York: 
St Martin’s Press, 1999), p. 4. 
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Literature Review 
 
Even before the turn of the century, Charbonnel (1897) produced a first and fairly 
documented denunciation of the pervasive influence of a neo-mystic revival he 
perceived to be influencing French culture, instigated by the translation of 
Dostoevsky and Tolstoy.9 Hemmings (1950) offered a more scholarly approach 
to the same phenomenon, tracing the same, initial period of reception.10 Seely 
(1966) then produced an unpublished thesis treating the critical reception of 
Dostoevsky in France, which contains some useful observations but also 
numerous factual inaccuracies with regards to chronology, and overlooks key 
publications.11 The most expansive and rigorous study to date is Backès’s (1972) 
doctoral thesis, which carried out much of the ground work necessary for the 
initial chapters of the current study.12 Backès’s findings remain relevant, if 
unpublished, though his methodological stance restrains him from interpretation 
of the data amassed and the work concludes on a statement of its own provisional 
nature.13 Unfortunately, Backès also terminated his study at 1930, claiming that 
this is when Dostoevsky's reception 'fossilised', an assumption the current study 
will challenge.  
 
Two Soviet studies from the same period also tackled the question of a 
connection between Dostoevsky’s fiction and the French philosophical novel of 
                                                   
9
 Victor Charbonnel, Les Mystiques dans la littérature présente (Paris Mercure, 1897). 
10
 F. W. J. Hemmings, The Russian Novel In France (1884-1914) (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 
1950). 
11
 Kay Gee Seely, "Dostoevsky and French Criticism" (Doctoral thesis, Columbia University, 
1966). 
12
 Backès, "Dostoïevski en France 1880 – 1930" (Doctoral thesis, Sorbonne-Paris IV, 1972). 
13
 Ibid., p. 679. 
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the mid-20th century.14 Methodologically, these have aged less gracefully than 
their French counterparts, ideologically bound as they were to defend a social 
humanitarian conception of Dostoevsky from bourgeois misinterpretation. They 
also omit numerous important French publications. 
 
Another significant gap in the field is that existing serious reception histories 
terminate by 1930. As such, they are completely dissociated from any of the 
absurdist and existentialist writers that followed and that drew directly both from 
Dostoevsky’s thought and from the existential re-interpretations of Dostoevsky of 
the 1920s. While comparativists have delved into the relationship between 
Dostoevsky and French existential thought, this has not been assessed historically. 
For example, Erofeev's study (1975) remains the most astute comparative study 
of Dostoevskian, Sartrian and Camusian thought; however, these have yet to be 
reincorporated into France's intellectual history.15 
 
A third deficiency of existing literature is that the influence of Russian émigré 
literary thought has yet to be incorporated both into the history of Dostoevsky’s 
French reception and into the history of French existential movements. The 
existential readings of Shestov and Berdyaev are largely absent from the French 
narrative. In Backès’s study, a rare exception, a brief discussion of Shestov’s 
interpretation of Dostoevsky is included, with an apology excusing the liberty on 
                                                   
14
 Y. A. Mileshin, Dostoevskii i frantsuzskie romanisty pervoi poloviny XX veka (Cheliabinsk: 
Cheliabinskii Rabochii, 1984). A. N. Lantynina, "Dostoevskii i ekzistentsializm," in Dostoevskii: 
khudozhnik i myslitel', ed. K. N. Lomunov (Moskva: Khudozhestvennaia Literatura, 1972) pp. 
210-259. 
15
 References throughout are from the more recent re-edition: V. V. Erofeev, Naiti v cheloveke 
cheloveka (Moskva: Zebra E, 2003). Erofeev’s research dates to his doctoral project “Dostoevskii 
i frantsuzskii ekzistentsializm” (1975). 
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the grounds of interest and pertinence of the reading, rather than its participation 
to French discourse as a French-language publication. Russian scholars, on the 
other hand, have explored the profound impact of Dostoevskian thought on 
Russian existential thought of the Silver Age as well as of the post-Revolutionary 
diaspora; however, this has rarely been considered as a participating voice in 
French discourse. 
 
Methods 
 
Evaluating the existing literature, the following under-researched issues become 
apparent: How did consecutive generations of readers in France interpret and 
draw from the fictional thought of Dostoevsky? How is this reflected in the 
history of his French translation? What was the role of émigré interpreters of 
Dostoevsky in his French reception history? To what extent, and in what ways, 
might Dostoevsky have functioned as a platform for intercultural dialogue 
between French and Russian existential movements? In order to broach these 
questions, a historical methodology has been chosen. Findings are arranged 
chronologically. This presupposes a conception of intellectual history whereby 
ideas and their modes of expression may be meaningfully associated with specific 
times and places through an association with individuals and movements. Such a 
conception, like any, poses a number of problems. The first is that chronological 
presentation of periodised ideas and aesthetic values tends to disguise the fact 
that narratives pertaining to the rise and fall of intellectual tendencies are often 
projected retrospectively. Consequently, it would perhaps be more scrupulous to 
tell the story from end to start in acknowledgement of the historical telescope in 
15 
 
operation. Narrative history and chronology have traditionally been used to 
denote or connote causal relations, which, in the context of ideas, become 
difficult if not impossible to qualify. Nonetheless, intellectual history is peopled, 
and people are situated and form collectives with shared values and concerns 
which, contextualized historically, represent moods and movements, informed by 
pre-existing moods and movements. 
 
As reception history has emerged as a historic genre, a number of strategies have 
been devised to confront this difficulty. Notions of passive influence have ceded 
to those of active reception.16 These have in turn been neutralised by text-centric 
concepts of intertextuality, which have in turn come into question as 
reader-centric projections of little use to the literary historian.17 The current 
study makes self-conscious use of all of these conceptual mechanisms, using 
historical evidence (drafts, diaries, correspondence) to establish authorial intent 
where possible, but without fearing a composite methodology that incorporates 
intertextual readings of fictional and philosophical texts. The study observes 
methodological awareness of the stance that translated texts contribute to national 
discourse, and thus fully incorporates, for example, émigré writings published in 
French as integral to French reception history. In such cases, translators and 
translations are also discussed at length. A final consideration is that this 
reception history, unlike the more tentative studies to date, treats critical reactions, 
adaptations, translations and intertextual references both in fictional and 
                                                   
16
 Gide contributed to this debate as early as 1900 with his ‘De l’influence en littérature’ in Gide, 
Essais critiques pp. 403-417. 
17
 Graham Allen, Harold Bloom: A Poetics of Conflict (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), p. 
160-162. 
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philosophical texts, as comparable processes of interpretation. The goal in the 
analysis of any such retelling is to establish the philosophical and ideological 
assumptions underpinning the retelling through the analysis of alterations, and to 
situate these historically. 
 
Contexts 
 
This approach presupposes, on the part of the current researcher, that the fiction 
of Dostoevsky has a philosophical and an ideological content (however 
multifaceted and ambiguous this may be) and that a retelling will emphasise or 
remove certain aspects. The polyphonic nature of Dostoevsky’s fiction is such 
that debates continue, and will continue, as to “which voice resounds loudest.”18 
These debates are misguided insofar as they presuppose an objective answer. The 
more pertinent question is which motifs resonate (i.e. subjectively) loudest with 
specific readers and historical contexts. As such, when speaking, throughout this 
thesis, of Dostoevsky’s novelistic thought, the assumed understanding is not of a 
coherent philosophical system, but of a polyphonic and open-ended source from 
which other thinkers and writers drew inspiration. 
 
The notion that Dostoevsky’s fiction has a specific philosophical content, and that, 
as such, Dostoevsky can be spoken of as a philosopher, dates to his early Russian 
reception. This must here be analysed in order to understand the philosophical 
readings of Russian philosophers in emigration. Dostoevsky’s writings had a 
                                                   
18
 I. I. Evlampiev, Istoriia russkoi filosofii (Moskva: Vysshaia shkola, 2002), p. 99-100. 
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great impact on movements in literary philosophy associated with the Russian 
Silver Age at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. 
Beginning with Vasily Rozanov’s seminal reading of the philosophical reflection 
on conceptions of human freedom and the irrational nature of human existence as 
presented by Dostoevsky’s fiction, a tradition was established of reading 
Dostoevsky as a profoundly philosophical novelist. Merezhkovsky, Berdyaev, 
Shestov and Ivanov, following Rozanov, all developed readings of Dostoevsky 
that brought to the fore the religious existential problematics within Dostoevsky’s 
work, with regard firstly to the irreconcilability of the human condition to any 
rational conception of a meaning of life, and secondly to the limitations of human 
interaction. The corresponding generation of philosophical theologians also 
interacted fruitfully with the existential problematics set out in Dostoevsky’s 
fiction. 
 
The prevalent place of Dostoevsky in the history of Russian thought has attracted 
due scholarly attention. Zenkovskii’s canonical overview (1948) spoke of 
Dostoevsky belonging as much to philosophy as to literature in both the national 
and global context, adding that his influence, felt by all subsequent Russian 
thinkers, literally opened a new era of Russian thought.19 Recent histories such 
as Hamburg and Poole’s (2010) continue to confer to Dostoevsky the privileged 
position of the single most significant literary influence on Russian philosophy.20 
Oleg Marchenko has observed that for a generation of Russian philosophers, 
                                                   
19
 V. V. Zenkovskii, Istoriia russkoi filosofii, 2 vols. (Parizh: YMCA Press, 1948), I, pp. 414-5, 
430, 436. Of course, the fact that Zenkovskii’s work was authored in Paris, in immersion in the 
émigré context, cannot be overlooked. 
20
 G. M. Hamburg and Randall A. Poole, eds., A History of Russian Philosophy (1830-1930) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 14. 
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Dostoevsky’s fictional thinkers functioned as philosophers in their own right:  
Художественный мир, созданный гением Ф.М.Достоевского, настолько 
завораживал русских религиозных мыслителей начала ХХ века, что 
грань между художественным вымыслом и действительностью 
становилась для них условной, зыбкой, проницаемой.
21
 
Evlampiev goes as far as to compare Dostoevsky’s impact on Russian thought of 
the Silver Age to the Renaissance in Western Europe. He writes:  
[П]очти вся русская философия конца XIX - начала XX века занималась 
тем, что развивала и углубляла ту новую концепцию человека, основу 
которой заложил Достоевский.
22
  
Ivanov and Berdyaev both attributed to Dostoevsky’s fiction a profound impact 
on the intellectual development of their generation.23 Not all witnesses of this 
historical moment were of this opinion.24 
 
A historical narrative has thus been long established, running from Dostoevsky’s 
novelistic thought, through the Silver Age and into the intellectual culture of the 
diaspora. This narrative became a highly important one in the 1990s, during the 
collective search for an alternative history and a link back to pre-Revolutionary 
                                                   
21
 Oleg Marchenko, Ocherki po istorii filosofii (Moskva: Mir Knigi, 2002), pp. 74-75. 
22
 Evlampiev, Istoriia russkoi filosofii, p. 132. 
23
 “Новый человек должен принять и пережить тему Достоевского.” writes Berdyaev: 
“После Достоевского что-то радикальное меняется в человеке. Мир проходит через тьму.” 
See “O Dostoevskom”. Rech’ N. A. Berdiaeva na sobranii Rel. Fil. Akademii v Parizhe v pamiat’ 
Dostoevskogo, 1931, RGALI, Fond 1496 Opis’ 1 Ed.Khr. 95, p. 3. Ivanov wrote, in 1911: 
“Достоевский жив среди нас, потому что от него или чрез него всё, чем мы живём, - и наш 
свет, и наше подполье. […] Он сделал сложными наши душу, нашу веру, наше искусство 
[…]. Он принёс нам откровение личности.” See Viacheslav Ivanov, Rodnoe i vselenskoe 
(Moskva: Respublika, 1994), p. 283. 
24
 It may be observed that many of the thinkers and writers associated with the Silver Age were 
entirely exterior to the existential faction, but drew equally from Dostoevsky’s fiction. This 
includes Soloviev’s Slavophile reading, as well as Florovskii’s romantic reading. Florovskii 
argued against the notion of a ‘Dostoevskian renaissance’ that was prevalent among the thinkers 
associated with Russian existentialism. See Georgii Florovskii, “Khitrost’ Razuma” (1921), 
reprinted in Georgii Florovsky, Vera i kul’tura (Sankt Peterburg: RKhGI, 2002), p. 45. 
19 
 
culture. A prime example of this is Ivanova’s 1999 study, which termed this 
strand ‘Russian classical philosophy’. 25  Despite this movement of Russian 
existential thought and existential criticism having generated an extensive body 
of secondary literature during recent decades, this secondary literature has often 
been ideologically coloured by the collective search for an alternative narrative of 
Russian intellectual history to Soviet intellectual life. As such, the continuation of 
the religious philosophical thought of the Silver Age into the émigré thought and 
culture has been thoroughly explored but in complete isolation from intellectual 
developments in the ‘host cultures’ of the diaspora.  
 
The interest of an intercultural reading of this history lies above all in the fact that 
Russian and French modes and structures of discourse differed traditionally. This 
is one of the reasons that literary sources, including Dostoevsky, have often been 
overlooked or omitted from French histories of philosophy and of existentialism 
as a philosophy. The second reason is that the colossal figure of Sartre, in 
defining, terminologising and dominating the existentialist terrain, became the 
retrospective representative of a movement that overtly rejected his leadership. 
Reception history can bring these issues to light. Through the reception history of 
Dostoevsky, this study represents a counter-narrative that subverts long-standing 
assumptions regarding the relationship between the existential and existentialist 
movements in France around the early-mid 20th century, simultaneously 
reassessing relations between French and Russian branches of existential 
philosophy, through their common interest in the fiction of Dostoevsky. 
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Outline 
 
Chapter one treats the two initial decades of Dostoevsky’s reception beginning 
with an in-depth analysis of Derély’s translation of Crime and Punishment on 
account of its significance in securing Dostoevsky’s reception. Early critical 
responses are then compared and contrasted, giving particular attention to 
Eugène-Melchior de Vogüé’s seminal overview of Dostoevsky’s fiction in Le 
Roman russe. The ideas of the oriental and the irrational emerge from this 
analysis, and are explored in particular depth. Other early translations and 
adaptations are then compared in order to assess the assumptions underpinning 
them and the various ideological forces at work, before drawing conclusions as to 
the overall impact of Vogüé and his legacy in terms of Dostoevsky’s French 
reception.  
 
Chapter two centres around the figure of André Gide and his reading in the 
context of other contemporary readings, such as those of Élie Faure and André 
Suarès, from the turn of the century to the 1920s. These readings are situated 
thematically between the earlier orientalist readings and existential readings to 
come. The evolution of Gide’s reading is traced biographically on account of 
Gide’s significance in later chapters, as a proto-existentialist writer and as an 
active agent in intercultural communication between French and Russian émigré 
literary thinkers, as well as the vast body of material available pertaining to 
Gide’s personal and intellectual development. 
 
Chapter three begins with the arrival of Russian émigré thinker Lev Shestov and 
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his existential, anti-rationalist interpretation of Dostoevsky. Existential thinker 
and translator Boris de Schloezer’s subsequent re-translation of Notes from 
Underground is analysed as an ‘existential translation.’ Nicolas Berdyaev’s 
romantic existential reading is then discussed in comparison to Shestov’s. Gabriel 
Marcel’s writings on Dostoevsky, particularly a little-known essay on Dostoevsky 
and Viacheslav Ivanov, is analysed in relation to Marcel’s proximity to Russian 
émigré circles and thinkers, and in relation to Marcel’s emerging religious 
existential philosophy. Finally, chapter three examines the transcripts of the 
meetings of the Studio Franco-Russe and the broad significance of Dostoevsky’s 
fiction as a platform for Franco-Russian intercultural dialogue in Paris in the 
1920s and 30s. 
 
Chapter four presents an analysis of critical and intertextual dialogue around 
Dostoevsky’s fiction (specifically Notes from Underground and Brothers 
Karamazov) among writers associated with France’s atheist existentialist 
movements in literature and philosophy. Jean-Paul Sartre’s early fiction, 
Louis-René des Forêts’s Le Bavard, and Camus’s La Chute are compared in 
relation to the shared hypotext of Notes from Underground. The prominent place 
of Dostoevsky in Camus’s two philosophical essays is then discussed in relation 
to earlier readings by Gide and Shestov. Finally, Camus’s theatre adaptation of 
The Devils is discussed. 
 
Through the lense of the interactions of readers and writers with Dostoevsky’s 
fiction emerge new perspectives on the history of literature and criticism, of 
translation practice, of shifting French perspectives on the legitimacy of Russian 
22 
 
cultural production, and of shifting modes of literary and philosophical 
expression.       
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Chapter One: The moralist readings: Eugène-Melchior de Vogüé and the 
first translators (1880-1900) 
 
 Comme si quelque chose existait dans ce monde indépendamment de la valeur morale!  
E.-M. de Vogüé26 
 
The Fin de Siècle was a crucial period in the internationalisation and 
cosmopolitisation of literature in France. The rise of prose fiction throughout the 
nineteenth century meant that for the first time the dominant mode of literary 
expression lent itself readily to translation. Up until this point Franco-Russian 
intercultural relations had been fairly uni-directional. Cadot has analysed the 
superficial writings of French aristocratic visitors to Russia published in the 
mid-nineteenth century (which Dostoevsky had been scathingly critical of).27 
This uni-directionality changed from the 1880s, however, in part due to the 
unprecedented quality of original literature that Russia’s Golden Age had 
produced and in part due to a general wave of interest in ‘oriental’ literatures that 
typified literary tastes from the decadents through the Belle époque. This interest 
was, crucially, far more interrogative and assimilative than its superficial 
Romantic predecessor: a step away from exoticism and towards 
cosmopolitanism.28 
 
Les Russes, were by far the most successful of ‘oriental’ literatures in France 
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during this period. This cannot be dissociated from the concerted efforts of 
Eugène-Melchior de Vogüé, the French diplomat who quite literally introduced 
contemporary Russian literature to France at the pivotal period of the forging of 
the Dual Alliance. This is not to say that Russia’s developing national literature 
was entirely unknown in France prior to Vogüé’s publications: Turgenev was 
already well-established and translated due to his personal proximity to French 
literary circles, meanwhile Pushkin and Gogol had been translated by Prosper 
Mérimée, in collaboration with Turgenev.29 Dostoevsky, nonetheless, remained 
almost entirely unknown in France until the mid-1880s.30 
 
The broad cultural impact of Vogüé’s Le Roman russe was widely acknowledged 
by his contemporaries in France as well as abroad, to the extent that Charbonnel’s 
1897 exposition of the neo-mystic revival associated with French decadentism 
opens with the sentence: “En 1886, parut Le Roman russe, de M. le vicomte de 
Vogüé.” Despite this, the work has received little in-depth scholarly attention.31 
Hemmings’ (1950) still relevant study of the very earliest French reactions to 
Russian fiction gives Vogüé his rightful prominence, as does Backès’s thesis 
(1972). By far the most profound study of Vogüé and his Roman russe was 
carried out by Röhl (1976), who drew together much of the above together with 
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an array of archival resources. Certain early French translations have also 
attracted critical attention.32 However, these studies, preceding as they did the 
paradigmatic shift in translation studies of the 1980s, are invariably concerned 
with assessing quality, defined as the achievement of a permissible compromise 
between fidelity to authorial intention and readability. Since the Death of the 
Author and the work of Lefevere, emphasis has shifted to the more meaningful 
task of assessing the implications of variations between the ideological content of 
the novels and of the translations concerned. 
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Initial translations  
 
The initial translations of Dostoevsky in French have received some critical 
attention following their fierce public denunciation by a second generation of 
critics and translators (not least Gide, discussed below) during the process of 
canonisation that followed throughout the 20s and 30s. Until then, Dostoevsky 
had been received as a barbaric, oriental writer. This perceived barbarism had 
several implications for translations. Firstly, western critics and translators made 
less recognition of authorship when ‘oriental’ literature was concerned: there was 
no aesthetic mastermind for translators to be faithful to, but rather a ‘raw talent’ 
to be improved by the translator, as well as cultural anomalies to be accentuated 
or normalised at the translator’s discretion.33 International copyright laws, only 
recently introduced for translated texts, did not extend beyond Western Europe. 
This meant that oriental literatures were not only marketably fashionable but also 
considerably cheaper to publish.  
 
Crime and Punishment, the text that was principal in sealing and sustaining 
Dostoevsky’s popularity in France, appeared in Plon in 1884 (contemporaneously 
to Vogüé’s Le Roman russe discussed below) translated by Victor Derély.34 
Though fairly abridged, the translation in fact contains fewer substantial 
omissions (or additions) than the more liberal adaptations of the other works that 
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were to follow. It does, however, contain a quantity of highly significant liberal 
renderings, which serve to limit the scope for interpretation of the enigmatic 
original. Derély’s modifications influence (or indeed remove) all of the major 
mysteries that Crime and Punishment presents: the inspiration behind 
Raskolnikov’s crime, the motivation for his surrender, and Dostoevsky’s ultimate 
critique of rational materialism. For each example cited in the following analysis, 
Dostoevsky’s original features in the first column, Derély’s (1884) in the second, 
and the corresponding quotation from Chuzeville’s (1931) translation is included 
for comparison in the third column. 
 
Beginning with the principal philosophical enquiry of the novel, the theoretical 
basis for Raskolnikov’s crime, a striking modification can be observed in 
Derély’s translation: 
У меня тогда одна мысль 
выдумалась, в первый 
раз в жизни, которую 
никто и никогда еще до 
меня не выдумывал! 
Никто! Мне вдруг ясно, 
как солнце, представилось, 
что как же это ни единый 
до сих пор не посмел и не 
смеет, проходя мимо всей 
этой нелепости, взять 
просто-запросто все за 
хвост и стряхнуть к 
черту! Я... я захотел 
осмелиться и убил... я 
только осмелиться захотел, 
Соня, вот вся причина!35 
Du jour où cette vérité 
m’est apparue, claire 
comme le soleil, j’ai voulu 
oser et j’ai tué... j’ai voulu 
seulement faire acte 
d’audace Sonia, tel a été 
le mobile de mon action!36 
“Une idée alors m’est 
venue pour la première 
fois de ma vie, une idée 
que personne jusqu’à ce 
moment n’avait eue 
encore. Personne! J’ai 
compris soudain, clair 
comme le jour que 
personne n’avait encore 
osé, voyant combien tout 
est absurde, prendre tout 
simplement ce monstre 
par la queue et s’envoyer 
au diable! Moi... moi... 
j’ai voulu tenter un coup 
d’audace... et j’ai tué... je 
ne voulais que tenter le 
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coup, Sonia, voilà tout!37 
Thus, while in the original text and the 1931 translation, Raskolnikov acts in 
protestation, setting his rebellious will against the absurdity of human existence 
(“проходя мимо всей этой нелепости, взять просто-запросто все за хвост и 
стряхнуть к черту!”), the 1884 translation permitted him only to dare an act of 
“audacity”, the notion of which presupposes the existence of the very 
transcendental values that Raskolnikov’s ‘absurd’ universe does not recognise. 
The notion of absurdity is key to Raskolnikov’s experience both before and after 
his crime and to the theoretical basis for his crime. The difference between the 
two French translations with regards to the concept of the absurd corresponds 
with the broader, modernist shift in the concept of the absurd in terms of 
Begriffsgeschichte. In addition to removing the notion of an absurd universe, 
Derély’s choice of “faire acte d’audace” as a rendering of “осмелиться” does not 
concede that the ethical codes subverted are overthrown, while Dostoevsky’s 
“стряхнуть к черту” metaphor clearly does. In the same vein, Derély has chosen 
to translate “мысль”(subjective) as “vérité” (objective) and to completely remove 
Dostoevsky’s Raskolnikov’s emphatic assertions of his idea’s originality. The 
self-consciously individualistic, subjectivist aspect of the theory is thus silenced. 
Dostoevsky had presented a man killing not for a conviction of a universal truth, 
but rather in order to proudly validate his own original thought in full awareness 
precisely of its non-universality. This seems to have been either misunderstood or 
else consciously censored through Derély’s striking omissions.  
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When translating Raskolnikov’s exposition of the theoretical motivation for his 
philosophical murder (i.e. that human freedom is limited only by psychological 
weaknesses ordained by no universal ethical values) the hero’s ideas are altered 
curiously in both French translations. Dostoevsky’s Raskolnikov elucidates that 
the необыкновенный человек has the right to transgress societal codes of 
conduct; in a world with no transcendental guarantor of ethical systems, 
individual will-to-power and individual capacity is law. Both translators 
normalised this subversive content: 
Но те люди вынесли свои 
шаги, и потому они 
правы38 
Mais ces gens-là sont allés 
jusqu’au bout, et c’est ce 
qui les justifie39 
Mais ces gens-là ont 
continué dans leur voie, 
c’est ce qui les a justifiés40 
In both of the above French translations, Dostoevsky’s emphatically 
non-processional they are right (the italics are Dostoevsky’s) is reduced to a 
process of justification: the act is rendered just retrospectively by virtue of 
accomplishment. History thus functions as the transcendental justifying force, as 
opposed to the Dostoevskian representation of the individual capacity to ‘bear 
out’ the burden of the act. Two disparate conceptions are thus revealed. At one 
extremity is Dostoevsky’s protagonist’s stress on the dependence of the definition 
of the just on the will and capacity of the agent. In both translations, however, the 
far less subversive conception that the individual act is justified historically by 
virtue of accomplishment: a radically subjective relativism has been replaced by 
historical relativism. 
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Plunged by his transgressive act into a reality that he no longer has any means of 
interpreting, Raskolnikov loses all capacity to identify ‘truth’ not only in his 
theories, but in his own words and acts. Truth per se becomes problematic, 
paradoxical and out of reach for Raskolnikov in the world his act has brought into 
being. This is best expressed in his confession to Sonia, throughout which he 
constantly repeats and contradicts himself, both characters finding themselves 
face to face with what would come to be termed the Absurd. Again, the 
translators significantly alter Raskolnikov’s experience: 
- Ох, это не то, не то, в 
тоске восклицала Соня, - 
и разве можно так... нет, 
это не так, не так! 
- Сама видишь, что не 
так!.. А я ведь искренно 
рассказал, правду! 
 
- Да какая ж это правда! 
О господи! – Да какая ж 
это правда! О господи! 
- Я ведь только вошь убил, 
Соня [...] 
- Это человек-то вошь! 
 
- Да ведь и я знаю, что не 
вошь [...] А впрочем, я 
вру, Соня, [...] давно уже 
вру... Это все не то; ты 
справедливо говоришь. 
Совсем, совсем, совсем 
тут другие причины!..41 
 
-Est-ce que c’est 
possible?... Non, il y a 
autre chose! 
 
- Tu juges toi-même qu’il y 
a autre chose! Pourtant je 
t’ai dit la vérité!” 
 
- La vérité! Oh! seigneur!  
 
 
-Après tout, Sonia, je n’ai 
tué qu’une vermine [...] 
- Cette vermine était une 
créature humaine! 
- Eh, je sais bien que ce 
n’était pas une vermine 
dans le sens littéral du 
mot [...] du reste, ce que je 
dis n’a pas le sens 
commun [...] tu as raison, 
Sonia, ce n’est pas cela.42  
 
-Non, ce n’est pas cela, ce 
n’est pas cela! 
 
 
-Tu dis toi-même que ce 
n’est pas cela! Pourtant je 
t’ai sincèrement raconté 
tout, c’est la vérité. 
-Et quelle vérité! Ô! 
Seigneur!  
 
-Après tout je n’ai tué 
qu’un pou [...]. 
-Ce pou était un être 
humain. 
-Et je sais bien que ce 
n’était pas un vrai pou (...) 
D’ailleurs, je mens, Sonia 
(...) Ce n’est pas encore 
cela. Tu as raison.43 
 
Derély’s rendering reveals fascinating differences between his and Dostoevsky’s 
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notions of truth. Raskolnikov and Sonia’s repetitions of “это не то; все не тo” 
(that’s not it/this is all wrong) are rendered by Derély as “il y a autre chose”. The 
problem appears to Derély that the entirety of the truth has not yet been unveiled, 
whereas in Dostoevsky’s text, a multitude of conflicting interpretations battle 
hopelessly for supremacy where no yardstick remains by which to measure 
them.44 Consequently, where Dostoevsky’s Raskolnikov finds that each of his 
attempted interpretations is a “lie”, the C19th translation has him question the 
“common sense” of his judgments. Derély thus rejects that in Dostoevsky’s 
fictional world common sense is (emphatically) non-equivalent to truth. A second 
manifestation of this difference may be noted in Dostoevsky’s Raskolnikov’s 
admission that Sonia has “spoken justly”, rendered in both French translations via 
avoir raison. Herein lies a linguistic disparity between the russophone and 
francophone conceptualisations of ‘being right’: the former by reference to the 
prav-seme (justice/truth/right); the latter by reference to reason.  
 
Accordingly, when Raskolnikov directly draws Sonia’s attention to the absurdity 
of the equally possible and dubitable reality, the 1884 translation simply removes 
the sentence, replacing it with a repetition of “tu as raison”:  
И это точь-в-точь так и 
было! Тебе смешно? Да, 
Соня, тут всего смешнее 
то, что, может, именно 
оно так и было...45 
Tu trouves ça risible? Tu a 
raison, Sonya.46 
Cela te semble drôle? Oui, 
Sonia, le plus drôle est que 
peut-être cela s’est passé 
exactement ainsi.47  
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Thus where Dostoevsky’s text expresses the impossibility for judgment, the early 
French translation simply imposes judgment. Where Dostoevsky’s Raskolnikov’s 
confession is littered with self-interruptions (“Нет, это не так! Я опять не так 
рассказываю!”48) Derély simply removes them, along with the repetitions and 
stammerings of the protagonist.49 The fact that Raskolnikov himself is at a loss 
to interpret his own absurd reality, even his own actions, finding no stable means 
by which to judge them, has also been removed by Derély’s translation. 
 
In the same vein, the translator’s treatment of Raskolnikov’s final police-station 
confession is also telling. The unanswerable question of Crime and Punishment 
remains that as to Raskolnikov’s genuine principal murder motive, problematised 
through Dostoevsky’s ambiguous representation of the relation between 
Raskolnikov’s economic hardship, his ‘humanitarian’ ambitions, and finally his 
aristocratistic theoretical impetus to transgress. Raskolnikov’s confession, in 
Dostoevsky’s version, had syntactically emphasized the disconnectedness of 
these motives. Derély’s protagonist opts instead to close the question in favour of 
the least unsettling conclusion: a causality between economic necessity and 
transgression. 
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Это я убил тогда 
старуху-чиновницу и 
C’est moi qui ai assassiné à 
coups de hache, pour les 
C’est moi qui ai assassiné 
à coups de hache la vieille 
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Syntactically, Derély’s parenthetical clause functions in diametric opposition to 
Dostoevsky’s. In the original, it serves to emphasise the unconnectedness of the 
two acts and motives, as accurately translated by Chuzeville. Derély, contrarily, 
introduces a parenthetical excuse incongruous to Raskolnikov’s own, theoretical 
interpretation of his crime in the original, as he had stated explicitly: “я только 
осмелиться захотел, Соня, вот вся причина!”53  
 
Thus, in Derély’s version, Raskolnikov’s murder-motives have been clarified, his 
theory simplified, and his paradoxical, proto-absurdist experience reduced to a 
more familiar monistic system. However, Derély’s greatest liberty concerns 
Raskolnikov’s confession, and with it, the enduring mystery of Dostoevsky’s 
novel. In the original, Raskolnikov clings, even in the epilogue, to the conviction 
that if he had been strong enough to bear the burden of his act no higher judge 
would stand above him. Raskolnikov expresses a distinct lack of guilt during his 
so-called confession, which is radically transformed by both French translators:  
Ну... ну, вот и все... Ну, 
разумеется, что я убил 
старуху, - это я худо 
сделал... ну, и довольно!54 
Eh, bien, voilà tout... 
Naturellement j’ai eu tort 
de tuer la veille... allons, 
assez.55 
Eh, bien, voilà tout... 
Naturellement j’ai eu tort de 
tuer la veille... Allons, en 
voilà assez!56 
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сестру ее Лизавету 
топором, и ограбил.50 
voler, la vieille prêteuse 
sur gages et la sœur 
Elisabeth.51 
prêteuse sur gages, et sa 
sœur Elisabeth, et qui les 
ai volées.52 
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Raskolnikov, in the French, admits the natural quality of the wrongness of his act, 
i.e. admits that his act breached an indubitable, ‘natural’ ethical code. This is the 
direct opposite of the Russian phrase, in which it is not the ‘wrongness’ that 
seems self-evident to Raskolnikov, but rather the decision to kill. Furthermore, 
razumeetsja implies not the naturalness (estestvennost’) of the act, which would 
connote an innate system of natural values governing human action, but rather the 
role of reason (razum) that provoked the crime. Meanwhile, ‘ja khudo sdelal’ jars 
in the context of a would-be confession as might ‘I messed up’ in coloquial 
English. 
 
Raskolnikov’s eventual capitulation is also stripped of its amoralistic and 
anti-humanistic dimensions. When Sonia, in the original, poses the question: ‘but 
how will you live without man,’ the meaning is not merely without ‘other men’ in 
a practical sense, but rather, beyond the conception of man that his idea and its 
enactment have shattered: how to live in a world in which human life has been 
stripped of any absolute value. This aspect both translators have missed:  
Ну как же, как же без 
человека-то прожить!57 
Eh bien, comment rester 
dehors de la société 
humaine?58  
Et comment vivre en 
dehors de toute présence 
humaine?59 
In a final dream, Dostoevsky represents Raskolnikov’s ideology as a plague 
sweeping Europe, allegorically depicting the author’s conviction of the 
impossibility of moral truth independent of Christianity, and a consequent 
impossibility of ethical human coexistence in an individualistic, atheist world. 
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Either the early translators’ miscomprehension of the argument or else (equally 
conceivably) a distaste for the dream device of authorial quasi-supernatural 
didactic intervention in an otherwise refreshingly ambiguous novel, is revealed in 
the following startling translations: 
Не знали, кого и как судить, 
не могли согласиться, что 
считать злом, что добром. 
Не знали, кого обвинять, 
кого оправдывать.
60
 
On ne pouvait s’entendre sur 
le bien et sur le mal61 
Chacun croyait posséder 
seul la vérité et discerner ce 
qui était le bien ou le mal.62 
In the first translation, and to only a slightly lesser degree in the second, the loss 
of moral truth, and the impossibility of the humanist project to construct society 
from man up rather than from God down – clearly the essential problem 
Dostoevsky had wished to depict with Crime and Punishment – has been reduced 
to a general difficulty in agreeing on ethical questions. 
 
This analysis of Derély’s alterations to – and corresponding interpretation of – 
Dostoevsky’s text has been far from exhaustive. Further examples could have 
been provided to show a general neutralisation of the contradictions and 
paradoxes, in which the original is so rich, and a drastic reduction in the agency 
of characters, resulting in a loss of polyphonic poetics. However, analysis has 
been limited to the task of tracing changing interpretations of the philosophical 
ideas expressed in Dostoevsky’s works rather than to assess the reception of his 
aesthetics. Clearly, Derély’s 1884 version of Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment, 
the only version available in French for almost half a century, represented on this 
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plain a drastic simplification. Raskolnikov’s individualistic and amoralistic 
conception of human reality is neutralised, and the philosophical prerogative of 
his crime has ceded to the more consoling and ostensibly logical hunger motive.  
 
This comparison highlights that what later commentators will term Raskolnikov’s 
experience of the Absurd, and his struggle with a multiplicity of subjectivist 
truths and interpretations, have been appropriated by the C19th translation to an 
incomplete or obscured vision of a monistic conception of empirical truth. 
Furthermore, Dostoevsky’s ultimate attack on the humanist notion of man and his 
capacity to rationally construct a moral world independent of religion is reduced 
to an expression of the difficulty of the endeavor. As to whether Derély made 
these modifications consciously or unconsciously, conjecture would be futile. In 
any case, the vast majority of French readers would have little choice but to 
accept this interpretation for decades to come.63 
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Initial Criticism 
 
Derély was not the only interpreter to stress the economic motive of 
Raskolnikov’s crime and diminish the act’s philosophical dimension. Avède 
Barine’s 1884 article went to equally great lengths to normalise Raskolnikov’s 
crime. Quoting (in her own translation) the passage from Raskolnikov’s 
confession to Sonia concerning his poverty, Barine saw fit to entirely omit the 
three crucial lines in which Raskolnikov confesses to refusing food out of spite. 
Barine has been obliged to censor these lines in order to preserve her thesis - 
namely that Raskolnikov and his compatriots are innocent victims of a gulf 
between received enlightened European ideologies and contemporary Russian 
social reality (understood by Barine as poverty, despotism and injustice).64 
Barine has had to turn a blind eye to the fact that Raskolnikov’s poverty was 
self-inflicted, that he did not rob his victim effectively nor, in any case, make any 
use of the spoils. The difficulty lies in the fact that Dostoevsky’s protagonist’s 
rebellion extends to the point of undermining even to his own pragmatic needs. 
This presented a challenge to the positivist culture of the French critic of 1880s 
France. Dostovsky’s rebelious philosophers have rather, according to Barine, 
been driven mad: “à force de retourner ces idées [those of the French and German 
Enlightenment], l’estomac vide et la tête chaude”.65 Barine thus, by slight of 
hand, transforms Crime and Punishment into a critique of Tsarist Russia’s failure 
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to live up to rationalist western ideologies as opposed to the critique of these very 
ideologies’ incapacity to account for the experience of individual reality that 
Dostoevsky makes so explicit throughout his writings. Barine attempts to 
reassure her reader that Raskolnikov “pensait moins au crime et plus à ses 
conséquences bienfaisantes,”66 a notion that the protagonist himself rejects in his 
confession and that his consequent actions refute. This motive is, furthermore, 
given only minimal attention in Dostoevsky’s exploration of the killer’s mind, 
while the details of the act itself and its theoretical justification are explored 
down to the minute detail.  
 
True to the positivist tradition, Raskolnikov’s rebellion is reduced to a result of 
his social condition, and its non-conformity to the more ‘developed’ western 
ideologies he had read:  
s’épuiser le cerveau à chercher des conciliations impossibles entre les 
exigences d’une imagination du XIXe siècle, nourrie de théories socialistes et 
humanitaires, et la condition de sujet de l’empereur Nicolas.67  
Madness, particularly a nineteenth-century French conception of madness, 
becomes crucial to such a reduction of Dostoevsky’s fiction: Raskolnikov having 
perdu la raison, hatches an insane solution to his economic situation. However, 
as observed in relation to the dream of the plague, and as Dostoevsky endlessly 
underlined, the nihilist’s madness is his atheistic positivism: Raskolnikov’s act 
was necessitated by his reason. To escape such a conclusion, Barine once again 
carefully misquotes Raskolnikov, having him ‘confess’ to his madness – an 
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alteration which few could verify, Derély’s translation having taken a similar 
liberty: 
Original: 
- это не то! А лучше... 
предположи (да! Этак 
действительно лучше!), 
предположи, что я 
самолюбив, завистлив, зол, 
мерзок, мстителен, ну... и, 
пожалуй, еще наклонен к 
сумасшествию. (Уж пусть 
все зараз! Про 
сумасшествие-то 
говорили и прежде, я 
заметил!)68 
Derély: 
ce n’est pas cela! Figure-toi 
plutôt que je suis rempli 
d’amour-propre, envieux, 
méchant, vindicatif et, de 
plus, enclin à la folie. 
69
 [remainder omitted by 
Derély.] 
 
Barine:  
il n’avait déjà plus en ce 
moment l’esprit tout à fait 
sain: “j’avais des 
dispositions à la folie.”, 
dit-il dans sa confession.70 
Thus, in the hands of both the translator and the critic, one of the numerous 
interpretations, with which Raskolnikov quite literally toys linguistically, melding 
with the perspective of the onlooker through the third person plural, is 
transformed into a genuine ‘confession’ of his own insanity. The far more crucial 
idea, explicit from Raskolnikov’s final dream - that this insanity is the positivist 
ideology dominating European thought - was either lost on both commentators. 
Perhaps it was deemed too blasphemous to retransmit. Raskolnikov, along with 
his nation, is reduced to an imbecile, and as such the representative of Russia and 
“la plainte d’un peuple malade, qui se sent devenir fou”,71 broken by its state’s 
failure to live up to enlightened ideals. It is not within the scope of this study to 
assess any possible socio-political validity of such a reading, but rather to 
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highlight the reduction it implies of Dostoevsky’s exploration of the human 
condition to a commentary on Russian social reality. 
 
Two tendencies in Barine’s article, namely a demarche in search of an image of 
Russian life and a conclusion of Russian collective insanity, were highly typical 
of the early responses to Dostoevsky by the French in the 1870s and 1880s. As 
for the notion that the philosophical insights expressed through Dostoevsky’s 
various ‘fous’ might be of value, there was no question:  
Dostoïevski est souvent prolixe et diffus; en vrai réaliste, il ne nous fait grâce 
de rien, pas même des bavardages des sots et des déviations des fous. Il 
dédaigne trop l’art de la composition. Il est quelque fois ennuyeux.72  
Philosophical ideas, particularly in the mouths of lunatics, have no place in the 
novel: they are simply seen as diversions from the narrative.  
 
Courrière’s 1875 monograph on Russian literature had taken the same line in her 
section on Crime et châtiment and Les mauvais esprits (her telling rendering of 
‘Besy’). ‘Cauchemar’, ‘rêve affreux’, ‘délire’: this is the world we are plunged 
into by Dostoevsky, and this is automatically equated to a symptom of 
socio-political nihilism rather than contemplation of the human condition.73 The 
Idiot, A Weak Heart, and Dostoevsky’s various explorations of other brinks of 
human consciousness, are not mentioned:  
Tous les héros du romancier sont fous, malades ou épileptiques...Tous les 
types qui vont passer sous nos yeux ont chacun leur maladie, quelque chose 
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dans le cerveau de brisé ou de détraqué. Tous sont gâtés par cette gangrène 
dont nous avons vu se produire les effets chez Raskolnikof.74  
As observed of Barine’s reading, Courrière’s conclusion concerning Crime and 
Punishment, as well as The Devils is unequivocally socio-political. Courrière has 
identified in Dostoevsky only an attack on political nihilism, concluding with 
great emotion, that while this disease is present elsewhere, in Russia the nihilists 
do not look for economic and social equality like the socialists of the west, but 
for the equality of reduction to ignorance, nothingness and vice.75  
 
 
E.-M. de Vogüé and Le Roman russe 
 
Viscount Eugène-Melchior de Vogüé, the undisputed herald of the Russian novel 
in C19th France, was the figure that most influenced the French conception of 
Dostoevsky’s thought from the 1880s to the end of the century. His diplomatic 
career had brought him in 1877 from Constantinople to St. Petersburg where he 
would remain for almost six years, marry and integrate into a noble family, 
master the Russian language, and set about devouring the wealth of new literature 
that surrounded him. A frequent guest at the literary salon of the Countess S. A. 
Tolstaya, the viscount also had ample opportunity to causer with many important 
authors and thinkers of the era, including Dostoevsky himself. 76  On his 
resignation from diplomatic service, Vogüé returned to Paris and played the key 
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role in the introduction of the most part of Dostoevsky’s oeuvre in France. 
However, Vogüé’s own ideological interests greatly shaped his presentation of the 
thought of the Russian novelist, not to mention Vogüé’s representation of Russian 
culture in general. His five articles on Turgenev, Pushkin, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky 
and Gogol for the Revue des Deux Mondes between 1883 and 1885, compiled 
into the phenomenally successful Roman russe in 1886, would not only seal 
Vogüé’s own literary destiny (resulting in his election to the Academy in 1888) 
but also that of Russian literature in France for a quarter of a century to follow.77  
 
It would be an error to approach Vogüé’s study as a straightforward work of 
literary criticism. Textual analysis was not its objective, even if on this level it 
constitutes a formidable achievement for its time. In order to appreciate its place 
in the intellectual history of France, Le Roman russe must be considered in the 
context of a broader movement of literary cosmopolitisation, alongside, for 
example, Taine’s study of English literature and Staël’s En Allemagne. All three 
advocated alternative perspectives on the barbaric literary creations of Northern 
Europe, in opposition to ever-enduring Latinist-protectionist factions at the peak 
of the age of European nationalisms. As Vogüé said in his preface to Le Roman 
russe:  
Il se crée, de nos jours, au-dessus des préférences de coterie et de nationalité, 
un esprit européen, un fonds de culture, d’idées et d’inclinations communes à 
toute la société intelligente.78  
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Le Roman russe must also be viewed as the strategic work of a patriotic diplomat 
in the wake of 1870 and the shadow of Prussian expansion. The Franco-Russian 
alliance was the ambitious political project of the day and part of this project was 
the establishment of two-way intercultural dialog. Numerous other works of the 
period shared this goal – some more overtly anti-Prussian than others.79 As to 
their role in the eventual realisation of the Dual Entente in 1894, this thesis 
refrains from qualifying. However, the desire in Vogüé’s case to present Russia as 
an enigmatic, vibrant and alien culture, from which France might draw in order to 
fortify its literature, cannot be separated from the desire to introduce a morally 
sound cultural and political ally. This dual objective shaped the image of Russian 
literature that Vogüé projected in Le Roman russe. 
 
The former of the two objectives takes precedence. Vogüé was first and foremost 
a Christian moralist homme de lettres and had a clear aesthetic agenda: to oppose, 
on the one hand, the lingering vestiges of a morally demotivating romanticism 
and to undermind, on the other hand, the despotic rule of a cold, cynical and 
predominantly atheistic naturalist school. In their place, he proposed a more 
sentimentally charged, morally instructive realism: narratives that pity their 
victims, while remaining ultimately subservient to reason, measure, and bon ton. 
It thus becomes clear why a vast section of Dostoevsky’s fictional output would 
not meet Vogüé’s requirements. 
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Before broaching Vogüé’s treatment of Dostoevsky’s work, a few words must be 
spared to his general approach to Russian culture. The startling otherness with 
which Vogüé’s writings present the mind of the Russian at first glance may seem 
to jar with his cosmopolitanist project:  
En vérité, le désespoir me prend quand j’essaye de faire comprendre ce 
monde au nôtre, c’est-à-dire de relier par les idées communes des cerveaux 
hantés d’images si différentes pétris par des mains si diverses.80  
His task was not to bring Russia and its cultural production closer to France, but 
to rouse curiosity in a radically different literature. From the beginnings of his 
diplomatic and literary career, Vogüé would fall into the vague category of the 
professional orientalist. His exoticising travel writing on Syria, Palestine and 
Egypt reveal a nostalgia for the predominant place of religion in what he broadly 
perceived as oriental society. Russia, he saw as a synthesis between this oriental 
religiosity and Christian values. Russia’s otherness is constantly raised by 
Vogüé’s work, but this otherness has a specific value. In his obituary of Soloviev, 
he writes: “L’homme est un animal étrange. L’homme russe en est de doublement 
étrange.”81 The implication is thus that Russians possess an excess of a strange 
“humanity,” an idea inherited from the Slavophiles. The predominantly 
Slavophile circles Vogüé moved in, particularly the salon of the Countess S. A. 
Tolstaya (widow of Alexei Tolstoy), further reinforced his notion of Russia as a 
‘bridge’ between Europe and a mythically loosely defined Orient.82 
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Vogüé’s Le Roman russe consequently begins with the curious theory that the 
roots of Russia’s otherness are to be found in India. Summarising theories of 
Slavophile origin, Vogüé informs his readers that the inherent nihilism in the Slav 
comes from the same roots as the nirvana of “les pères hindous”:  
Si l’on veut bien connaître la Russie, il faut se remémorer tout ce que l’on a 
appris de l’Inde ancienne.83  
This theory he supports with allusions to connections between Russian and 
Sanskrit and even the statement that the future of Russia may be divined from the 
history of India.84 The term nihilism, which Vogüé melds with a vague notion of 
asceticism and complacency, is even supposed to have been coined as a 
translation of ‘Nirvana’.85 These connections, appearing as they did at the 
beginning of the work, had the aim of presenting an ancient, deeply rooted and 
radically different cultural and intellectual tradition: the alternative to 
Greco-Roman antiquity that the imagination of an emerging Belle Epoch 
generation craved. The successful synthesis, however, for Vogüé is not in 
Dostoevsky but in Tolstoy: “on dirait l’esprit d’un chimiste anglais dans l’âme 
d’un bouddhiste hindou; se charge qui pourra d’expliquer cet étrange 
accouplement: celui qui y parviendra expliquera toute la Russie.”86 
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Vogüé’s confused notions of ‘Buddhist’ abnegation, Orthodoxy, political nihilism, 
and vibrant aesthetic barbarity set the tone for the entrance of Vogüé’s 
Dostoevsky, whom he presents as the literary equivalent to St. Basil’s Cathedral: 
“cette monstrueuse cathédrale de Saint-Basile, découpée et peinte comme une 
pagode chinoise, bâtie par des architectes tartares, et qui abrite pourtant le Dieu 
chrétien.”87  A condescension toward conglomerated oriental ‘barbarisms’ is 
evident, and a typically homogenised notion of the Orient emerges from Vogüé’s 
comparison of Russian, Chinese and Tartar architecture, as it was in the 
connecting of Hindu, Islamic and Orthodox abnegation and asceticism.88 In 
Vogüé’s study of Dostoevsky in Le Roman russe, this exoticising and othering 
has an aim beyond attention grabbing. It serves as the device by which Vogüé 
discounts all of Dostoevsky’s mature output as formless fanatical fantasy and, as 
such, suppresses the subversive themes therein addressed, focusing rather on his 
early fiction, which corresponded less problematically to Vogüé’s own cultural 
agenda.89 
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Vogüé clearly used Dostoevsky to uphold his own aesthetic and moral doctrines. 
The superior works he identified as Poor Folk, Memoirs from the House of the 
Dead, and above all Crime and Punishment. In Dostoevsky’s first novel, Vogüé 
declares his art of characterisation and prose fully-developed.90 Vogüé identified 
in it the sentimentality he searched, combined with a conservative fidelity to 
realism. Humiliated and Offended he defends from the criticism it had received, 
though it lacked, for Vogüé, the simplicity and clarity of the Poor Folk, and the 
psychology of its characters, commenting that he cannot understand that one 
could prefer a desperate romantic liaison to a rational, mutually beneficial one.91 
Clearly this is not a critic who appreciated the twisted romantic intrigues of 
Dostoevsky’s mature fiction. 
 
The Memoires from the House of the Dead received Vogüé’s firm stamp of 
approval, and he includes an original translation of a large extract.92 Tellingly, he 
identifies the most successful of the stories therein contained as the two ‘crimes 
of love’, Akulina and Bakluchin, whilst “pour d’autres, le philosophe ne 
s’inquiète pas de fouiller dans leur passé.”93 The implication is that Dostoevsky’s 
‘philosophical’ interference with the narrative is unwelcome; as is confirmed by 
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the collocation “digressions philosophiques” testifying to a conception of fiction 
that cannot integrally comprise philosophical reflection.94 
 
Crime and Punishment he also received with enthusiasm, however, his reading 
was striking in its reductiveness. The rubric of “La religion de la souffrance” that 
Vogüé lends to the chapter is the aspect that he accentuates, focusing his reading 
on the figure of Sonia and Raskolnikov’s prostration before her as an image of 
human suffering. Vogüé’s reading is, however, remarkably astute for his time in 
recognising the subversive fact that Raskolnikov’s confession is motivated not by 
remorse but by a need for reconciliation with humanity via the figure of Sonia.95 
However, on Raskolnikov’s fate, Vogüé enforces a causality that Dostoevsky took 
pains to avoid. For Vogüé, the act of killing robs Raskolnikov of his “capacité de 
sentir et de raisonner comme les autres, de trouver sa place stable dans la vie”.96 
However, it was not “le fait irréparable d’avoir supprimé une existence humaine” 
that transformed Raskolnikov: his psychological and ontological insecurity 
preceded the crime, and indeed the time frame of the narrative.97 It was not an 
incapacity to reason that Dostoevsky embodied in Raskolnikov, but rather a 
capacity to rationalise to the extremity, as would also be the case with the 
underground man and Ivan Karamazov: Dostoevsky’s rebellious heroes each 
embody an emphatically unsuccessful attempt to synthesise abstract reason and 
existence. 
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Vogüé recognises the fantastic element of Dostoevsky’s realism as a challenge 
(“duel”98) to the reason of the reader but expresses this if not as a negative aspect 
of his fiction, at least as one that will alienate it from the contemporary French 
novel-reading public: “mais le lecteur des romans n’est pas tenu d’être 
philosophe… En France, au moins, nous ne prendrons jamais notre parti de ce 
spectacle”. 99  Certainly, there is a facetious aspect to Vogüé’s statement; a 
challenge to the readership accustomed to effortless reading and as such to 
superficial fiction. However, at Humiliated and Offended and Crime and 
Punishment, Vogüé draws the line: 
Avec ce livre [Crime et châtiment], le talent avait fini de monter. Il donnera 
encore de grands coups d’aile, mais en tournant dans un cercle de brouillards, 
dans un ciel toujours plus trouble, comme une immense chauve-souris au 
crépuscule. Dans l’Idiot, dans les Possédés, et surtout dans les Frères 
Karamazof, les longueurs sont intolérables, l’action n’est plus qu’une 
broderie complaisante qui se prête à toutes les théories de l’auteur, et où il 
dessine tous les types rencontrés par lui ou imaginés dans l’enfer de sa 
fantaisie.100  
Vogüé clearly saw the intrusion of philosophy in fiction as a lack of bon ton. The 
Notes from Underground, unsurprisingly, receive no mention throughout. Thus 
from the point that Dostoevsky severed himself from sentimental moralist fiction 
and launches his attack on humanist ethics, Vogüé turns away. The Devils is 
described as “confus, mal bâti, ridicule souvent et encombré de théories 
apocalyptiques,” and granted the only possible “value” of providing an accurate 
depiction of the nihilist movement.101 The radical individualism and resultant 
philosophical suicide of Kirilov is correspondingly reduced to conform to 
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Vogüé’s moral system:  
[L]es pessimistes logiques, comme l’ingénieur Kirilof, ceux qui se tuent par 
impuissance morale de vivre, et dont la partie exploite la complaisance; 
l’homme sans principes, décidé à mourir parce qu’il ne peut pas trouver de 
principes”102  
Kirilov’s redefinition of man and the limits of human freedom are thus neatly 
swept under the carpet. In general, the intervention of philosophical ideas in 
Dostoevsky’s novels perturbed and inconvenienced Vogüé: “le lecteur des romans 
n’est pas tenu d’être philosophe… En France, au moins, nous ne prendrons 
jamais notre parti de ce spectacle.”103 
 
The sentimentalist critic likewise disowns the Brothers Karamazov on account of 
its “digressions sans excuses,” permitting only the beauty of certain touching 
“scènes digne” such as “celle de la mort de l’enfant.”104 As with Crime and 
Punishment, the disturbing philosophical core of the novel has been removed; the 
morally consoling epilogue retained. This dismissal Vogüé justifies with the 
argument that: “De l’aveu commun, très peu de Russes ont eu le courage de lire 
jusqu’au bout cette interminable histoire”.105 It seems possible that Vogüé here 
thinly masks a personal confession. However, whether Vogüé did or did not read 
the Brothers Karamazov in full, his recommendation to France to abstain from 
doing so would have a serious impact on the translation (adaptation) and 
publication of the work in French. Henri Troyat indeed cites a letter from Vogüé 
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to Plon, dated 30 Oct 1884 beseeching not to publish the Brothers Karamazov in 
French:  
[C]’est le plus faible, le plus lourd et le plus long des romans de 
Dostoïevsky; peu de Russes en soutiennent la lecture, il rebuterait à coup sûr 
le goût français. Je ne saurais assez vous conseiller, si vous êtes en mesure de 
le faire, d’entreprendre de préférence la publication des Souvenirs de la 
Maison des Morts. Il y a là une peinture éloquente de la vie des condamnés 
en Sibérie, qui intéresserait notre public plus encore, peut-être, que les 
œuvres de pure imagination du romancier russe.106 
In his preface to the 1886 translation of Souvenirs de la Maison des Morts, Vogüé 
gives a clear indication of his reasoning for this and of his role as critic in 
general:  
C’est si rare et si bon de recommander un livre où l’on est certain que pas 
une ligne ne peut blesser une âme, que pas un mot ne risque d’éveiller une 
passion douteuse; un livre que chacun fermera avec une idée meilleure de 
l’humanité, avec un peu moins de sécheresse pour les misères d’autrui, un 
peu plus de courage contre ses propres misères.107  
It is perhaps clear, in light of this desire to provide positive and unambiguous 
moral instruction to the readership, why Vogüé swept such works as Notes from 
Underground under the proverbial carpet.  
 
In Le Roman russe, The Idiot is likewise altered to fit Vogüé’s moral system. 
Dostoevsky had no doubt presented his Christ-inspired protagonist as a light 
shining into the darkness, but (emphatically) the darkness did not understand it. 
Vogüé, however, imposes an optimistic, socially and morally constructive vision 
of Myshkin’s presence in society: “ils subissent son influence et deviennent 
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meilleurs.”108 It is difficult to imagine how such a conclusion could genuinely be 
construed from Rogozhin’s murderous jealousy, Nastasia’s demise and Aglaya’s 
fall from innocence: the influence of the idiot on those around him was rather an 
acute and entirely destructive awareness of the inescapability of personal vice.  
 
Vogüé’s desperate attempts to bring Dostoevsky’s works round to a coherent 
morally instructive doctrine, even permitting the removal of the most part of his 
mature output, thus fall tragically short. With the declaration: “comme si quelque 
chose existait dans ce monde indépendamment de la valeur morale!”109 he 
concludes of Raskolnikov’s crime that “[c]erte, l’intention de Dostoïevski n’est 
pas douteuse, il espère détourner de pareilles actions”110 expressing, nonetheless, 
his personal misgivings as to the genuine utility of such literature.  
 
Vogüé’s final verdict on Dostoevsky reveals his lack of understanding of the 
latter’s anti-rationalist stance: “il avait jeté son cœur à la foule, ce qui est bien, 
mais sans le faire précéder de la sévère et nécessaire compagne du cœur, la 
raison.”111 The force of Dostoevsky’s fiction may resemble genius at first glace, 
“mais on se souvient vite que le génie n’existe pas dans les lettres sans deux dons 
supérieurs; la mesure et l’universalité.”112 Literature that expresses the subjective 
experience of the individual in the face of individual existence, is thus firstly 
deemed of no social utility, and secondly fails to achieve the supreme goal of art; 
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namely to represent reality in its stable, objective entirety.113 Thus as Voltaire had 
once presented and rejected Shakespearian drama to France, Vogüé would now 
turn from a barbarous Dostoevskian anti-rationalism, to the synthesis he had in 
mind from the outset: the sentimental realist par excellence and the aboutissement 
of Le Roman russe: Lev Tolstoy, bidding farewell to Dostoevsky with a dignified 
bow and a mildly ironic: “ce n’est pas devant toi que je m’incline, mais devant 
toute la souffrance de l’humanité.”114 
 
It was ultimately in Tolstoy, and not in Dostoevsky, that Vogüé found his 
preferred antidote to the excesses of contemporary French realism. The 
naturalism of Zola’s generation he found unbearable, and Le Roman russe is 
clearly an expression of this. More directly, in a review of Zola’s La Débacle, 
Vogüé writes: “en achevant La Débâcle, ayant souffert par cette lecture dans mes 
plus tristes souvenirs, j’ai pris instinctivement un volume de Guerre et Paix.”115 
The article goes on to compare Zola to the Dead Sea and Tolstoy to the Jordan.116 
   
Behind Vogüé’s dismissive and slightly condescending regard for Dostoevsky is 
also an element of lingering resentment from a personal encounter. A diary entry 
from between 17 - 19 January reads:  
Discussion avec Dostoïevski. Curieux type d’obstiné russe, se croyant plus 
profond que toute l’Europe parce qu’il est plus trouble. Composé de 
Medviédev et d’ioj. Infatuation qui permet de mesurer à quelles extrémités se 
portera l’esprit slave dans son prochain grand mouvement sur lui-même. 
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“Nous avons le génie de tous les peuples et en plus le génie russe, dit 
Dostoïevski, donc nous pouvons vous comprendre et vous ne pouvez pas 
nous comprendre.”117  
Vogüé’s personal correspondence also indicated a lack of desire to reread 
Dostoevsky’s works when required to provide a preface for a publication: “il me 
faut remordre sans grand appétit un Dostoïevsky.”118 
 
The preface in question is that to L’Idiot, translated by Derély for Plon in 1887. 
Vogüé discusses therein the turbulent reception Dostoevsky has had in France, 
chastising the extremities of hostility and of fanaticism that have typified it.119 
He then disuades the littré from reading the novel on account of its lack of unity 
and form, but reccommends it to psychologists and philosophers.120 This reveals 
the telling distinction that would, in the next periods of reception, be broken 
down. Vogüé was aware of this breaking-down and found in Dostoevsky’s Idiot 
an innovation in this direction:  
[…] un roman qui fait penser autant qu’un traité de philosophie, et travailler 
l’esprit autant qu’un texte hiéroglyphique! Notre éducation littéraire nous a 
enseigné le respect des genres, et nous ne souffrons pas qu’on les mêle.121 
Röhl has convincingly demonstrated that Le Roman russe is underpinned 
essentially by a conflict between materialism and spiritualism. 122  Röhl 
consequently read the whole of Vogüé’s oeuvre as a search for a synthesis 
between the material and the spiritual; science and faith; the rational and the 
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mystic.123 Rather than a synthesis, it may be more accurate to say that Vogüé 
desired scientific fact to accommodate faith. In an elucidating article commenting 
on the construction of the Eiffel Tower, Vogüé addressed the iconic structure: 
Et toi, fille de savoir, courbe ton orgueil. Ta science est belle, et nécessaire, et 
invincible; mais c’est peu d’éclairer l’esprit, si l’on ne guérit pas l’éternelle 
plaie du cœur. Ton aînée donnait aux hommes ce dont ils ont besoin, la 
charité et l’espérance. Si tu aspires à lui succéder, sache fonder le temple de 
la nouvelle alliance, l’accord de la science et de la foi. Fais jaillir l’âme 
obscure qui s’agite dans tes flancs, l’âme que nous cherchons pour toi dans 
ce monde nouveau. Tu le possèdes par l’intelligence; tu ne régneras vraiment 
sur lui que le jour où tu rendras aux malheureux ce qu’ils trouvaient là-bas, 
une immense compassion et un espoir divin.124 
This thesis, underpinning Vogüé’s preface to Le Roman russe and his opposition 
to naturalism, seems to have been what eventually secured his place in the 
Académie:  
On continue de me dire que ma préface a eu une grande pénétration. J’ai reçu 
un mot de Thureau-Dangin, me disant que j’avais écrit un manifeste et une 
prophétie, et bien de compliments dans une autre lettre d’A. Duruy. Le vieux 
peintre Lamy, que j’ai rencontré, m’assure que tous ses amis de l’Académie 
parlaient de moi et se disposaient à me donner leurs voix.125 
However, it seems to have been above all his cosmopolitanist stance on 
intercultural politics that the Académie was warming to: Vogüé succeeded 
classisist and cultural protectionist Jean Marie Napoléon-Desiré Nisard. The 
heated debate surrounding this appointment on the 22 Nov 1888 is revelatory in 
this respect. The transcripts of the speeches on the occasion of his inauguration 
have until now been overlooked by previous Vogüé scholars.  
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Vogüé’s speech, pronounced 6 June 1889, makes direct reference to the fact that 
his appointment on Nisard’s death was highly symbolic. Vogüé talks of the 
translation of Shakespeare and the introduction of German romanticism by Staël 
(modestly refraining from explicitly listing his own Roman russe) as examples of 
cosmopolitanist renaissance currently taking place in France.126 He predicts that 
Latin will be replaced in schools by the study of modern foreign languages, and 
that consequently: “Plusieurs d’entre nous verront grandir à leurs foyer des 
petits-enfants nourris d’un autre lait, qui nous comprendront mal et que nous ne 
comprendrons plus.”127 Edmund Rousse’s speech in response to Vogüé’s was 
scathingly ironic. Rousse warns, in response to Vogüé’s insufficiently mournful 
declaration of the death of Latin: “Le latin se meurt,” Messieur! Oui sans doute, 
comme bien d’autre choses encore, comme mourront notre langue et nore pays, si 
nous ne savons pas les défendre.”128 Rousse continues: 
Au nom de la raison, ils ont dit que si l’on enseigne le latin aux enfants... 
[c’est] parce que, depuis trois mille ans, il n’est aucune vérité morale, aucun 
secret de l’intelligence et de la conscience humaine que cette langue 
généreuse n’ait reçu et transmis au monde entier par ses écrivains et par ces 
poètes...129 
On Vogüé’s  descriptions of Russia he noted facetiously that Vogüé had or affected a 
slight foreign accent: “avec cette pointe d’accent étranger qui donne un charme de plus à 
tous vos discours”.130 Rousse’s closing word is extremely elucidating. Following 
Vogüé’s claim that the French novel had begun to sell poorly in the European 
                                                   
126
 E.-M de Vogüé, "Discours pour la réception de E.-M. de Vogüé à l'Académie Française," in 
Recueil des discours (1889) (Paris: Palais de L’Institut, 1889), p. 27.  
127
 Ibid., p. 28. 
128
 M. Rousse, "Réponse au discours pour la réception de E.-M de Vogüé à l'Académie 
Française," in Recueil des discours (1889) (Paris: Palais de L’Institut, 1889), p. 55. 
129
 Ibid., p. 56. 
130
 Ibid., p. 51. 
57 
 
market in comparison to English or Russian literature of the period, Rousse 
retorted: 
Vous, Messieurs, qui comptez dans le monde entier tant d’amis [...] 
dites-leurs bien que tout notre esprit n’est pas dans nos romans, tout notre 
cœur dans nos vaudevilles. À côté des Français qui les amusent et leur font la 
vie plus légère, montrez leur les Français qui les instruisent et les rendent 
meilleurs, - nos poètes et nos savants, nos philosophes, nos historiens et nos 
orateurs.131 
The argument hinges on a preconception of the novel as a frivolous genre that 
was not a place for philosophy or politics, but for light entertainment. The rest 
was the domain of the poet, philosopher or essayist, but not the novelist. Gide 
would make the same observation, but as a criticism of the restrictive structure of 
French discourse. For Gide, Pascal and Baudelaire had captured existential angst 
as effectively as Dostoevsky; however, the French novel had not learned how to 
do this.132 What came from abroad was thus a redefinition of the novel and its 
philosophical potential.  
 
A similar debate would arise in the Académie on 17 Jan 1907 at the reception of 
Maurice Barrès, when it would fall to Vogüé to make the reception speech.  
Malgré cet inconvénient [1871], notre seule qualité de Français nous 
conférait la prééminence sur tout le genre humain: pas un de nous qui n’en 
fût persuadé; cet axiome ne se discutait pas. [...] la superbe confiance de ce 
roi de l’univers, un jeune Français, ne s’abattait pas pour si peu. Je constate, 
je ne défends pas notre préjugé; nous l’avions sucé avec le lait, il était dans 
notre sang, dans l’air que nous respirions. Rien n’efface ces premières 
impressions. 133 
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For all the limitations of Vogüé’s reading of Dostoevsky, his critique of the 
arrogance of late-nineteenth century Franco-centrism and his appeal to the next 
generation had an undisputed impact.  
 
Regarding the resounding success of Le Roman russe, Corbet observes: “Le livre 
de Vogüé renforça la cause de l’alliance, et le désir de l’alliance multiplia le 
succès du Roman russe. Jamais livre ne tomba mieux à son heure.”134 René 
Wellek’s history of criticism identified Vogüé as “a turning point in East-West 
literary relations”.135 Charbonnel, writing in the wake of the mode russe in 1897: 
“jamais une œuvre de critique, pas même l’Histoire de la Littérature anglaise, 
n’eut si puissante prise sur les intelligences et sur les cœurs”.136 Le Roman 
russe’s attack on naturalism was also, evidently, a timely one. René Lalou writes 
retrospectively in 1929 that at its appearance:  
le public français était tout à fait dégouté du réalisme […] on adopta 
Dostoïevski et Tolstoï en bloc. On en tira essentiellement une conception 
mystique de la souffrance, une conception de la pitié, comme la médiatrice et 
la consolatrice de tous.137 
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What can be asserted with still greater conviction is that with regards to Russian 
literature, Vogüé’s authority went predominantly unchallenged. Léon Sichler’s 
Histoire de la littérature russe (1886) contents itself to quote Vogüé at length on 
the intolerable philosophical digressions and apocalyptic theories of 
Dostoevsky’s output post-Crime and Punishment.138 The works he had condoned, 
Poor Folk and the House of the Dead, appeared in more or less faithful 
translations by Derély and Neyroud in 1883 and 1886 respectively. As for the 
‘unbearably long’ and poorly composed Brothers Karamazov, the Devils and the 
unmentioned Notes from Underground, they were to appear only in radically 
adaptated forms, their translators seeing fit to remove the ‘deviations’ Vogüé had 
found so arduous, and along with them, the undesired philosophical dimension of 
Dostoevsky’s originals. 
 
Pièrre Pascal and Nikita Struve are among later, authoritative commentators who 
identified wholly with Vogüé’s ‘religion de la souffrance’ reading of 
Dostoevsky’s creation.139 Charles Somond’s preface to the 1891 publication of 
the Dostoevsky article commented:  
Je me souviens du retentissement qu’eurent les articles publiés en 1885 dans 
la Revue des Deux-Mondes sur Dostoïevsky. Il n’était question que de cet 
événement, et il y avait dans tous les esprits une espèce d’éblouissement. Ce 
fut en définitive M. de Vogüé qui créa chez nous le courant russe et slave [...] 
M. de Vogüé fut le promoteur d’une tendance qui va s’accentuant 
profondément dans le roman français, et qu’à lui seul revient l’honneur, nous 
n’exagérons pas en ajoutant la gloire, d’avoir jeté notre jeune génération 
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littéraire hors de chemins battus.140  
Paul Bourget, closely acquainted with Vogüé from 1883, joined the ranks of the 
rising “mystic” opposition to naturalism and recognised Vogüé’s role in the 
movement.141 Bourget himself was among the first French novelists to attempt a 
‘variation’ on Crime and Punishment in his Le Disciple.142 
 
Charbonnel writes: “peu à peu, Dostoïewski et Tolstoï changèrent nos bohêmes, 
nos réalistes, nos athéniens de lettres, en ‘néo-chrétiens’ ou mystiques. Ce fut 
bien d’eux ce miracle.”143 He traces this mystic revival through the work of Paul 
Margueritte, Eduard Rod, Paul Bourget and Joris-Karl Huysmans. Hemmings 
further explored the connection between Dostoevsky and the same French writers 
with the addition of Charles-Louis Philippe, though his comparisons often feel 
somewhat forced. The franco-centric, dominant history of French literature 
certainly has generally not placed special emphasis on such a relationship 
between Russian literature and the French decadents. It may therefore strike the 
contemporary literary historian that so many contemporary commentators, along 
with Charbonnel considered that Vogüé “orienta pour vingt ans, pour plus de 
temps encore peut-être, la littérature française elle-même.”144  
 
Desjardins, writing in 1889 at Vogüé’s reception to the Académie, describes the 
impact of Russian culture on France, associating the revival of religious thought, 
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psychology and neo-Kantiansim with this.145 For Desjardin, this intercultural 
dialogue was unabiguously opened by Vogüé: “Lui, il apporte un monde nouveau, 
la Russie, et derrière elle l’Orient”;146 “Quant à la Russie, on peut dire que c’est à 
M. de Vogüé que nous la devons.”147 In this respect, Desjardins identified Vogüé 
as “prophète de la jeunesse,” 148  in light of the extent to which his 
cosmopolitanism, his spiritualism, and his fanaticism for Russian literature, all 
anticipated tendencies that would dominate a rising and enduring movement in 
French intellectual life. Desjardins also identified in Dostoevsky and Tolstoy a 
redefinition of the novel. He wrote that in France, up until the arrival of Russian 
literature, the novel was still preconceived as a source of entertainment.149 
 
Vogüé’s influence on the younger generation of the Belle époque seems to have 
been significant. His official and emblematic appeal to them, ‘A ceux qui ont 
vingt ans’, dated 31 Dec 1889, and published in the new year in the Journal des 
Débats, cried out to the next generation of hommes de lettres to look abroad for a 
means to restore to French literature its former strength.150 A twenty-year-old 
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André Gide would note the article in his reading diary and recall its influence on 
his own literary ambitions in his memoires.151 The influence of the fictional 
world he had uncovered in Dostoevsky, was of course greater still. Likewise, 
Vogüé’s great influence on the reception of Dostoevsky abroad cannot be 
overlooked.152 
 
 
Dostoevsky’s reception in the wake of Le Roman russe 
 
The 1880s and 90s were a prolific period in the translation of Russian literature. 
This was part of a larger translation boom and a broader increase in curiosity for 
‘oriental’ literatures; however, the reception of Dostoevsky and Tolstoy was a 
phenomenon that surpassed all others. Corbet writes that no foreign literature had 
or has ever succeeded in “gnawing” on French minds so “profoundly” as the 
Russian greats towards the turn of the century. 153  First translations and 
adaptations followed Vogüé in removing philosophical ‘diversions’.154 In line 
with Vogüé’s preference, Tolstoy enjoyed instant popularity, along with the early, 
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humanitarian works of Dostoevsky, up to Crime and Punishment. His mature 
fiction, however, had a turbulent translation history.  
 
Along with Vogüé and the critics of this first period, those who proceeded to 
translate Dostoevsky deemed it necessary to ‘protect’ the public from certain 
subversive – if not ‘unseemly’ – aspects of his post-exile writings. More even 
than Derély’s greatly adapted Crime and Punishment, Ely Halpérine-Kaminsky’s 
and Charles Morice’s L’Esprit souterrain exemplifies the sanitisation that 
Dostoevsky’s thought underwent in its translation into French at the end of the 
19th century. The translation appeared in Plon in 1886, with the cover labeled, in a 
minuscule font: “traduit et adapté”. No further sign, preface or disclaimer alerted 
the reader as to the extent to which the translation deviated from the original in 
content. The work is in fact a rather awkward synthesis of Dostoevsky’s The 
Landlady (1847) and the Notes from Underground (1864). 155  The two 
protagonists are rolled into one through a bridge section, entirely fabricated by 
the translators:  
Cette mélancolique aventure d’un amour sans espoir et jamais guéri devait 
avoir sur la caractère et la vie d’Ordinov une triste influence. Ce cœur 
ardent, cette âme de poète furent aigris et stérilisés; il vécut inutile aux 
autres, insupportable à lui-même, et mourut à soixante ans, seul, 
pauvre… 156 
The adaptors continue in this vain, inventing Ordynov/the underground man’s 
failed attempts to travel, and one further failed love story, providing no indication 
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as to the fabrication of these sections other than a very tangible drop in literary 
credentials. Further cross-references to the misadventure of The Landlady are 
superimposed throughout the translation from Notes from Underground to further 
reinforce the fusion. The reason for this splicing is two-fold. Firstly, the 
underground man, an unprecedented psychological type, had to be accounted for: 
a causal explanation had to accompany the narrative. Ordynov’s tale is essentially 
used as a rationale for the composite character’s later ‘underground’ mind state, 
as the altered title and invented bridge section make explicit. Dostoevsky’s 
original, however, had consciously done precisely the opposite: in reversing the 
chronology of the two halves of his Notes, Dostoevsky’s original structure 
discouraged from approaching the underground man’s polemics (the first half of 
the work) in terms of psychological causality. Even the origins of the physical 
‘notes’ themselves are normalised and accounted for: the notebooks are reported 
(by the translators’ fabricated third-person narrator) to have been found (to the 
narrator’s feigned surprise) by Apollon, the underground man/Ordynov’s servant, 
who had inherited it along with the deceased protagonist’s belongings and sold it 
to the narrator.157 The second reason for embedding the Notes from Underground 
within The Landlady is that the Notes were aesthetically subversive and explicitly 
anti-romantic, particularly in their parody of Rousseau. The Landlady, dating 
from the 1840s was an unproblematically ‘romantic’ novella in every sense. By 
so forcing the modernist romantic realism (or proto-existentialism) of the Notes 
into a familiar romantic frame, much of its aesthetic subversiveness was 
neutralised.  
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The Notes section of their adaptation is re-entitled ‘Lise’ (the Landlady section 
having been entitled ‘Katïa’) immediately giving the love story precedence over 
the polemical aspect, while the first half of the Notes, are introduced with the 
following abashed disclaimer from the translation’s narrator: 
[…] le récit était précédé d’une assez longue et un peu désordonnée 
discussion qu’Ordinov supposait entre lui-même et des lecteurs imaginaires. 
Je n’ai pas cru devoir retrancher ces pages qui jettent de vives lumières sur 
l’âme de cet homme extraordinaire... C’est donc le manuscrit même 
d’Ordinov qu’on va lire. 
This is clearly addressed to a reader expected to wonder why they were not 
removed altogether. An interpretation of the title is then imposed on the work by 
the translation’s narrator:  
Aussi retrouvera-t-on souvent dans ses notes le mot souterrain. Il vivait, en 
effet, en une sorte de souterrain spirituel, il avait un ESPRIT SOUTERRAIN, 
toujours creusant plus avant et plus profond dans les mystères de sa 
conscience: “la conscience, cette maladie!” écrit-il quelque part.158 
The translation’s narrator goes to describe the notes as “une triste réponse à 
l’antique maxime: ‘Connais-toi.’ –Non, il n’est pas bon à l’homme de se 
connaître lui-même.”159 The contemporary critic may indeed wonder at the 
translators’ claim to such license as to fold what is essentially a translator’s 
preface into the diegesis, and, as such, to dictate a particular reading of the work 
in the author’s name. This is wholly indicative of their much less reverent stance 
towards an uncanonised novelist from a peripheral literary tradition. The 
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translator’s task has clearly been interpreted as rendering of an obscure and exotic 
artifact accessible. 
 
Equally consequential as these striking additions are the translators’ numerous 
omissions, which greatly detracted from Dostoevsky’s anti-rationalist thesis in 
the translation. The first significant omission consists of the last five sentences of 
the second chapter; the famous discourse on the laws of nature, in which the 
underground man set out the thesis that one cannot be reconciled with the 
injustice of existence.160 They are replaced with the following sentence: “Et puis 
j’étais innocent parce que... Eh bien! Parce que j’étais innocent!...”161 The effect 
of replacing an exposition of a sophisticated critique of positivism with a childish 
“just because” argument is that the underground man becomes irrational rather 
than irrationalist. The role of will and indeed that of reason in the underground 
man’s arrival at a valourisation of caprice is diminished. 
 
Half of chapters nine and eleven were removed entirely, and all that remains of 
chapter ten is a conspicuous single paragraph, taken completely out of context. 
This curious, stand-alone paragraph-chapter is none other than underground 
man’s apology for his own philosophising. Much of the mathematical imagery 
and philosophical terminology employed by Dostoevsky to attack positivism and 
utilitarianism are removed from the translation. The desired effect was clearly to 
reduce an anti-rationalist polemic to a far more accessible and far less subversive 
irrational ‘outburst’. Consequently it is hardly surprising that so few readers of 
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the period recognised any import in the text, and a fuller translation did not 
appear until Bienstock’s in 1909, i.e. a quarter of a century later.  
 
Perhaps Lefevere’s writings on the translation of poetics and universes of 
discourse may illucidate the matter of why such ammendments might have 
seemed necessary.162 It is possible that the form of Notes from Underground 
having no direct precedent in French literary discourse seemed aesthetically 
untranslatable. Vogue’s genuine hostility toward the philosophical ‘deviations’ in 
Dostoevsky’s fiction would fit with this hypothesis.      
 
This first translation of Notes from Underground marks a vital moment in the 
history of Dostoevsky’s French reception, particularly that of the existential 
themes that would take on such significance for subsequent generations of 
interpreters. The names of Harpéline-Kaminsky and Charles Morice have thus 
become somewhat infamous in Russian-French translation studies on account of 
their handling of the text. Their 1888 Frères Karamazov has already been 
assessed in terms of its multiple deficiencies.163 Aside from the practices of 
tactical omissions witnessed in the above analyses of other translations, 
Harpéline-Kaminsky and Morice again felt the need to improve Dostoevsky’s 
original by providing it with a ‘proper’ ending. Alesha’s sermon by the rock was 
removed,164 and in its place are added six chapters recounting Mitja’s escape, 
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Alesha’s trial and Lise’s miraculous healing, all events entirely absent from the 
original.165  
 
When a second generation of translators and critics challenged 
Harpéline-Kaminsky, he provided prefaces to subsequent re-editions justifying 
his choices and claiming that his ‘mitigation’ of Dostoevsky’s fiction had been 
necessary to attain the author’s success in France: “ce chef-d’oeuvre rendu… 
mettons, moins ‘foisonnant’ est devenu classique aux yeux du public”166 A 
highly curious correspondence between Gide and Harpéline-Kaminsky 
concerning this matter survives in the Bibliothèque Jacques Doucet. Gide was 
unsurprisingly critical of the translator-adaptor’s significant omissions and 
additions. However, he was not altogether critical of the translation in terms of 
tone: 
Une fois admises ces coupures et ces remaniements il m’est aisé de louer 
votre traduction qui sait, autant que je puis m’en rendre compte, rendre 
exactement le ton de ces ouvrages et, particulièrement dans L’Esprit 
souterrain, l’accent spasmodique de l’auteur.167 
Gide, however, had no access to the original and could only compare 
Harpéline-Kaminsky’s attempt to its German counterpart. In fact, 
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Harpéline-Kaminsky’s translation, as the above analysis demonstrated, was 
significantly more “spasmodic” than the original. It is also telling that Gide 
attributes this spasmodic aspect not to the narrator but to the author. With regard 
to the “butchered” version of the Karamazovs that Harpéline-Kaminsky and 
Morice produced, Gide even agreed that the nineteenth century French public 
was not ready for the full text: “Je crois, en effet, qu’une traduction intégrale des 
Karamazov eût risqué, dans le premier temps, de rebuter les lectures, et de 
décourager très fâcheusement l’éditeur.”168 Nonetheless, and despite Vogüé’s 
desire both to protect the public from Dostoevsky’s more subversive ideas and to 
protect Russian literature’s reputation from the wrath he anticipated this to elicit 
from the public, he did speak critically concerning the numerous liberal 
translations that were being produced. His preface to the Souvenirs de la Maison 
des Morts described the 1886 translation as one of the only integral ones to date, 
chastising the “adaptors” of other works for altering texts to suit public taste 
rather than allowing the texts to challenge reading habits.169 
 
Erneste Combes, in his highly typical indictment of Dostoevsky, wrote that 
“[Crime et châtiment] est très convenable... aux souteneurs et aux filles publiques 
qui ont pu le voir, mise en drame, joué, en 1888, dans un théâtre faubourien de 
Paris, au Bouffes-du-Nord. C’était sa place.”170 Comes employs an age-old 
argument that proved perenial to detractors of many a work of literature in the 
nineteenth century. Francisque Sarcey made a similar pronouncement: 
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Le Crime et le Châtiment est le livre d’un Gaboriau qui serait philosophe: 
c’est l’œuvre d’un Balzac barbouillé de mysticisme. La Guerre et la Paix est 
une admirable épopée. Le Crime et le Châtiment est un roman très amusant 
et très curieux. Les femmes préféreront Le Crime et le Châtiment. La Guerre 
et la Paix plaira mieux aux hommes.171  
Like Charbonelle, Combes lamented the imitation of Dostoevsky by the French 
writers of the 1890s: “Un nom célèbre ne m’effraie pas, et j’attaque résolument 
ce représentant d’une école nauséabonde; puisqu’il est le chef, il paiera pour sa 
séquelle.”172 Like Goncourt, he resented the fact that readers found a novelty in a 
Russian literature that he esteemed to be an imitation of French works:  
Le succès de ces romans ne prouve rien, sinon la bêtise humaine; nous 
n’avons chez nous que l’embarras du choix. À propos, mais ce sont les 
mêmes! Ce bric-à-brac romantique ne nous vient pas, il nous revient de la 
Russie (...) sentez, vous reconnaîtrez l’odeur.173  
Hector Pessard lamented the same tendency for opposite reasons: a Russian 
influence on French literature could only devalue it in decreasing its typically 
French qualities: 
L’imitation des Russes, et particulièrement celle de Dostoïevski, risque de 
nous amener à faire trop bon marché de nos qualités nationales de clarté, de 
bon sens, de droiture intellectuelle, de grâce et de charme.174  
Maurice Barrès’s diaries express a similar fear in rather more emotive terms: 
“L’Orient nous envahit. L’Asie! son flot vint mourir dans l’Iphigénie de Racine. 
Sa grande vague moderne, c’est Tolstoï, c’est Dostoïewski. […] Le mal d’Asie! 
J’en suis envahi.” 175  Armand de Pontmartin also bemoaned Dostoevsky’s 
influence on a generation:  
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Ne laissons pas dire que, dans la patrie de Montaigne et de Racine, de 
Bossuet et de Molière, de Voltaire et de Montesquieu, on n’est plus bon qu’à 
créer ou à copier une littérature d’épileptiques, de malades, de visionnaires, 
de possédés, d’assassins, de filles, de forçats, de monomanes et 
d’imbéciles.176  
This “littérature d’épileptiques” argument was also a common one. Combes made 
use of it: “Laissons à d’autres le plaisir d’analyser les âmes slaves. Ces arcanes 
effraient ma simplicité qui n’aime que la lumière. Il faut être néo-psychologue 
pour apprécier un psychopathe, pour entrevoir le génie sous l’hallucination.”177 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
By 1900 the majority of Dostoevsky’s oeuvre had been translated, to some extent, 
into French. However, these translations were often highly liberal, translators 
clearly approaching texts as an aesthetically flawed brute material to be moulded 
to correspond to more refined French tastes. Moreover, analysis of Derély’s 
Crime et châtiment and Harpéline-Kamisky’s L’Esprit souterain revealed 
significant attempts to neutralise the subversive philosophical discussions these 
texts contain, specifically Dostoevsky’s critique of positivism. Initial critics made 
the same assumptions with regard to Dostoevsky’s aesthetics. His aesthetic 
‘barbarism’ and his philosophical ‘digressions’ – seen as unseemly and morally 
questionable – were viewed as limitating factors on the value of his work. Both of 
these flaws were directly attributed to his Russianness.  
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The triple task of translator and critic was therefore to root out the morally 
problematic, underline the morally instructive, and to mitigate (in the case of 
translation) or accentuate (in the case of criticism) the clash of Volksgeists that 
Dostoevsky’s fiction represented to the French. In all three respects Vogüé was no 
exception. His reading isolated the moralist in Dostoevsky from his subversive 
philosophical questioning, and actively sought to dissuade both readers and 
publishers from venturing near Dostoevsky’s mature fiction, retaining a 
fundamental prejudice that the novel was no place for philosophising. 
 
What Vogüé did achieve, was to present Dostoevsky’s opposition to nineteenth 
century culture as modern rather than backward or reactionary. By the 1890s, a 
shift had begun. The heyday of naturalism was at its end; Russian literature was 
intensely fashionable, and decadents were beginning to explore similar 
challenges to those launched by Dostoevsky. By the time of Vogüé’s  
appointment to the Académie, he had come to represent not only the herald of the 
Russian novel, but also to a certain extent of a new chapter of French literary 
history. His association between the Russian Orient and the Modern, as a 
historical force in opposition to both franco-centrism and classicism, would 
continue and develop throughout the subsequent, pivotal period of Dostoevsky’s 
reception.   
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Chapter 2: André Gide and “ceux qui avaient vingt ans” (1898-1926) 
 
 
Paul Valéry, writing retrospecively on the year 1900, recalled: “C’est en 1900 que 
le mot Beauté a commencé à disparaître. Il a été remplacé par un autre mot, qui, 
depuis a fait son chemin: le mot ‘Vie’. Et cela est capital.”178 The decline of the 
cult of beauty and the rise of the cult of life, widely recognised by commentators 
of modernism, had a favourable impact on Dostoevsky’s reception, the vivacity 
of his fiction becoming more important than aspects of composition thus far read 
as deficiencies. The cult of life of which Valéry spoke did not survive the Great 
War; a parallel cult of the immediate, the spontaneous and l’informe continued to 
grow in magnitude. These shifts in values would radically alter the ‘modern’ 
readings of Dostoevsky. The most renowned and influencial of these was that of 
André Gide. His reading and its development thus form the backbone of this 
chapter.  
 
In light of the novelty and broad influence of Gide’s reading, numerous studies 
have broached the issue. Fayer (1946) was among the earliest to fully appreciate 
the place of Dostoevsky in Gide’s intellectual development, positing a 
Dostoevsky-informed conception of freedom as the central pillar of Gide’s 
worldview in a study to which Gide responded: “Je ne me suis jamais si bien 
compris moi-même qu’en vous lisant.”179 Despite the purport of Gide in the 
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French modernist milieu and despite his own overt recognition of the centrality of 
Dostoevsky in his thought, the implications of the Gide-Dostoevsky dialog in the 
context of French intellectual history have never been traced. Backès’s (1972) 
previously mentioned doctoral thesis compiled a wealth of data in relation to 
Gide and his contemporaries’ readings of Dostoevsky; however, his corpus 
terminates at 1930.180 The reverberations of Gide’s thinking on Dostoevsky 
remain to be explored. Moutote’s (1976) article explored possible influences of 
Dostoevsky’s shorter fiction on Gide’s satirical writings. 181  However, the 
philosophical component of their intertextual dialogue as well as more major 
works such as L’Immoraliste and Crime and Punishment were omitted. Cadot’s 
(1993) paper on the subject drew from several of the above studies, stratifying 
Gide’s engagement with Dostoevsky into periods of ‘discovery’, ‘criticism’ and 
‘assimilation’.182 However, due to the small scale of his study it could not assess 
the breadth or depth of implication that the present thesis undertakes to explore. 
 
In this chapter, Gide’s early reading of and thinking on Dostoevsky are traced 
from the youthful moralist’s reception of Vogüé through his sensualist awakening 
towards a paradoxalist reading. Gide’s violent revolt against Vogüé’s moralist 
reduction of Dostoevsky’s thought is explored in comparison to key 
contemporaneous analyses and adaptations by Suarès, Faure and Copeau. War, 
Revolution and Russian immigration are then discussed as factors respectively in 
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Dostoevsky’s increased significance both in Gide’s thought and in French 
discourse throughout the 1920s. Finally Gide’s mature interpretation and 
corresponding literary output of the mid-20s are discussed in relation to other key 
publications of this crucial period of re-formation in Dostoevsky’s French 
reception.  
 
 
Containing two voids: Gide’s inital readings (1887-1902)  
 
Like most of his generation, Gide’s initial reading of Dostoevsky was informed 
by Vogüé. On reading Le Roman russe in August 1890, Gide’s reading diary 
records his initial appreciation: “très remarquable – notes tout au long.”183 
Following Vogüé’s advice, Gide and his generation directed their enthusiasm 
towards Tolstoy.184 His Journal records his completion of War and Peace in 
August 1891: “Jamais, je crois, je n’ai tant vécu dans le livre…”185 In the entry 
of the following day, Gide discovers Schopenhauer with considerably less 
enthusiasm, affronted by the latter’s critique of Kantian ethics: “Cette morale de 
Schopenhauer (Fondement de la morale) toute empirique, m’agace… Une morale 
doit être a priori.”186  Gide’s thinking at this stage 187  was steeped in the 
neo-Platonic idealism prevalent in the symbolist circles whose sway he was under, 
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as evidenced in his contemporaneous Traité du Narcisse (1892): 
Tout s’y cristallisait en une floraison nécessaire, et tout était parfaitement ainsi 
que cela devait être. – Tout demeurait immobile… Chaste Eden! Jardin des 
Idées! où les formes, rythmiques et sûres, révélaient sans effort leur nombre; où 
chaque chose était ce qu’elle paraissait; où prouver était inutile.188  
Striving towards the unadulterated and the a priori in epistemology as in ethics, it 
is hardly surprising that Gide’s reading of Crime and Punishment in 1891 (during 
the preparation of the Traité du Narcisse) left an ambiguous to negative 
impression. Dostoevsky’s radical experiment in relativism struck the idealistic 
writer, still heavily under the influence of the symbolists, as “une des choses les 
plus morbides.”189 Gide, nevertheless, seems to have been compelled to reread 
the disturbing work that same year.190 At this time, however, no mention of 
Dostoevsky appears in Gide’s intimate diaries, normally such a rich source of 
commentary on his intellectual development. Gide’s affiliations seem to have 
remained closer to Kant than to Raskolnikov. This would soon change. 
 
On 13 September 1893, the Gide’s Journal interrogates Goethe:  
Disons-nous donc maintenant que le bonheur s’obtient par la suppression des 
scrupules? Non. Supprimer les scrupules ne suffit pas à rendre heureux; il faut 
mieux. Mais les scrupules suffisent à nous empêcher le bonheur…191 
Emerging doubts as to the validity of the a priori conceptions in ethics that he 
had thus far defended herald the crisis that his memoirs recall as “la période la 
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plus confuse de ma vie” and Gide’s intellectual shift towards subjectivism.192 
One burning question was beginning to undermine his idealism: “au nom de quel 
Dieu, de quel idéal me défendez-vous de vivre selon ma nature?”193 In 1893, 
Gide rose to his own challenge in a sensualist awakening: “Volupté! Ce mot, je 
voudrais le redire sans cesse; je le voudrais synonyme de bien-être, et même qu’il 
suffit de dire être simplement”194  is the existential outcry of the resultant 
Nourritures Terrestres (1896). Along with Nietzsche, a contemporaneous 
discovery through Gide’s knowledge of German, Gide attacks the classical and 
theological education that had led him to hide behind Kantian ethics from the 
potentialities of embodied existence:  
Certes, il m’a plu souvent qu’une doctrine et même qu’un système complet de 
pensées ordonnées justifiât à moi-même mes actes; mais parfois je ne l’ai plus 
pu considérer que comme l’abri de ma sensualité.195 
Dostoevsky’s fiction, until this moment, had occupied at best a marginal place in 
Gide’s thought. However, a series of traumatic events was to throw Gide into his 
greatest spiritual crisis, and to plunge him into Dostoevsky. His contraction of 
tuberculosis during his voyage of sexual self-discovery brought his scandalised, 
puritanical mother to North Africa, 196  bringing Gide’s two opposed moral 
frameworks – and two ‘Karamazovian extremes’ – into direct conflict. Depressed, 
repressed, uprooted and morally cleaved in two, in 1896 Gide returned to 
Dostoevsky. 
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Gide’s initial ambiguous response to Crime and Punishment had not prevented 
him from continuing with Vogüé’s censored, sentimentalist’s reading list: he had 
read Humiliated and Offended by 1893 and Memoirs from the House of the Dead 
by 1895.197 However, it was only at this moral impasse of 1896 that he was 
drawn finally to the murkier works that Vogüé had ‘forbidden’. In Gide’s 
correspondence with Paul Valéry, he writes: “Lis donc L’Idiot de Dostoïevsky. 
J’attends pour en parler d’avoir fini Les Karamazof – mais jusqu’à présent, je 
trouve ça presque très mauvais – procédeux et… intéressant. Lis donc L’Idiot.”198 
Appreciation was clearly not immediate, but Gide’s curiousity had been roused 
profoundly. Gide seems to have recognised something of his own duality in the 
Dostoevskian conception of man, even finding something of a working model in 
Dostoevsky’s conception of the human self ‘containing two voids’ as opposed to 
representing psychological dualisms in dialectical conflict, as he would later 
recall.199 This realisation would take decades to reach fruition, however, as early 
as the turn of the century Gide was ready to publish his first tentative pages of 
interpretation. 
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Que peut l’homme? Delineating the human: Gide’s first writings on 
Dostoevsky (1898-1902) 
 
Gide’s often overlooked sixth ‘Lettre à Angèle’ appeared in January 1899 in 
L’Ermitage accompanying the first French translations of Also sprach 
Zarathustra (Thus Spoke Zarathustra) and Jenseits von Gut und Böse (Beyond 
Good and Evil). This early interpretation of Dostoevsky’s thought bears the 
decisive mark of the spiritual crisis through which it was formed: his struggle to 
simultaneously appropriate both the ideal of Nietzschean self-affirmation and that 
of Evangelical abnegation.200 In the context of a discussion of Nietzsche, Gide 
offers his first published analysis of Dostoevsky’s thought. Significantly for the 
present study, this was also French criticism’s first association of Nietzsche and 
Dostoevsky. Arriving as it did in the same volume as the first translations of the 
primary texts that would secure Nietzsche’s reputation in France, Nietzsche’s 
reception was to some extent refracted through Dostoevsky from the earliest 
stage.201 The comparison of Dostoevsky’s fictional philosophers (Raskolnikov, 
Ivan Karamazov, Kirilov) to their German ‘nephew’ has since become a 
commonplace. Gide, however, was among the earliest readers to identify its 
significance, presenting to the French readership, alongside Zarathustra, the 
controversial theories of Kirilov. As observed in the previous chapter, Gide’s 
predecessors had for the most part disregarded these as pure satire, incompatible 
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with a humanitarian preconception of their author’s ethical stance. 
  
As Gide asserts, Nietzschean thought fell on “terrain préparé”,202 reception 
preceding translation thanks to German-reading French writers (like himself) who 
were already expounding interpretations of Nietzsche’s ideas. This, as Gide was 
all too aware, was also the case for Dostoevsky: Vogüé’s much smaller generation 
of Russian-reading hommes de lettres in France had ‘prepared’ his own 
generation to receive a censored reading of Dostoevsky. This reading, Gide 
would now subvert: “Nul plus que Dostoïevski n’a aidé Nietzsche.”203 Gide’s 
italics testify to the extent to which the notion clashed with established 
conceptions of both writers. It seems highly improbable that Gide could have 
known at this early stage of the archival evidence of Nietzsche’s enthused reading 
of French editions of Les Possédés and L’Esprit souterrain.204 But as Moutote 
has postulated, no-one more than Dostoevsky helped Gide to come to terms with 
Nietzsche’s thought.205 
 
Not surprisingly, Gide identifies Nietzsche as an embodiment of the selfsame 
moral dilemma that he himself had lived through since his sensualist awakening 
and his rift with traditional conceptions of ethics, both Kantian and Evangelical, 
however, Gide concludes that “Nietzsche, prisonnier dans sa cage de philosophe, 
dans son hérédité protestante, y devient fou.”206 Gide’s implication is that any 
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reconciliation of ethics, and specifically protestant ethics, with lived experience 
lies beyond the reach of speculative philosophy, but perhaps not beyond the 
limitations of artistic representation. This explains Gide’s appreciation of 
Nietzsche’s endeavour and reservations, with regards to his conclusions: “Œuvre 
admirable? Non – mais préface d’œuvres admirables.”207 
 
It is here that Gide turns from Nietzsche to Dostoevsky, including a long excerpt 
from Kirilov’s now famously ‘proto-Nietzschean’ discourse. Kirilov herein 
develops the idea that in admitting the non-existence of God, the atheist 
individualist succeeds God, inheriting absolute freedom over subjective existence. 
Kirilov concludes that the herald of such a truth (Kirilov himself) must first 
validate it through an ultimate act of will: a purely philosophically-motivated 
suicide.208 However, Gide’s account of this discourse differs decisively from the 
original. Dostoevsky had left no doubt that Kirilov’s theory, along with his serene 
intent to realise it, long preceded Verkhovensky’s plot to exploit the event for 
political gain.209 Gide’s presentation is contrarily compelled to stress that Kirilov 
is forced by external circumstance into a state of mind that simultaneously 
provokes both the theory and the act:  
Kirilov doit se tuer… doit signer un papier où il se déclare coupable […] tout 
est perdu pour Pierre, l’écouteur, s’il ne remet pas Kiriloff en état de se tuer. 
(Tant il est vrai que tout état pathologique inconscient peut proposer à 
l’individu des actes neuf, que sa raison s’ingéniera aussitôt à admettre, à 
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soutenir, à systémiser).210 
As if Gide’s pathological interpretation were not already explicit from his italics 
and parenthesis, he then introduces Kirilov’s monologue thus: “Voici ce que, 
poussé par Pierre, Kiriloff arrive à dire, superuomo d’un instant”.211 
 
The final, deciding motivation for Kirilov’s suicide is one of the great lingering 
controversies of The Devils, Dostoevsky having taken pains to problematise the 
event through Kirilov’s momentary hesitation and his ambiguous penultimate act 
of biting Verkhovensky’s finger. Whether this can be deemed the philosophical 
suicide Kirilov had theorised, whether it is marred by the spite towards his 
witness, or whether the act was philosophically discredited by the suggested 
association with an altered state of consciousness (pre-epileptic trance), 
Dostoevsky’s text offers no final comment. What is clear is that while Kirilov’s 
reasoning may be irrational, his state of mind is in no way induced by 
Verkhovensky, as Gide would recognise in his mature reading. 
 
This initial misconception on Gide’s part is telling, and his treatment of the 
relationship between pathology and reason in this parallel interpretation of 
Kirilov and Nietzsche is worthy of attentive analysis:  
Je sais bien que Dostoïevski met ses paroles dans la bouche d’un fou; mais 
peut-être une certaine folie est-elle nécessaire pour faire dire une première fois 
certaines choses; peut-être Nietzsche l’a-t-il senti. L’important c’est que ces 
choses-là soient dites, car maintenant il n’est plus besoin d’être fou pour les 
penser […] je préfère dire que Nietzsche s’est fait fou.212 
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Such efforts to defend Kirilov or Nietzsche’s reflections from disregard on 
account of madness seems unnecessary to the post-modern (or even modern) 
critic. However, Gide’s first essay preceding the twentieth-century rehabilitation 
of non-rational modes of thought, he faced the initial and formidable task of 
convincing his reader that the thought of madmen might be of some degree of 
value. To still prevalent conservative critics observed in the first chapter to attack 
“une littérature d’ epiléptiques, de malades, de visionnaires”213, Gide retorts with 
comparison to the taunters of Christ: “Si tu es le Christ, sauve-toi toi-même.”214 
Gide’s provocative argument maintains that just as the human limitations of 
Christ do not diminish the divine truth of his teachings, so the verdict of madness 
does not detract from his elected prophets of modernity.  
 
Gide’s fictional world was meanwhile grappling with the same question that 
Kirilov and Nietzsche embodied in his critical writing: could a single act of 
individual will indeed redefine man, and is man free to commit such an act? The 
problem receives its first, somewhat burlesque treatment in the ‘gratuitous act’ of 
the Prométhée mal enchainé, published in the following year. Edmond Jaloux for 
one did not hesitate to trace back to this novella (and through it directly back to 
Dostoevsky’s Kirilov), the concept of the gratuitous act that would be of such 
consequence to a subsequent generation of writers. 215  Significantly, the 
‘gratuitously’ administered punishment and reward that set the Prométhée in 
motion are carried out not by a man as such, but by a capricious deity, suggesting 
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that while gratuity may be within the means of divine action, human action 
remains bound by psychological causation and rationality. 216  However, the 
conclusion of the sixth Lettre à Angèle with its comparison of Kirilov and 
Nietzsche to Christ suggested ample room for the negotiation of this boundary 
within Gide’s conception of man and God. Dostoevsky’s Kirilov and Stavrogin 
had also achieved a quasi-divine status (as Man-God and Übermensch 
respectively), permitting gratuitous acts of violence: the former’s finger-biting 
and the latter’s ear-biting. The ‘creaturely’ character of their super-human acts is 
indicitive of their departure from a definition of the human. As Aristotle famously 
wrote: “he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is 
sufficent for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state.”217 
 
Gide’s interrogation of this boundary would receive a more cathartic exploration 
in L’Immoraliste (1902), in which Gide’s dialogue with Dostoevsky is again 
apparent. The work is most obviously a fictional application of the 
Nietzsche-informed proto-existential sensualist doctrine that Gide had espoused 
in Les Nourritures: “Avant, pensais-je, je ne comprenais pas que je vivais. Je 
devais faire de la vie la palpitante découverte.”218 As such, Gide’s interaction 
with The Devils, and the debate he had staged three years earlier between 
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Dostoevsky and Nietzsche (and thus during the preparation of L’Immoraliste) 
continues beneath the surface.  
 
Gide’s protagonist Michel’s perceived conquest of death (survival of tuberculosis 
without recourse to prayer) functions in counterpoint to Kirilov’s suicidal 
conquest of life. In proving his wilful independence (albeit through continued 
existence rather than self-destruction) Michel, like Kirilov, transcends human 
ethics. The liberated superman’s existence then spirals towards cynicism, 
paedophilia and eventual confession, a last-ditch attempt to reintegrate with the 
conception of humanity his defiance had transcended. Comparison with Stavrogin 
is only too evident, and far from circumstantial, though this has not been 
addressed by comparativists thus far. This is not surprising, since Stavrogin’s 
censored confession of his similar paedophiliac transgression did not appear in 
French (or indeed Russian) print until 1922. Some confusion has arisen in the 
limited scholarship surrounding this question.219 
 
Thus, while Gide’s own experiences and sexual exploits in North Africa were the 
source of material for L’Immoraliste, the literary ‘licence’ (to exploit Gide’s own 
terminology of reception)220 for Michel’s representation had been granted by 
Dostoevsky’s Stavrogin. The confessional structure of L’Immoraliste, and notably 
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the misgivings expressed by Michel’s listener with regard to the excess of style 
with which it was delivered, mirror Tikhon’s reception of Stavrogin’s 
confession.221 Conceptually, Michel’s desperate, last-ditch attempt at even an 
insincere, guiltless confession in the hope not of grace, but of a bearable earthly 
existence, is entirely in keeping with Raskolnikov and Stavrogin’s confessions.222 
Jaloux (with whom Gide corresponded frequently on the topic of Dostoevsky 
throughout this period) did not miss the connection, seeing in Michel the first 
character in French literature that could be compared to Stavrogin, 
acknowledging that Dostoevsky had clearly “helped if not influenced” Gide in his 
creation.223  
 
Thus, at this early stage of Gide’s dialogue with Dostoevsky’s fiction his 
preoccupation remains with the Nietzschean problem encapsulated by “que peut 
l’homme? Que peut un homme?” However, Gide’s conclusions, in 1902, seem far 
closer to Raskolnikov and Stavrogin than to Zarathustra. Just as in his 
comparative essay Gide had rejected Nietzschean self-affirmation in favour of an 
evangelical reading of Kirilov’s abnegatory nihilism, in Michel, his own fictional 
Man-God experiment, his conclusion coincides with Dostoevsky’s. While an 
auto-affirmative act may indeed redelineate the human, the liberated perpetrator 
of such an act proves hubristically incapable of bearing the burden of his own 
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liberation.224 This tragic, Dostoevskian conclusion, however, was not one that 
Gide was prepared to accept indefinitely. 
 
 
Overcoming Crime and Punishment: Gide’s reactive re-reading (1908-1914) 
 
Gide’s intellectual development had a somewhat pendular character, oscillating 
between the extremes of self-effacement and self-affirmation. The ideological 
component and final conclusions of L’Immoraliste seemed to warn of a 
bankruptcy in Nietzschean self-affirmation and suggest a turn to Dostoevskian 
confessionalism. However, the next stage of Gide’s engagement with 
Dostoevsky’s thought can be seen as a violent revolt against his own initial 
conclusions. In his criticism this took the form of a violent polemic against 
Vogüé’s moralistic reduction of Dostoevsky’s thought to the closing pages of 
Crime and Punishment. By this time, Gide had established himself as an 
authority on Dostoevsky among his peers. His correspondence abounds with 
recommendations of works by Dostoevsky, at times abbreviated to ‘Dost’ or 
simply ‘D,’ testifying to the frequency of reference. He reads Dostoevsky’s 
novels aloud to the future NFR group, sowing the seeds of moral and aesthetic 
values that would so influence the review, and with it, the dominant aesthetic 
values of an era.225 Fayer has observed that “through [Gide’s] influence on his 
disciples of the Nouvelle Revue Française, who begin to see Dostoevsky with 
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Gide’s eyes, his devotion becomes the source of an important revisionist 
movement in French literature.” 226  Hermetet has also investigated Gide’s 
dissemination of his reading of Dostoevsky within his circle as a dicisive factor 
shaping the development of the NRF and its values.227 
 
In 1903, Gide and Jaloux correspond over Merezhkovsky’s recently translated 
Dostoïevsky et Tolstoï, the latter beseeching Gide:  
Toute la partie consacrée à Tolstoï est admirable, mais que notre Dostoievski 
est donc incomplètement compris! Vous seul, cher ami… Mais quand 
ferez-vous votre volume?228  
The emphatic “notre” is suggestive of the circle’s self-conscious adoption of the 
Gidian reading. Gide was at this time hatching two projects: a full-scale study of 
Dostoevsky and a ‘real novel’ that would depart from the roman à thèse tradition 
in which his previous fiction was rooted. The first intertwined attempts at both 
projects would appear in the following years.  
 
Gide’s first large-scale critical work on Dostoevsky appeared in 1908 in La 
Grande Revue.229 The article launches an attack against Vogüé’s moralistic 
reading, quoting (loosely) at length from the Le Roman russe, to the end of 
denouncing the injustice the critic had committed in delaying France’s reception 
of the richest of Dostoevsky’s novels. Gide disavows Vogüé’s pronouncement 
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that with Crime and Punishment “le talent de Dostoïevsky avait fini de 
monter”, challenging his dismissal of the Notes from Underground, The 
Adolescent, The Eternal Husband and, above all, the ‘interminable’ Brothers 
Karamazov.230 Gide condemns the academician’s claim, made to a trusting 
French readership, that his task was to highlight in Dostoevsky’s oeuvre “les trois 
parties qui montrent le mieux les divers aspects de son talent: […] Les Pauvres 
Gens, Souvenirs de la maison des morts et Crime et Châtiment”.231 It is above all 
against Vogüé’s (and, following him, a generation’s) reductive reading of Crime 
and Punishment that Gide launched his offensive. “Pour faire réussir une idée, il 
faut ne mettre en avant qu’elle seule… Trouver la bonne formule ne suffit pas; il 
s’agit de n’en plus sortir”.232 Gide pours scorn on the fact that Dostoevsky found 
success in France only thanks to Vogüé’s readily accessible religion de la 
souffrance: 
La doctrine qu’il trouvait incluse dans les derniers chapitres de Crime et 
Châtiment. Qu’elle y soit, je le veux croire, et que la formule soit heureusement 
trouvée… Par malheur, elle ne contenait pas son homme; il débordait de toutes 
parts.233  
Gide devotes considerable attention to the phenomenon of Dostoevsky’s delayed 
reception in France, which he attributes to the complexity of Dostoevsky’s 
aesthetics and the paradoxalism inherent in his novelistic thought: “elle renferme 
de contradictions pour l’esprit occidental, peu accoutumé à ce désir de 
conciliation des extrêmes.”234 In this observation the seeds for Gide’s mature, 
anti-binary reading of the twenties can already be gleaned. 
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From as early as 1902, Gide’s acquaintances had eagerly awaited the fruition of 
his project to produce a full-scale novel.235 From May of this year dates Francis 
de Miomandre’s “André Gide et l’inquiétude philosophique” in Mercure de 
France, which speaks of Gide’s undertaking of a novel of complex moral 
discourse in the fashion of Dostoevsky.236 The initial conception of Les Caves du 
Vatican in fact dates back to 1893, though serious work did not begin until 
1911.237 Thus, the novel’s gestation period coincides with Gide’s avid research 
on Dostoevsky. By the 1908 appearance of Gide’s ‘Dostoïevsky d’après sa 
correspondance’ the principle character of the Caves was clearly formed in Gide’s 
notes.238 The novel’s fruition period, 1911-1914, also coincides with Gide’s 
collection of material for his Vie de Dostoïevsky, which was never realised on 
account of the outbreak of war.239  
 
Though Gide refused to classify the finished product as a roman, associating it 
through a subscript rather with his satirical soties (Paludes and Prométhée), it 
nonetheless represents Gide’s first large-scale work and his first experiment in the 
unfolding of a complex plot using multiple narrative perspectives. The work is 
steeped in direct intertextual reference to Dostoevsky. However, Gide does not 
offer the moral discourse that Miomandre and his readers awaited, Gide’s 
interpretation of Dostoevskian enquiry having far less to do with Good and Evil 
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than the established reading. Gide’s approach was rather to engage with 
Dostoevsky’s thought via a rich, parodic pastiche of several of his works. In their 
abundance and openness, these clearly conscious citations of Dostoevsky have 
escaped few of the work’s critics. However, the majority have limited themselves 
to flagging up ‘borrowings’ without engaging with the full import of Les Caves as 
a parodic commentary on Dostoevsky’s thought. Moreover, they have overlooked 
the striking fact that Les Caves contains, as shall be shown, direct references to 
Dostoevsky’s French reception, to Vogüé and to his reading.  
 
Of existing comparative studies, Fridlender’s remains the most thorough.240 
Fridlender reads Lafcadio as a “своеобразный вариант современного Аркадии 
Долгоруки,” noting particularly the Lambert-Protos parallel.241 The nature of 
this relative svoeobraznost’ and sovremennost’ sadly, Fridlender did not develop 
(all differences between Dostoevsky and Gide, he was methodologically obliged 
to attribute to the latter’s burzhuaznozt’). In recreating Dostoevsky’s illegitimate 
son not as a social outcast with an inferiority complex, but as a superman, 
liberated from all social and moral restraints, Gide’s intent was to rehabilitate and 
affirm bastardy as a state of being. Gide’s intertextual dialogue with Brothers 
Karamazov functions on the same level. Both Moutote and Fridlender observed 
the family unit of Gide’s sotie as a transmutation of the Karamazovs:242 three 
step-brothers (as opposed to estranged half brothers) together with the illigitimate 
Lafcadio, an inverted Smerdiakov. In both novels, the illigitimate brothers 
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commit parallel murders within the family unit, both murderous acts finding their 
theoretical legitimation in the thought of the intellectual among the three brothers 
(Ivan and Julius). Far more than the ‘borrowing’ that critics of a bygone age 
denounced, Gide’s work is a conscious inversion of Dostoevsky’s: through 
Lafcadio Wluiki, Gide rachète Smerdiakov. While the former (etym. smerdet’: 
stink) was an eternal underdog, driven to suicide following his crime, the latter 
(etym. Wlk: wolf, according to Rayfield) displays a superman’s capacity for 
transcending criminality.243 It is in the consequent polemic on criminality and 
culpability that Gide most directly engages with Dostoevsky, tackling Crime and 
Punishment head on, and in particular the dominant reading of it epitomised for 
Gide by Vogüé.   
 
The oft-cited references to Crime and Punishment are strikingly overt. Lafcadio’s 
spontaneous rescue of two children from a burning house is a direct pastiche of 
Raskolnikov’s. The aristocratic theories expounded by Protos refer to 
Raskolnikov’s doctrine. If Lafcadio is a rewriting of Raskolnikov, Gide has made 
a number of significant ammendments. Early in the narrative Gide bestows upon 
Lafcadio financial security, removing the ‘hunger motive’ from the criminal act. 
His level-headed charm and general psychological balance, coupled with his 
complete lack of humanitarian pretentions, read intertextually, are further 
mitigations of Raskolnikov’s motives. Lafcadio’s resultant complete and 
unproblematic lack of remorse for his murder is the final inversion. Consequently, 
the conclusion of Les Caves is overtly parodic. The grisly end met by Carla, 
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Gide’s noble prostitute is an inversion of Sonya’s redemption of Raskolnikov and, 
as such, a rejection of Vogüé’s religion de la souffrance. Meanwhile Lafcadio, 
following a momentary mock-consideration of confession, reassures himself of 
his total moral independence through the sexual conquest of his victim’s (and his 
own) niece. The work ends with cutting irony and a direct quotation from the 
closing paragraph of Crime and Punishment: 
Quand bien même j'échapperais à la police, je n'échapperais pas à 
moi−même […] j'ai tué comme dans un rêve; un cauchemar où, depuis, je 
me débats... 
— Dont je veux vous arracher, cria−t−elle. […] C'est à Dieu qu'il faut vous 
livrer, non aux hommes. […] l'Église est là pour vous prescrire votre peine et 
pour vous aider à retrouver la paix, par−delà votre repentir. 
[…]L'amour la pousse, l'élance vers lui. Lafcadio la saisit, la presse, couvre 
son pâle front de baisers... 
Ici commence un nouveau livre. […] Au loin, dans les casernes, le clairon 
chante. Quoi! va−t−il renoncer à vivre? et pour l'estime de Geneviève, qu'il 
estime un peu moins depuis qu'elle l'aime un peu plus, songe−t−il encore à se 
livrer?244 
 
Но тут уж начинается новая история, история постепенного обновления 
человека, история постепенного перерождения его, постепенного 
перехода из одного мира в другой, знакомства с новою, доселе 
совершенно неведомою действительностью. Это могло бы составить 
тему нового рассказа, — но теперешний рассказ наш окончен.245 
Gide’s ironic ‘immoralist’ rewriting of Sonya’s salvation of Raskolnikov in many 
ways corresponds to Shestov’s critical treatment of the same passage, as explored 
in the next chapter. Andler’s reading of Nietzsche and Dostoevsky can shed light 
on Gide’s references to Dostoevsky’s thought in Les Caves.246 Dostoevsky never 
broached truly gratuitous crime, or indeed truly gratuitous action (as discussed 
with reference to the ambivalence surrounding Kirilov’s suicide). In this respect, 
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Gide’s novel can be seen as a Nietzschean rewriting of Dostoevsky’s novel. If 
Raskolnikov proved incapable of escaping guilt and punishment for his 
intellectually motivated, philosophical crime, Lafcadio’s spontaneous, capricious 
murder is entirely guiltless, and as such, crimeless. 
 
In light of this it makes little sense to speak of Caves des Vatican as a novel 
‘influenced’ by Dostoevsky, nor to speak (as Bettinson and many of Gide’s 
contemporaries did)247 of Gide’s borrowings and plagiarisms. In its rich pastiche 
and parodic inversions it offers a direct challenge to the Russian novelist, or 
rather, to a particular reading of the novelist. What comparativists have neglected 
is that through the satirical appearance of Vogué in the novel, les Caves is a direct 
discussion of Dostoevky’s French reception. Despite his overt criticism in 1908, 
Gide’s resentment toward Vogüé had clearly not been fully vented. If Gide’s 
aristocratic literary fop, Julius de Baraglioul’s title, paternal connection to the 
foreign office, publications in La Revue des deux-mondes and his ambitious drive 
towards L’Academie Française were not enough to associate the fictional 
second-rate novelist with Vogüé, Gide name-drops his predecessor in the opening 
pages of the chapter entitled to Baraglioul. As the character laments the 
ambiguous to negative general response to his L’Air des Cimes, his wife reminds 
him of the positive response it had received from the church, and reminds him of 
the words M. de Vogüé had written in its favour: “Une plume comme la vôtre, 
contre la barbarie qui nous menace, défend la France mieux qu’une épée.”248 
Clearly the critic’s Christian conservative politics are implied to have determined 
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his judgement rather than the work’s aesthetic valour. Furthermore, a hypocritical 
discrepancy between Vogué’s officially cosmopolitan literary politics and his 
nationalism is also clearly suggested: the champion of the Russian novel is 
presented by Gide as an ideological protectionist, in keeping with Gide’s 
representation of the Viscount’s ‘censorship’ of Dostoevsky in his own 1908 
article.  
 
 
Contemporary readings: André Suarès, Jacques Copeau, Élie Faure 
(1911-1914) 
 
In the period immediately preceding the outbreak of war a number of other 
‘modern’ French intellectuals began to reassess the oeuvre of Dostoevsky. 
Dostoevsky was becoming increasingly central to the conception novelistic 
modernity in opposition to aesthetic clacissism, nationalised as French.249 As 
Akio Yoshi has observed, this association was particularly strong among the 
writers associated with Gide and the NRF.250 In terms of scope and profundity, 
Gide’s reading was undeniably the most developed of the period, as comparison 
with contemporaneous readings by André Suarès, Jacques Copeau and Élie Faure 
will serve to illustrate. 
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André Suarès 
 
In 1911, Suarès published a rival interpretation of Dostoevsky in the Cahiers de 
la Quinzaine. Despite Suarès’ overt claims to a long-standing and considered 
acquaintance with his author’s works251 his analysis leaves considerable room 
for doubt. The 100-page work not only lacks specific citations from works; it 
makes almost no reference even to the titles of Dostoevsky’s novels nor the 
names of his characters. One rare exception is a footnote (afterthought?) on the 
thirty-sixth page, listing Crime and Punishment and The Idiot as chefs-d’oeuvre, 
Le Joueur as a ‘roman confus’ and L’Eternel Mari as a ‘livre médiocre’. However, 
all of these judgments could equally have been extracted from Vogüé’s Le Roman 
russe. Like Vogüé, Suarès omits, for example, Notes from Underground and The 
Adolescent. On one occasion, in a disjointed and suspiciously wedged-in 
paragraph, Suarès announces “Dostoïevski est riche en mots inoubliables”252 
before enumerating three ‘memorable lines’ from The Idiot, three from Crime and 
Punishment and two from the same page of Brothers Karamazov. This is the only 
occasion on which he cites directly from the oeuvre he is supposedly interpreting, 
and all of these “mots inoubliables” come from between the first and seventh 
pages of the tomes from which they have been selected. He does make several 
general references to Myshkin, suggesting a greater familiarity with the Idiot than 
other works; however, most of these references have the ends of equating the 
attributes of this one character to their author.253 Clearly, such a study cannot be 
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considered seriously in terms of any critical contribution to the study of 
Dostoevsky. It does, nevertheless, provide a wealth of insight into the various 
prejudices that surrounded the Russian author, as well as highlighting the upper 
hand Gide had over his contemporaries.  
 
Suarès shares with Vogüé and Gide the tendency to equate any sensation of 
aesthetic unfamiliarity in Dostoevsky’s work to its Russian-ness, a category 
extrapolated more often than not towards a more general Asianness, observing, 
for example: “la simplicité familière et la douceur d’Orient […] Ils [les russes] 
ont cette faculté d’émotion si générale en Orient.” 254  Suarès’ superficial 
comparison of Dostoevsky’s “passions qui se passionnent” to Stendhal, where 
“tout est clair; tout est ordre; toute est esprit”255  indicates that traditional 
conceptions of ‘l’esprit français’ and ‘ l’âme russe’ dominate his thinking: “Ce 
que l’Occident connaît par la mesure, le Russe le devine par le sentiment”.256 
Suarès’s ethnocentrism even extends to the assumption that Russia has been 
significantly civilised by the fact alone that Dostoevsky’s fictional world has 
reached French readers:  
Dostoïevski a créé pour nous la Russie mystique […] entre l’Europe et 
l’Asie, qui porte à l’ennui du crépuscule occidental le feu et l’âme divine 
de l’Orient. Quel roi, quel politique ou quel conquérant a plus agi pour ça 
race? C’est dans Dostoïevski, enfin, que la Russie cessant, d’être cosaque, 
se manifeste une réserve pour l’avenir, une resource pour le genre 
humain.257   
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Suarès’s fantasy does not limit itself to ethnography. He dedicates, for example, 
almost an entire page (more than was spared for his textual analysis) to a 
presumably entirely imagined (if embellished) description of Dostoevsky’s 
eyes.258 Suarès, doubtlessly following Gide, then ends with a general comparison 
of Nietzsche and Dostoevsky, seeing the later as “un Nietzsche racheté”: an 
affirming force capable of overcoming the “mort et négation” of Nitzsche’s 
thought.259 Saurès concludes by writing off Nietzsche with the same perenial 
argument that Francisque Sarcey had used to dismiss Dostoevsky in 1885: “Il 
n’est bon qu’aux femmes de lettres et aux jeunes gens.”260  
 
The conclusion of the study (addressed directly to “O Féodor Mikhaïlovitch, si 
ardent, si aigu et si humble”) is revelatory: “Où tout est amour, tout est vie! Par 
delà le néant de tous les objets éphémères, c’est là-dessous enfin que notre espoir 
se fonde.”261 Of Dostoevsky’s affirmation of existence, of redemption within 
lived human reality, and of the various overt polemics against transcendentalism 
in his fiction, Suarès’s sources seem to have told him nothing.262 
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Jacques Copeau 
 
Copeau and Croué’s adaptation of The Brothers Karamazov, first staged at the 
Théâtre des Arts in 1911 (6th April), marks an important event in the reception of 
Dostoevsky in France.263 Comparison of the adaptation to the original text also 
offers a revealing insight into the playwright’s interpretation of the Russian 
novelist. Like Suarès, and most of the circle associated with the NRF at its 
creation, Copeau’s enthusiasm for Dostoevsky had been formed and kindled by 
Gide. Gide was, of course, close to Copeau and wrote enthusiastically of his 
adaptation project in Le Figaro in 1911. Less widely-known is that Gide was also 
actively involved in the early stages of the scripting of the adaptation, as his 
correspondence to Harpéline-Kaminsky in the Jacques Ducet literary archive 
indicates: “C’est avec moi que Copeau commença de travailler à son drame, et, 
comme vous le dites, il n’a eu, le plus souvent, qu’à reproduire textuellement vos 
phrases.”264  
 
While wrestling with the ambitious task of adapting the colossal novel for the 
stage in 1910, Copeau wrote to Peter Gast, challenging the common opinion that 
Dostoevsky lacked in compositional skill: “Dire des livres de Dostoïevsky qu’il 
sont mal composés, c’est pratiquement n’en rien dire, ou plutôt, c’est soumettre 
son esprit à une idée toute faite de la composition littéraire.”265 The adaptation is 
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remarkably loyal, given the precedent set by previous adaptors and translators, 
indicative of a significant shift in the status of Dostoevsky’s fiction among the 
younger generation of writers. In his correspondence, Copeau noted a broad 
intellectual debt to Dostoevsky: “j’ai été profondément marqué par ce 
Dostoïevsky, et qu’en me rapprochant de lui c’est de moi-même que je me 
rapproche.”266 He did, however, qualify this debt slightly more ambiguously in a 
in a subsequent letter: “Oui, D. est un géant. Il m’a marqué. Mais peut-être d’un 
coup de talon sur la nuque…”267 Copeau’s choices throughout the adaptation 
process permit speculation as to possible points of divergence from Dostoevsky’s 
thought and its fictional representation.  
 
The most striking alteration concerns Copeau’s characterisation of Ivan. The 
editor of Copeau and du Gard’s correspondence has noted that Copeau had been 
seduced by the “ardent” and “empassioned” youths of Dostoevsky’s fiction.268 
This is evident in his approach to Ivan, which stresses his Romantic psychology 
but omits all of his philosophical expositions. His famous discourses, ‘Rebellion’ 
and ‘The Grand Inquisitor’, are reduced to the following lines: “Pas la révolte! 
On ne peut vivre dans la révolte. Et je vis, en dépit de tout. Pas la révolte, oh! 
non… Mais le désespoir, ou plutôt… l’indignation, oui: un refus! Voilà: je 
n’accepte pas le monde!”269 The practical necessity for abridging Ivan’s diatribe 
for the stage is evident; what is curious, however, is the choice to remove the 
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question of freedom and theodicy, the dialectics that provoked Ivan’s revolt in the 
original and which Dostoevsky had identified as the question that tormented him 
most throughout his life.270 All that remains in the adaptation is Ivan’s anguished 
rejection of earthly existence which, without its original context, reverts Ivan to 
the paradigmatic Romantic hero. While Dostoevsky’s Ivan’s revolt was famously 
directed against the supposed divine justice of creation, Copeau’s Ivan redirects 
his revolt against the inconsistencies of his own psychology.271 As such, Copeau 
rewrites him as a ‘rebellious type’: a psychological paradox, as opposed to the 
mouthpiece of a philosophical paradox. This extends to Ivan’s language: as in the 
above quotation, eloquently developed discourse is replaced to surprisingly 
disjointed outbursts that verge on incoherence. Ivan’s uncanny interlocution with 
the devil is correspondingly rendered unambiguously as the raving monologue of 
a hamletesque madman.272 
 
A second significant adaptation is the augmented role of Smerdiakov. The 
shadowed and deliberately sketchily-traced character of the original takes on a 
leading role (that was first interpreted by Charles Dullin). Humiliation is 
accentuated as Smerdiakov’s psychological driver 273  and indeed seems to 
underpin the entire play, particularly the Katerina-Mitia-Grushenka 
plotline. 274 Psychological motives are thus accentuated throughout while 
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philosophical motives (the various expositions of ideas that the playwrites 
referred to as “certains épisodes secondaires”275) are removed. It is noteworthy 
that the critics commended this: the play was perceived to have retained “les deux 
choses essentielles: d’une part, la violence du drame, de l’autre la psychologie 
des personnages.”276  
 
The set and costumes were exoticised by designer Maxime Dethomas, who 
explained this choice in the following terms: “Au dix huitième siècle, on avait 
créé une chinoiserie et une turquerie très savoureuse, nullement documentée. J’ai 
pensé que je pourrais faire de même [pour la Russie] à notre époque. […] Je 
souhaite que les héros de Dostoïevski s’y détachent en vigueur. Je les ai fait dater 
par leurs costumes, car ils ne pouvaient être tout à fait modernes dans cette 
Russie imaginée.”277 Dethomas’ kitch paraphernalia of russerie perhaps assisted 
Joseph Galtier to identify in the staging: “ce je ne sais quoi de troublant qui 
caractérise l’âme russe. Devant elle, nous nous sentons à la fois dépaysés et 
attirés, comme lorsque nous pénétrons dans l’empire des tsars.”278 
 
Ultimately, the adaptation steered Dostoevsky back towards more familiar 
Romantic territory both in terms of cultural representation and characterisation. 
Copeau also shared much of Suarès’ romantic enthusiasm with regards to the 
figure of the novelist himself. His reaction to Suarès’ article attests to this. For 
both writers, Dostoevsky represented:  
                                                   
275
 Cited in Gaston Sorbets, "Les Frères Karamazov au Théâtre des Arts," in Les Frères 
Karamazov, ed. Jacques Copeau and Jean Croué (Paris: L'Illustration, 1911), p. 1. 
276
 Ibid., p. 33. 
277
 Ibid., p. 33. 
278
 Ibid., p. 33. 
103 
 
le plus homme de tous les hommes, le plus enfoncé que l’on puisse 
concevoir au sien même de l’humanité, le plus prédestiné à la pure 
connaissance et le plus sacrifié, mais le plus libre aussi, car toutes les formes 
de la vie et tous les drames se rencontrent en lui, le traversent et le 
transpercent.279 
Gide is thus the only French homme de lettres in a position to offer comparatively 
level-headed commentary of Dostoevsky’s.  
 
Élie Faure 
 
One potential contender to Gide arose in 1914 with art historian Élie Faure’s 
chapter on Dostoevsky in his Constructeurs. The book places the Russian 
novelist alongside Nietzsche, Michelet, Lamark and Cézanne as the forgers of a 
neo-modern conception of man. Regrettably, these essays have no comparative 
element. Like Suarès, Faure finds Dostoevsky’s ‘self-portrait’ in the Idiot: “Il faut 
lire L’Idiot, Il fut L’Idiot” ; “il écrit l’Idiot pour essayer de se saisir lui-même, 
mais là surtout il se dérobe, et les autres avec lui.”280 At times the comparison 
becomes deliberately confused, Dostoevsky melting into Myshkin.281 However, 
like Gide, it is in the Possédés that Faure finds the clearest expression of 
Dostoevsky’s thought and his most forceful representation of his opposition 
between “la certitude, la calme architecture morale et le rationalisme objectif” 
and “l’irrésolution déchirante, le tragique, sentimental, l’incessant débordement 
de l’âme hors des cadres de la loi.”282  
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Faure is among the first in France to integrate the Notes into his reading of 
Dostoevsky’s conception of man. Faure reads it in rather Rousseauist terms as an 
interrogation of human nature: “Dieu des humain, suis-je noble ou suis-je vil?”283 
In line with this moralistic reading of the Notes, Faure recounts the Brothers 
Karamazov as the tale of Dmitri’s struggle between sensualism and personal 
moral standards.284 In placing the stress on Dmitri over Ivan and Aliosha, the 
philosophical interrogation that they embody is downplayed. As with Copeau’s 
adaptation, the novel’s interrogation of the existence and legitimacy of God (that 
Dostoevsky deemed the crux of the novel)285 is omitted from Faure’s reading. 
When it comes to Crime and Punishment, Faure does go a step beyond the 
moralistic reading of his predecessors. He recognised ahead of his generation that 
Raskolnikov did not repent on any spiritual level for his act, but rather is forced 
to confess by a need to reunite with the collective, having, like Sonya, been 
severed from society by: “quelque chose que les hommes appellent ‘crime’ et 
dont on ne peut se délivrer qu’en se confessant à eux.”286 
 
As with the other critical responses explored thus far, appeal to the Volksgeist 
dominates here again: “comme les autre Russes, il a besoin de pardonner, besoin 
d’aimer, besoin de souffrir et qu’on souffre pour consoler et être consolé”;287 
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“Tout Français a l’esprit architectural”.288 Faure, like Vogüé and Suarès, invests 
considerably more energy in accentuating Dostoevsky’s alterity as opposed to 
bridging the gap to the readership.289 Dostoevsky’s aesthetic deviation from the 
European tradition is automatically and necessarily attributed to an Asian 
conception of art in opposition to “l’esprit régulateur de l’Occident”.290 The 
conventional conception of Dostoevsky as a barbarian possessed by a talent he 
cannot understand shines through Faure’s reading:  
Avec lui, on n’a pas le droit de parler de ce qu’on appelle le style. Il ne sait 
pas écrire, il n’écrit pas. Sa forme n’est pas neuve. Elle n’a pas besoin de 
l’être. Une puissance interne anime tout, incorporant les scories et les pierres 
mortes à l’organisme primatif lui sort de son incessante action.291  
Like Voltaire’s Shakespeare, Faure’s Dostoevsky can only have written malgré 
lui. Though the value judgement has been reversed, the underlying assumption 
remains that aesthetics that do not refer to Rome are fortuitous barbaric accidents. 
Ultimately, Faure’s study ends where Vogüé’s began: with an image (this time a 
visual illustration) of St. Basil’s cathedral imposing on the final page as an 
ultimate symbol of Russia as orient.292  
 
Gide’s mature reading (1914-1925) 
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Gide’s most developed reading of Dostoevsky came to fruition in the early 1920s, 
shortly followed by his most engaged novelistic dialog with Dostoevsky, in the 
form of Les Faux-Monnayeurs. The personal crisis that coincided with the Great 
War and the conclusions Gide drew from this in his reflective work Numquid et 
tu… fed directly into his mature interpretation of Dostoevsky. The title of the 
reflexive work, an allusion to the interrogation of Christ in John 7. 46. and John 7. 
52., establishes Gide’s introspective interrogation of the nature of his faith and 
personal ethics.  
 
On 15th Febuary Gide comes to a deeper understanding of John 12. 24. and John 
12. 25.: “Si le grain de blé ne meurt… et encore Celui qui aime sa vie la perdra. 
Ici le Christ renonce à l’homme; ici vraiment il devient Dieu.”293 This significant 
passage, which Dostoevsky had chosen as his epigraph for Brothers Karamazov, 
and that Gide would later choose as the title for his famous memoirs, contains the 
idea that would permit him to reconcile his until now opposed conceptions of 
individualism and Christianity: “C’est dans la négation de soi que bondit et se 
réfugie l’affirmation de soi la plus haute.”294 Gide had encountered this paradox 
in Dostoevsky’s thought, specifically in his ‘Essay on the bourgeoisie,’ which he 
had cited and discussed this in relation to Christ in his ‘Dostoïevsky d’après sa 
correspondence’ eight years previously.295 As Gide would reveal in the Numquid, 
his own eventual conclusion was the same: “Résurrection dans la vie totale. Oubli 
de tout bonheur particulier. Ô réintégration parfaite!”296 
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Another idea to reach fruition in this period was Gide’s notion that:  
La vie éternelle n’est pas seulement à venir. Elle est dès à présent toute 
présente en nous; nous la vivons dès l’instant que nous consentons à mourir à 
nous mêmes, à obtenir de nous ce renoncement qui permette la résurrection 
dans l’éternité. Celui qui hait sa vie dans ce monde la conservera pour la vie 
éternelle (Jean, XII, 25)”297 
This too was informed by, and would in turn inform, Gide’s readings of Kirilov 
and Zosima, and is thus another key to his Dostoïevsky. He continues: 
Celui qui aime sa vie, son âme, - qui protège sa personnalité, qui soigne sa 
figure dans ce monde – la perdra; mais celui-là qui en fera l’abandon, la 
rendra vraiment vivante, lui assurera la vie éternelle; non point la vie 
futurement éternelle, mais la fera déjà, dès à présent, vivre à même l’éternité. 
Amen, amen dico vobis, nisi granum frumenti cadens in terram, mortuum 
fuerit, ipse solum manet: si autem mortum fuerit, multum fructum affert. 
(Jean XII, 24)298  
At this troubled time, Gide seems unaware of any connection between his new 
understanding of the Christian faith and Dostoevsky’s thought. The figure of 
Dostoevsky is far from his thoughts and writings, which are dominated by 
reflections on the war, inner struggle and the Gospels. Political circumstances 
would soon change this.  
 
The following year the Bolshevik Revolution would turn all eyes to Russia,299 
and with it, to Dostoevsky, its ‘prophet’. Lalou recalled an “explosion de 
dostoïevskisme” in France following 1918.300 Rather than seeing in Dostoevsky 
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a depiction of the early stages of the Revolution as he witnessed them in 
development, many French commentators, for whom the Russian Revolution 
seemed to appear suddenly from nowhere, now perceived Dostoevsky as its 
prophet and the Demons as a recording of his revelation.301 In any case, the 
French literary scene, to use Bataille’s expression, was now “pregnant with 
revolution.”302 History seemed to have validated Dostoevsky’s oeuvre, which 
was rapidly becoming an undisputed modern classic. Gide’s long expressed 
preference for the Devils would likewise confirm his status as France’s leading 
authority on the Russian novelist, a position he was jealously keen to preserve. A 
final, vital factor in this rapid reassessment of Dostoevsky’s work was that the 
Revolution, via the ‘philosopher’s steamboat’, discussed in the next chapter, 
would bring Gide and his generation in to contact with the fruits of Russia’s 
Silver Age rethinking of Dostoevsky’s fiction. 
 
 
Dostoevsky’s Centenary and Gide’s Lectures (1921-23) 
 
The occasion of the centenary of Dostoevsky’s birth was to spark a new wave of 
critical publications, among them a special edition of the NRF in February 1922. 
The edition is of special interest to the current study as the first place of 
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publication of Shestov’s existential reading of Dostoevsky, explored in depth in 
the next chapter. Having collaborated with Shestov on the edition, Gide thus 
came into early contact with the existential interpretation, which elicited his high 
praise and an invitation to Shestov to attend his series of lectures on the subject of 
Dostoevsky, commencing that month at the Vieux Colombier.303 The ensemble 
of Gide’s 1908 and 1911 articles, the introduction to his Allocution in the NRF 
centenary edition, and the stenographed text from the Allocution itself were 
compiled in 1923 and published under the title of Dostoïevsky with Plon, 
constituting Gide’s most enduring contribution to Dostoevsky scholarship.   
 
The change in Gide’s tone by 1922 is striking. Gide, like Shestov, now confronts 
the challenge that Dostoevsky’s irrational conception of man poses to the 
rationalist tradition and discusses the place of subjective and non-rationalist 
modes of thought in Dostoevsky’s fiction, all in accordance with Shestov’s 
existential reading.304 Significantly, Gide for the first time here turns attention to 
the Notes from Underground: “Je crois que nous atteignons avec L’Esprit 
souterrain le sommet de la carrière de Dostoïevsky. Je le considère, ce livre (et je 
ne suis pas le seul), comme la clé de voûte de son oeuvre entière.”305 This is 
evidently a reference to Shestov’s recent collaboration, which read Dostoevsky’s 
thought, for the first time in France, through Notes from Underground. However, 
Shestov’s reading does not appear to have penetrated Gide’s deeply. Gide does 
not engage with Dostoevsky’s anti-rationalism on epistemological terms, but 
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remains bound to his now elaborate orientalist reading. 306  Gide’ primary 
concerns are thus the healthy experience of culture shock that the cosmopolitan 
French readership might obtain from Dostoevsky’s fiction and, ultimately, the 
points of contact between Dostoevsky’s characters’ ideas and Gide’s own 
conception of the Christian self, as developed in his contemporaneous personal 
writings. As Gide avowed in his Journal (22 Apr 1922) from the outset: “Ce sera, 
tout autant qu’un livre de critique, un livre de confessions, pour qui sait lire: ou 
plutôt; une profession de foi.”307  
 
The meandering form of Gide’s study, consisting as it does of six dictographed, 
largely improvised lectures, problematises analysis somewhat. However, Gide’s 
reading strategy itself is fairly clear, as are his ultimate aims. The inverse of his 
1911 study, Gide now tackles l’oeuvre almost independently of l’homme, 
disregarding chronology and context:308 It is not the genesis of particular works 
that is under scrutiny, but the confrontation between the texts and the French 
reader. Like Vogüé before him, Gide uses Dostoyevsky to launch a critique of 
French intellectual culture and, following Rivière, he raises up an ‘aesthetics of 
complexity’ in opposition to French classicism.309 Gide goes considerably further 
than Vogüé and Rivière, however, and further than his own 1908 attempt, in 
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developing the idea of a resultant ‘psychology of complexity’.310 Not only our 
knowledge of psychology, but our very thought processes and behaviour are thus 
conceived to be limited by learned patterns. Gide posits that, in receiving 
Dostoevsky, a generation had not only learned to depict fictional characters with 
more complexity and precision, but consequently to experience and perform 
psychological reality differently.311 The implications of Gide’s statement are 
strikingly reminiscent of Ivanov’s expression of the influence of Dostoevsky on 
the Russian Silver Age: “Он сделал сложными наши душу, нашу веру, наше 
искусство”.
312
 From this stance Gide can launch his attack on lingering 
protectionists in abhorrence of the formless and disorderly, on the grounds that 
innovative forms seem necessarily formless. 313  Gide’s reading is typically 
modernist in embracing what he calls Dostoevsky’s psychological ‘chasms’ and 
narratological ‘vortex,’314 in defiance not only of classicism in literary terms, but 
against a conception of man there entrenched and perpetuated. Gide’s lectures are 
among the first in France to genuinely engage with Dostoevsky’s novelistic 
thought. Gide relates this to Pascal and Baudelaire, noting that in the French 
tradition:  
un certain ordre de problèmes, d’angoisses, de passions, de rapports, soient 
réservés au moraliste, au théologien, au poète et que le roman n’ait que faire 
de s’en laisser encombrer.315  
Anticipating Bakhtin, Gide sees the Dostoevskian novel as an innovative, 
novelistic presentation of a chorus of contradictory philosophical ideas:  
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Je ne connais pas d’écrivain plus riche en contradictions et en 
inconscéquences que Dostoïevsky; Nietzsche dirait: “en antagonismes.” S’il 
avait été philosophe au lieu d’être romancier, il aurait certainement essayé de 
mettre ses idées au pas et nous y aurions perdu le meilleur.316  
However, as the quote betrays, Gide has not appreciated that the breadth of 
thoughts surpassed the convictions of their creator: “il s’est éperdument donné 
dans son oeuvre. Il est perdu dans chacun des personnages de ses livres; et c’est 
pourquoi dans chacun d’eux, on le retrouve.”317 This is why, as we shall see, 
Gide’s own attempt at the polyphonic novel was comparatively unsuccessful. 
However, the critical licence Gide permits himself through such a conception 
makes for an original, if rather refractive reading.  
 
Gide feels obliged to disregard Dostoevsky’s problematic journalistic endeavours 
(on the grounds of poor style and inaccuracy),318 maintaining that the author’s 
genuine worldview found expression only through fictional voices. These voices 
he then organises structurally into three planes, corresponding to the intellect, the 
passions and the soul. Gide’s language betrays his conceptualisation of these in 
hierarchical arrangement: he refers repeatedly to the intellectual plane as “la 
région la plus haute”; to the passions as “intermediary” and the soul as the 
“deepest” plane.319 This imagery is directly at odds with Dostoevsky’s own 
linguistic treatment of these ‘planes’: Dostoevsky had made it explicit throughout 
his works that the intellect constituted the ‘lowest’ plane. Its conceptual 
spacialisation is the “подполье”; Dmitri Karamazov’s conversion and Ivan’s 
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demise are related to the moral structure summed up by “ум подлес.”320 
Raskolnikov eventually associates his self with a louse, the underground man 
with a mouse, and so on. Gide’s structural arrangement thus elucidates his own 
thought, which in this regard is opposed diametrically to Dostoevsky’s.  
 
A revelatory curiosity is that it is on the psychological plane that Gide broaches 
ethics. Gide presents the dichotomy of humility and humiliation (the latter a 
renunciation of pride in opposition to the former, its spiteful reinforcement) at the 
heart of Dostoevskian ethics. All of Dostoevsky’s characters, Gide posits, can be 
arranged along this axis.321 This dialectics of humility and humiliation is traced 
to the underground, specifically to the injury of its protagonist by the officer in 
the pool hall. Clearly this is a fairly reductive reading of the work, especially in 
light of the reversal of psychological causality that Dostoevsky had fostered 
through the chronological inversion of the two halves of the work. Likewise, 
Gide follows Varvara Petrovna in reducing Stavrogin’s “ironic life” to a case of 
injured pride.322  
 
It is likewise on the psychological plane of the passions that Gide tackles 
Dostoevsky’s paradoxalism. Gide sets this in opposition to traditional French 
character psychology, which he conceives to be rooted in a fundamental 
dialectical struggle between opposed forces, most classically desire and duty.323 
What Dostoevsky offers, on the contrary, is a natural coexistence of contrary 
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impulses, with no necessary dialectical struggle nor synthesis: “le déconcertant, 
c’est la simultanéité de tout cela, et la conscience que garde chaque personnage 
de ses inconséquences, de sa dualité.”324 Gide thus pinpoints Dostoevsky’s 
innovation as a step away from binary psychologies.325 
 
Following Pascal and Baudelaire, Dostoevsky and Blake, Gide revels in the dual 
nature of man, a simultaneous embodiment of the divine and the demonic, thus 
making his transition from psychology to ethics.326 The self Gide sees as a 
battleground between continuity and sincerity, i.e. between conventional desire 
reactions based on learned self-perception, and sincere desire reactions based on 
spontaneous urges, the latter of which Gide clearly values more highly. It is 
crucial to an understanding of how Gide interprets Dostoevskian ethics that moral 
questioning takes place uniquely on the plane of the passions. Behaviour is the 
affair of psychology, where all urges and actions are subjectively permissible, 
while the only value that presides over them is sincerity, understood as 
spontaneous reactions to desire. The intellectual plane is seen as necessarily 
egotistical. This is in keeping with Dostoevsky’s own representation; however, 
the plane of the soul differs dramatically. Gide’s “deepest region” is entirely 
personal, having no interaction with either desire or reaction, but only with a 
strictly metaphysical understanding of abnegation. The opposite end of Gide’s 
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spectrum, the intellectual region, is likewise dissociated from action insofar as 
reflection is deemed to lead essentially to a paralysing egoism and inaction, thus 
returning to the thesis of Notes from Underground.  
 
Despite his assertion of the centrality of this text in Dostoevsky’s thought and his 
oblique reference to Shestov’s ‘underground’ interpretation, Gide offers no 
genuine analysis of this supposed clé de voûte. Indeed, his only discussion of its 
philosophical implications is to reduce it to the epithet: “celui qui pense n’agit 
pas” before extrapolating this to the whole of Dostoevsky’s novelistic thought.327 
However, the conclusions Gide wishes to draw from this go considerably further, 
and require a wizardly slight of hand. Gide turns his discussion away from 
Dostoevsky on a detour via Nietzsche and Browning in order to reach the 
conclusion that “l’esprit n’agit point, il fait agir”, which he then presents as a 
Dostoevskian dictum.328 Thus, Gide presents the Dostoevskian intellectual not as 
an incapacitated perversion, as Shestov had done, but as a higher race of 
Supermen leading the herd from inactive hights. Clearly this is fairly removed 
from Dostoevsky’s fictional representation.  
 
The most obvious counter-argument of Raskolnikov Gide pre-empts and writes 
off the novel as an early, immature work. The underground man is left in 
obscurity. Meanwhile, Stavrogin is presented as the intellectual driver of 
Verkhovensky, when in fact Dostoevsky makes it clear that while the latter 
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desires to exploit the persona of the former for political gain, Stavrogin’s thought 
is immaterial to Verkhovensky’s careerist ends. Gide’s previously observed scale 
of values, with intelligence at the structural top, is again in evidence. While Gide 
displayed an infatuation with Dostoevsky’s presentation of paradoxical states of 
mind, he could not accept the epistemological critique implied in Dostoevsky’s 
anti-intellectualism.  
 
This inversion does not imply that Gide disregards or underestimates the region 
of the soul; however, his discussion of it is isolated from the rest of the analysis. 
For Gide, the Christian thought at the ‘deepest’ level of Dostoevsky’s fiction 
exists in a kind of bubble. Gide identifies the teachings of Zossima, along with 
Alesha and Myshkin, as the core of Dostoevsky’s thought. He stresses the 
immanentism that Dostoevsky’s Christian thought implies (in opposition to 
Suarès’ transcendentalist reading) and the possibility of conciliation and paradise 
on Earth in the immediate present, all in resonance with his own writings in 
Numquid et tu… However, there is a strong sense in Gide’s reading of 
Dostoevsky that faith is equivalent to abnegation and as such represents a 
renunciation of intelligence, which he equates to egoism, creativity and the 
diabolical. It is for this reason that Gide read’s Zossima as “un saint, non pas un 
héros. Il n’atteint à la sainteté précisément qu’en abdiquant la volonté, qu’en 
résignant l’inteligence.”329 Gide’s conception of will is revealed as synonymous 
to egoism; intelligence as synonymous to rationality, and as such incompatible 
with faith. Likewise, this betrays Gide’s presumption of intelligence as an 
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essential facet of heroism. 
 
For Gide, the Christian ideal is abnegation, which he opposes relentlessly to 
individualism. The divine is thus not to be found in the individual personality but 
in its negation, as the Nourritures had expressed: “Ne souhaite pas, Nathanaël, 
trouver Dieu ailleurs que partout. Chaque créature indique Dieu, aucune ne le 
révèle. Dès que notre regard s’arrête à elle, chaque créature nous détourne de 
Dieu.”330 For Gide, the self is the ego, and exists in opposition to creation. This 
is the opposite of Dostoevsky’s Christian thought, as expressed by Dmitri 
Karamazov following his spiritual and existential awakening: 
И кажется столько во мне этой силы теперь, что я все поборю, все 
страдания, только чтобы сказать и говорить себе поминутно: я есмь! 
В тысячи мук — я есмь, в пытке корчусь — но есмь! В столпе сижу, но 
и я существую, солнце вижу, а не вижу солнца, то знаю, что оно есть. 
А знать, что есть солнце — это уже вся жизнь.331 
Maxence was perhaps not unjustified in accusing Gide of “portestantising” 
Dostoevsky.332  Nevertheless, Gide’s was the first reading in France of the 
religious aspects of Dostoevsky’s thought that went significantly beyond “la 
religion de la souffrance”.333  
 
For Gide, the third and deepest plane is fundamentally personalistic. This 
presents a number of problems in his reading of Dostoevsky. The Christian 
thought that Gide posits at the ‘core’ of Dostoevsky’s oeuvre, he dissociates 
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entirely from Orthodoxy, and entirely from ethics. As observed, Gide conceives 
of ethics strictly in terms of desires and a dichotomy of convention vs. 
spontaneous, sincere action. All that remains of Dostoevsky’s Christian thought is 
what Gide repeatedly refers to as “une sorte de Bouddhisme”. 334  Vogüé’s 
orientalist legacy is in evidence: Orthodox doctrine is once again extrapolated 
back toward supposed Vedic roots. “L’individu triomphe dans le renoncement à 
l’individualité,” writes Gide, “Résurrection dans la vie totale, oubli de tout 
bonheur particulier, O réintégration parfaite.”335  
 
In concurrence with Vogüé and the Belle Epoque critics, Gide persists in reading 
Dostoevsky as an oriental force, repeating the notions that he had received from 
the Slavophiles via Vogüé. In Gide, these serve the same rhetorical function that 
they did for Vogüé: the regeneration of Europe is deemed to necessarily come 
from outwith. As such, Dostoevsky is located “plus près de l’Asie que de 
Rome”336 in order to give his thought the required metaphysical ‘leverage’ to 
budge the French tradition. For all the innovative force of Gide’s comments on 
psychology and performativity, any notion that cultural distinctions may be 
equally performative eludes him.  
 
These comments differ little from those of Vogüé’s, such that Gide’s reading 
cannot be described as a significant step towards a more cosmopolitanist reading. 
Gide’s innovation lies in his positing (informed by his own theological reflections 
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in Numquid et tu) of a paradoxical connection in Dostoevsky’s thought between 
self-affirmation and religious abnegation, in opposition to the traditional reading 
whereby self-affirmation leads directly to atheism and to self-destruction. To 
substantiate this reading, Gide returns to where his interrogation of Dostoevsky’s 
fiction had begun in 1899: to the riddle of Kirilov. 
 
It is noteworthy that Kirilov, in Gide’s reading, is not associated with 
Dostoevsky’s egomaniacal intellectuals but with the various holy fools that 
populate the ‘deepest plane’. As stated, this personalistic plane Gide conceived to 
be impervious to moral concerns. The renunciation of the self – Kirilov’s suicidal 
project – Gide sees at the centre of Dostoevsky’s religious thought. Remnants of 
Gide’s early parallel reading of Kirilov and Nietzsche remain intact: the role of 
illness in revelation is stressed, again, not as a literary device but as a 
fundamental aspect of Dostoevsky’s gnosticism and, for Gide, of genius in 
general.337 The opposition that Gide had initially established between Nietzsche 
and Kirilov is strengthened. Gide highlighted that both draw fundamentally 
opposed conclusions from the same revelation of human freedom: the former 
referring to self-will, the latter to abnegation. 338  However, certain crucial 
elements of Gide’s understanding of Kirilov have been honed. The mistaken 
notion of force from the part of Verkhovensky has been removed. More 
importantly Gide’s definition of gratuity has been refined:  
Le suicide de Kiriloff est un acte absolument gratuit, je veux dire que sa 
motivation n’est point extérieure. Tout ce que l’on peut faire entrer d’absurde 
dans ce monde, à la faveur et à l’abri d’un “acte gratuit”, c’est ce que nous 
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allons voir […] cet acte, pour être gratuit, n’est pourtant point immotivé.339 
Gide’s conception of the absurd is here in evidence: the absurd in this context is 
neither a latent attribute of reality nor a discrepancy between a rationalist outlook 
and an un-rationalisable reality. Rather it is willed and actively generated through 
gratuitous action, which is understood as action motivated exclusively to this end.  
 
Gide’s analysis of Kirilov’s project fills almost all of his final lecture, which is in 
turn his final critical engagement with Dostoevsky. Kirilov was also the subject 
of his first critical work dealing with Dostoevsky: his 6e lettre à Angèle of 1899. 
Therefore, the place of Kirilov in Gide’s reading cannot be over-stated. The same 
fundamental concerns of both studies – suicide, abnegation, revelation and 
gratuitous action – would resurface in the Faux-Monnayeurs, Gide’s last fictional 
interaction with Dostoevsky’s thought. 
 
 
Les Faux-Monnayeurs (1925) 
 
In 1922, Roger Martin du Gard urged Gide to draw from Dostoevsky in his next 
work of fiction: “Voyez ce que votre Dostoeïvski a fait de L’Idiot. […] Vous avez 
pourtant tout ce qu’il faut pour écrire un livre comme celui-là. Cependant […] 
vous auriez procédé tout autrement. Petitement.”340 Du Gard observed that Gide 
would have presented the material of a Dostoevskian novel as five or six consice 
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romans à thèse, but that: “l’extraordinaire force de L’Idiot vient surtout de 
l’enchevêtrement hardi de tous ces sujets divers.” 341 Moutote and Mileshin 
were justified in interpreting Les Faux-Monnayeurs as Gide’s attempt to meet du 
Gard’s challenge.342 Du Gard continued to correspond extensively with Gide on 
the emerging novel over the following years, regularly evoking Dostoevsky, 
urging Gide, for example, towards a Dostoevskian use of clairs-obscurs.343 It is 
not unreasonable to assume that Gide took considerable heed of this aesthetic 
guidance given that he dedicated the finished Faux-Monnayeurs to du Gard. 
 
The novel’s reception also testifies to a tangible Dostoevskian ‘flavour’, 
numerous critics having drawn attention to this from the novel’s first appearance. 
Curiously, this was particularly true of the novel’s detractors. Those more 
sympathetic to Dostoevsky saw in the Faux-Monnayeurs a failed attempt at 
imitation, while those hostile towards Dostoevsky lamented his influcence on 
Gide. Jaloux was in the former camp, raising the problem of the ‘unfrenchness’ of 
the Faux-Monnayeurs with relation to Dostoevsky:  
M. André Gide a certainement été, dans cette oeuvre, profondément 
influencé par Dostoïevski, mais justement un Russe ne se trouve jamais 
dépaysé devant Dostoïevski, et aucun Français qui lira Les 
Faux-Monnayeurs, en dehors des lettrés, n’aura l’impression de se trouver 
entouré d’êtres sinon pareils à soi, du moins assimilable à son esprit.344 
Jaloux’s statement betrays several curious assumptions: that Dostoevskian 
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characterisation is universally accepted by Russians; that Russian literature in 
France is appropriate only for an elite whilst the masses should restrict 
themselves to more accessible French literature. The further implication is that 
this French literature ought to correspond to their expectations. While these 
conclusions may be debatable, Jaloux’s critique of Gide’s characterisation is 
nonetheless valid: despite his expressed desire, Gide could never achieve 
polyphony, insofar as he could never dissociate his ego from his characters. This 
is why, while Lalou was not unfounded in receiving Les Faux-Monnayeurs as 
Gide’s ‘French version’ of The Devils, Fayer was perhaps equally justified in 
observing that there could be no Shatovs or Kirilovs in Gide’s fictional world.345 
 
Comparisons to Dostoevsky abounded in the Russian émigré reception of the 
Faux-Monnayeurs. Zaitsev’s reading was typical, as Livak has shown, in 
mobilising cultural stereotypes. He starts from the assumption that, as a French 
rewriting of Dostoevsky, Gide’s work was doomed from the outset to fall short of 
attaining [‘Russian’] profundity, and achieve only [‘French’] superficiality.346 
Inversely, for Adamovich, Gide’s work was praiseworthy precicely for its 
‘Russian’ traits and greater still than Dostoevsky’s owing to the authenticity of 
experience Gide recounted.347 Livak’s comparison of Zaïtsev’s and Adamovich’s 
articles shows how Gide’s quality was assessed by the benchmark of Dostoevsky, 
and both clearly operate within the binary system of oppositions surrounding the 
Franco–Russian literary relations; namely that of the French mind–Russian soul 
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dichotomy already discussed in chapter one.348 
 
Numerous French critics less predisposed towards Dostoevsky blamed Gide’s 
infatuation with the Russian for the scandalous novel, again in accordance with 
the established cultural mould. Louis Reynaud’s Crise de notre littéature asserted 
that Gide “s’annexa simplement Dostojewski, s’agrandit de ce barbare.”349 
Camille Mauclaire violently attacked the novel as an “enormous poisoned 
gateau” populated only by “repugnant individuals” that leave the reader with 
“nausea in the soul”, concluding that “Dostoevsky is to blame… you have to 
have monsters.” 350  Edmund Gosse, on reading the novel, wrote to Gide 
beseeching him:  
Try to release yourself from your bondage to the Russians, and particularly 
to Dostoevsky[.] We have all in time been subjected to the magic of this 
epileptic monster. But his genius has only led us astray, as I should say to any 
young writer of merit who appealed to me. Read what you like, only don’t 
waste your time reading Dostoevsky. He is the cocaine and morphine of 
modern literature.351 
Comparatists have set out to account for this ‘Dostoevskian flavour’, often with 
unconvincing results.352 Numerous parallels between characters and images have 
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been evoked; however, intertextual dialogues and thematic reverberations are in 
this case simply insufficient substantiation for the more fundamental and broadly 
acknowledged Dostoïevskisme that the work was deemed by contemporary critics 
to incarnate.353 If Gide’s Caves engaged with Dostoevsky’s oeuvre intertextually 
via pastiche and parody, Les Faux-Monnayeurs did so on a less textual level.  
 
A number of critics have tackled the connection in terms of narrative aesthetics, 
again without drawing satisfactory conclusions. Betisson posits potential 
structural parallels without tracing them, while Sheridan is unjustified in 
regarding les Faux-Monnayeurs as aesthetically categorically “undostoevskian” 
without defining the term.354 Jaloux penetrated deeper, seeing in Gide’s novel a 
failed attempt at a Dostoevsky-inspired narrative dissolution of the self. What 
Bakhtin identified as the polyphony of Dostoevsky’s narrative was an aspect of 
his fiction that Gide revered as an aesthetic embodiment of his Christian, 
quasi-metaphysical virtue of abnegation. However, Gide’s own authorial ego 
could never concede to this.355 As such, Gide’s fiction remains dialectical and 
discursive rather than dialogical in the Bakhtinian sense.356 The result is a 
conglomeration of romans à thèses rather than a suspension of narrative 
judgement. Gide’s novel is thus obliged to use structural contraption in order to 
generate the aesthetic value of ‘complexity’: the attribute of Dostoevsky’s fiction 
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that he and Rivière has so highly praised and that their generation sought.  
 
The novel remains, nevertheless, fairly unambiguous in ethical terms. However, it 
is possible that in the Faux-Monnayeurs Gide no longer sought the ethical 
ambiguity he cultuvated in earlier works. At the time of his ‘Allocution’ on 
Dostoevsky, Gide had criticised Dickens’s fiction for the over-simplicity of its 
“échelle des valeurs”, which he contrasted to Dostoevsky’s more problematic 
charectarisation and moral interrogation.357 However, by the mid-Twenties, Gide 
seems to have outgrown the ironic mode of his earlier works in favour of a less 
ambiguous depiction of his own moral values. As such, the Faux-Monnayeurs, 
for its convoluted structure, operates within a surprisingly simple ethical 
framework. This can be divided fairly easily into three moral trajectories, all of 
which find precedents in Gide’s earlier fiction and, particularly, in his 
contemporaneous writings on Dostoevsky. These trajectories, broadly speaking, 
run from material egoism to cynicism; from pious selflessness to self-loss; from 
revolt to sincerity and reintegration.  
 
The first trajectory is represented by Vincent, Passavant and Lady Griffith. In 
contrast with Dostoevsky, Gide’s novel contains fairly unproblematic villains, 
rendering its moral landscape infinitely easier to map. Lady Griffith tells the tale 
of a ship evacuation to account for her doctrine of ruthless egoism. Passavant 
requires no such legitimising narrative for his own, innate, inherited egoism 
(inherited along with his name’s etymology). Vincent, the biologist who abandons 
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his inseminated mate, represents a third, positivist path to the same conclusion of 
rational egoism. Gide’s account of Vincent’s descent, from positivism to cynicism 
is curiously conveyed in numbered bullet points, aesthetically attesting to the fact 
that his “culture positive” is especially susceptible to corruption by the forces of 
evil that it refuses to acknowledge.358 In consideration of Gide’s writings on 
Dostoevsky’s ethics in his lectures, the trajectory of Vincent (who goes on to kill 
Lady Griffith) is clearly that of Dostoevsky’s various Raskolnikovs and Piotr 
Verkhovenskys. Both authors represent rational approaches to ethics as instantly 
corruptible and blind to this corruption: tragically so in Dostoevsky; farcically so 
in Gide. 
 
Gide is here continuing a discourse he had begun with L’Immoraliste in a now 
unambiguously satirical representation of conglomerated material egoism, 
positivism and aristocratism. This is further satirised in the narrative strand of the 
child-counterfeiters and their epithet “l’homme fort ne tient pas à la vie” which 
results in the death of Boris. Dostoevsky’s The Devils is clearly an intertextual 
referent for the children’s criminal brethren, their Kirlilovian epithet and the 
conspired suicide. In representing this Nietzchean brethren of hommes forts as 
children, Gide employs a satirical technique that he had observed in Dostoevsky’s 
characterisation of Kolia Krasotkin in Brothers Karamazov: that of attributing the 
convictions of his adversaries to misguided child characters.359 The culmination 
of the Faux-Monnayers in the tragic death of Boris at the hands of his 
schoolmates has a clear precedent in that of Iliusha at the end of Brothers 
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Karamazov. 
 
If the first moral trajectory (that of the Griffith-Passavant-Vincent and the 
George-Ghéridanisol-Philippe triumverates) related back to Michel of 
L’Immoraliste, the second is the reincarnation of Marcéline, Alésia – and, of 
course, Emanuelle – in Rachel. This is the abnegatory Christian ideal that Gide 
had praised so fervently in his Numquid and his subsequent writings on 
Dostoevsky. However, this he seemed to deem inaccessible if not, indeed, 
unbefitting of his own ego. As always, this abnegatory path of humility Gide at 
once idolises beyond reach and femininises through Rachel (and to a lesser 
degree Laura).  
 
Gide shared with Dostoevsky this ideal of Christian self-effacement as well as its 
feminine engendering. Dostoevsky, until his final novel – and at that only 
debatably – cast predominantly female characters in this role of the selfless 
sufferer. It was this that attracted a first generation of readers to Sonya. However, 
and despite his great efforts, Dostoevsky struggled to represent a masculine 
character in this idealised role. The self-effacing male ego he could only 
accommodate within monasteries, or else within the confines of the sexless, 
‘ridiculous’ holy fool model of Myshkin, Makar Dolgorukii, the unnamed 
‘ridiculous man’ of Son Smeshnogo Cheloveka. Only with Alesha did he make his 
final attempt to send masculine humility from the monastery out into a gendered 
world.  
 
Gide, having completely isolated the religious element of Dostoevsky’s thought 
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in his ‘Allocution’ and privatised its Christian ethics in a “région profonde,” 
continues in this vein by confining piety and abnegation to the most domesticated 
of female characters. Rachel’s comparatively minor role in Les Faux-Monnayeurs 
to her predecessors in Gide’s earlier fiction, coupled with her increased domestic 
confinement, indicates that Gide had further isolated his religious abnegatory 
ideal from his moral framework by further burying it in the “région profonde”.  
 
Barry attempted a more feminist reading of the Faux-Monnayeurs in relation to 
Dostoevsky’s cult of [feminine] self-effacement:  
The rebel Sarah, Rachel’s sister, mirror of Gide's revolt against the 
Calvinistic gospel, ultimately crushes Rachel, and her "religion de la 
souffrance" drowns midway through the novel as a disconcerting myth.360 
While Catherine Barry is justified in reading Sarah as Gide’s representation of a 
destructive, individualistic, anti-religious force, the ‘diabolical’ aspect of his 
creative thought that lashes out at Rachel, it must be recalled that Sarah does so 
explicitly in shame at her own comparative moral bankruptcy. As such, the 
feminine moral ideal for Gide remains firmly abnegatory. 
 
The third moral trajectory is that of Bernard, from insincere revolt to sincere 
reintegration. It is in this trajectory that the moral framework of Gide’s novel 
most differs from that of Brothers Karamazov and The Devils. Bernard’s initial 
rebellion against a received identity (the act of writing an insulting letter to his 
adoptive father) is presented as an affected act. The letter is stained with a drop of 
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sweat that “joue la larme”.361 The tear image reappears throughout the novel, 
accompanying spontaneous acts of sincerity in juxtaposition to cynicism.362  
 
His second significant act of revolt is against his re-defined identity as a rebel, 
preceding his prodigious return to the family hearth. This vanquishing of the self 
is represented as wrestling with an ambiguous angel-devil.363 This ambiguous 
sparring partner can be read as a transformation of Ivan Karamazov’s debate with 
Satan. Just as Ivan’s wilful affirmation of the self in defiance of the father (his 
complicity in parricide; his metaphysical revolt against God) was tested, so is 
Bernard’s. However, while Ivan proved no match for his adversary, Bernard 
successfully overcomes his otherworldly opponent. Bernard’s victory over the 
devil/angel is a paradoxical self-affirmation that permits an act of submission (his 
consequent return to the father). Thus, the victory of the self over the self, or 
rather, over the preconception of the self that prevented his return, is also Gide’s 
overcoming of Ivan and his hubristic incapacity to abnegate or to accept personal 
responsibility for existence (‘Bunt’). Bernard’s ‘conversion and return is clearly a 
representation of Gide’s overcoming of the romantic hero and his proposition of 
an engaged proto-existential one: Gide’s first and final character with a capacity 
for overcoming his own characterisation.364 
 
Bernard’s willful overcoming is presented in opposition to La Pérouse. The latter 
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also metaphorically wrestles with a divine entity, however, his struggle is that of 
Job rather than Jacob, and unlike Bernard he has no hope of victory. The 
theodistic outcry with which La Pérouse closes the novel refers back to Ivan’s, as 
well as to the existential revolt of Shestov’s philosophical writings. La Pérouse’s 
revolt is a clear inversion of Kirilov’s, in his incapacity to abnegate, to transcend 
the human condition: he is a slave to his own existence.  
 
La Pérouse’s purely abnegatory, impassionate suicide proves impossible; 
Olivier’s empassioned attempt also fails; only Boris’s self-affirmative suicide is 
successful. It is also the most resemblant of Kirilov’s in its motivation, as a 
paradoxical test of the limits of self-affirmative abnegation. It is also wrapped in 
the same context of nihilist criminal conspiracy. It is thus no coincidence that 
Gide’s novel’s successful suicide is characterised as a Russian and mystic: Boris 
is Gide’s final, fictional tribute to Kirilov.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has followed Gide’s reception of Dostoevsky, both from the 
perspective of his reading, his commentary, and intertextual reverberations of 
Dostoevskian motifs in his fiction. His discovery of Dostoevsky and initial 
reading list was at the discretion of Vogüé and his “religion de la souffrance” 
interpretation, which had an influence over Gide’s and his generation’s first 
period of reception: an influence Gide would later rue. The second period was a 
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critical and fictional parallel interrogation of Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, 
evidenced in Gide’s ‘6e lettre à Angèle’ and L’Immoraliste. Contemporaneous 
interpretations and adaptations by Suarès, Faure and Copeau represented an 
emerging ‘modern’ reassessment of Dostoevsky’s work, in which Gide took on a 
flag-bearing role. From 1908, Gide launched a violent backlash against Vogüé, 
the first translators and the previously widely admitted moralist reading of 
Dostoevsky. This took the form of a subversive re-casting of the figure of 
Dostoevsky himself in ‘Dostoïevski d’après sa correspondance’ in 1908, followed 
by Gide’s parodic representation of Crime and Punishment (and specifically of 
Vogüé’s reception of it) in Les Caves du Vatican. Gide’s mature reading of 
Dostoevsky in the ‘Allocution’ and his final fictional engagement with 
Dostoevsky’s oeuvre in Les Faux-Monnayeurs revealed that the fundamental 
concerns with which he initially broached The Devils in the late 19th century 
were still intact, significantly informed by his now mature religious thought, as 
expressed in Numquid et tu.   
 
Gide raised in his study of Dostoevsky the problematisation of dichotomous 
conceptions of self-affirmation and abnegation, in the constitution of selfhood, in 
the conceptualisation of the divine and in Gide’s highly abstract ethics. On the 
psychological plane, this took the form of humility and pride, which transposed 
in ethical terms into altruism and egoism. Unlike Dostoevsky, however, Gide 
represented both of these ethical extremes as equal forms of moral deadend. 
These extremities were engendered – affirmation masculine; abnegation feminine 
– in their characterised manifestations. 
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The abstract ideal, shared by Gide and Dostoevsky, of a self-affirmative 
abnegation lay beyond the reach of any of their characters. In Dostoevsky, only 
the innately meek, or the holy fool, could hope to achieve humility and quietism, 
while the rest are tragic victims of egoism and consuming pride. Gide took a less 
polarised view, which drew him to the paradox of Kirilov. Gide found an 
evangelical seed of hope in Kirilov’s mystical suicide and in Dostoevsky’s 
famous claim that self-effacement and reintegration required the highest 
development of individualism. Between the extremities of abnegation and of 
self-development, Gide’s diametrically opposed and conflicted moral ideals, 
Kirilov’s philosophical suicide represented a mystical point of contact, a 
reconciliation that preoccupied Gide for almost thirty years. This reconciliation is 
never rationalised in either Gide or Dostoevsky: it remains an intuition somewhat 
beyond reach. It is an ideal that finds only ironic representation in either oeuvre 
as it is unrealisable and fictionally unrepresentable. However, these two axes, like 
parallel Lobachevskian lines, find in Kirilov’s mystic suicide an imaginary, 
scriptural meeting point.    
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Chapter 3 – The Existential Reading (1920-1940) 
 
 
 
The arrival of Russia’s exiled religious intelligentsia to Paris in the early 1920s 
brought with it significantly more developed interpretations of Dostoevsky, the 
Russian reception predating the French and benefiting, no doubt, from a degree 
of domestic insight. Dostoevsky’s critique of the post-enlightenment intellectual 
tradition had been a key source of inspiration to the ‘Silver Age’ generation of 
Russian existential thinkers. This continued and increased in emigration, a 
curious phenomenon that has duly attracted considerable attention in recent 
analyses of the culture of the Russian diaspora, underlining the importance of 
Dostoevsky’s fictional world to the émigré conceptions of Russianness and 
modernity.365  
 
What has generally been overlooked, however, in studying the diaspora in 
isolation from its ‘host’ cultures, is the significance of Dostoevsky’s fiction as a 
platform for intercultural discourse. Parisian salons had long been animated by 
discussion of Dostoevsky, and it was principally as his authoritative interpreters 
that such thinkers as Lev Shestov were first invited into the high profile French 
journals through which they accessed the francophone readership. As such, the 
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longevity of Dostoevsky’s centrality to émigré culture cannot be exclusively 
explained as a quasi-metaphysical aspect of alienation and uprootedness – an 
experience which in itself had as much to do with European modernity as with 
exile.366 This oversight is in part due to the spiritual bent of the first wave of 
post-soviet scholarship on émigré thought. The task that remains is to situate the 
existential émigré readings in dialogical relation to existing cults of Dostoevsky 
in French discourse, bringing to the fore the historical significance of Russian 
émigré contributions to the author’s French reception and, as such, to the 
development of existential thought in France.  
 
Livak’s various studies have demonstrated that the exiled Russian intelligentsia 
was far less isolated from the intellectual life of Paris than has often been 
assumed.367 He argues that the cultural construct of the alienated émigré had 
more to do with émigré poets fashioning themselves on a modernist cult of 
alienation, than with the reality of the French milieu.368 Livak’s work indicates 
that throughout the 1920s and 30s cultural dialogue between Russian and French 
elites was highly developed. What is constantly evidenced, if not specifically 
examined, is that throughout this period Dostoevsky’s fiction remained an 
important and ever-present reference point – a meeting ground – particularly for 
an influential proto-existential faction of religious thinkers. The following chapter 
traces this dialogue, beginning with the seminal existential reading of Lev 
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Shestov, and its reception by French readers. It then examines the canonical 
retranslation of Notes from Underground by Boris de Schloezer – Shestov’s close 
friend, follower and translator – in relation to Shestov’s reading. I then analyse 
Berdyaev’s interpretation and its reception in terms of existential and romantic 
thought, before examining Gabriel Marcel’s reception both of Dostoevsky as an 
existential thinker and of the existential thought of Russia’s Silver Age tradition. 
 
 
Shestov’s ‘underground’ philosophy 
 
It was through his writings on Dostoevsky that philosopher Lev Shestov’s 
anti-rationalist revolt first came into contact with rising existential currents in 
French literary thought of the early twenties. Shestov’s main French publications 
on his predecessor, ‘Dostoïevsky et la lutte contre les évidences’ (1922)369 and 
La Philosophie de la tragédie: Dostoïevsky et Nietzsche (1926),370 thus played a 
key role in establishing the philosopher’s voice in the French intellectual milieu, 
meanwhile positing, for the first time in France, a central place for the 
Dostoevskian underground man in the history of European philosophy.  
 
Shestov’s contribution to the 1922 centenary edition of the NRF, briefly 
mentioned in the previous chapter, constituted a crucial first step in opening this 
dialogue simultaneously between French and Russian readings of Dostoevsky 
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and between French and Russian existential movements. Like the readings of the 
generation discussed in the previous chapter, Shestov’s reading of Dostoevsky 
was amoralistic. However, Shestov went significantly further than previous 
French interpreters in textually substantiating his reading, which on many levels 
equates to actively silencing the voice of Christian moralism that arguably 
resounds as loudly in Dostoevsky’s fiction as any conceivable amoralism.371  
 
‘Dostoïevsky et la lutte…’ is a radical existential reading of the yet 
little-discussed Notes from Underground, raised up by Shestov to no less than 
“une des œuvres les plus extraordinaires de la littérature universelle”.372 This 
‘universalisation’ of Dostoevsky’s thought was critical to Shestov’s success in 
France in comparison to other commentators (both native French and émigré), 
many of whom persisted along 19th-century Volksgeist lines of interpretation.373 
In radically dissociating Dostoevsky’s anti-rationalist revolt from any ultimate 
Christian moral objectives and analysing it instead in epistemological terms, 
Shestov’s reading, while religious in its ultimate conclusions, opened the way for  
more secular existential readings of Dostoevsky’s revolt, significantly broadening 
the scope of its impact. 
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In interpreting the Notes from Underground as an expression of individual 
existential revelation, Shestov disentangles the anti-rationalist drive of 
Dostoevsky’s thought from the ‘Russian Soul’ construct, from Slavophilism and 
from the religious fanaticism previous Romantic anti-rationalist readings had 
hinged on. Furthermore, by dealing almost exclusively with the first section of 
the Notes in isolation from the second, thus militating against any possible 
moralistic reading, Shestov’s representation of the work comes to resemble an 
anti-rationalist manifesto, which he explicitly refers to as European philosophy’s 
first authentic “critique of pure reason”.374 In juxtaposing Dostoevsky’s critique 
to Kant’s, Shestov targets the validity of rational approaches to ethics, in order 
not to proclaim the suprarational supremacy of Christian ethics (as Dostoevsky 
had doubtlessly intended) but to present a religious existential reading that 
attempted to go beyond the moral dimension of Dostoevsky’s oeuvre. Shestov’s 
target is drastically different from Dostoevsky’s; crimes and punishments are 
entirely secondary to the initial moment of absurd revelation and indignation that 
sets Dostoevsky’s rebellious characters against social and religious laws.  
 
In Shestov’s thought, this conception of the absurd is not an end in itself. Shestov 
extends Dostoevsky’s critique of the post-enlightenment intellectual tradition in 
order to launch his own metaphysical attack on transcendentalism and ideals. 
Having set underground philosophy in opposition to Kantian idealism’s ‘praise’ 
of pure reason, Shestov then extrapolates his argument back to Plato. In a creative 
use of metaphor, Shestov melds Dostoevsky’s ‘underground’ with Plato’s ‘cave’ 
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using the former to subvert the latter.375 For Shestov, the underground is not the 
cave in which the ignorant are enchained but a space of revelation. However, 
contrary to Plato’s allegory, this revelation is individual and subjective. Left in 
the cave are the prejudices of vsemstvo, collective conscience which, following 
Dostoevsky, Shestov conceives in rationalist terms. By Shestov’s inverted 
allegory, any philosophy dependent on universal laws (in this he does not 
differentiate between idealism, rationalism or indeed positivism) is left in the 
cave with the idyllic transcendental ‘shadows’ Plato had inadvertently venerated. 
In confining universality to the cave, Shestov aims to debunk not only platonic 
idealism but rational thought per se. 
 
The result is not necessarily irrationalism nor radical scepticism. Shestov and his 
underground man revolt not against the validity of rational thought processes, but 
the presumption of the authority that truths obtained rationally claim over any 
conception of truth that lies outwith these boundaries (in this case, the existential 
revelation that Shestov posits behind Dostoevsky’s underground polemics). In 
pitting the underground man against the entirety of the European philosophical 
mainstream, from the Greeks to Kant and from idealism to positivism, Shestov 
evidently indulges in a fairly radical extrapolation of the underground man’s 
original thesis.376 Dostoevsky’s polemicist had focused his attack against various 
contemporary utilitarianist attempts to rationalise human interaction. He had 
employed psychological realism against assumptions as to the infallibility of 
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human reason and human science to the ultimate end of reaffirming the 
pre-eminence of Christian anthropology over secular humanism.377 In Shestov’s 
reading, however, Christian dogma is rejected as yet another universalism with a 
view to challenging both ethics and epistemology with a near-anarchistic 
subjectivism.378 
 
Shestov’s ‘Dostoïevski et la lutte contre les évidences’ is typical particularly of 
his early writings in the precarious balance it strikes between mysticism and 
agnosticism. A surviving, unpublished draft of the article in the archives of the 
Sorbonne indicates that many final amendments to the article concerned the 
quasi-religious vocabulary throughout. Curiously, much of this was a late 
addition to a more secular initial draft.379 Varying conclusions could, of course, 
be drawn from this, depending on whether last-minute additions are interpreted as 
afterthoughts straying from an initial essence or as laboured finishing touches 
straining towards a particular communicative goal. The latter seems more 
plausible. What can, in any case, be deduced is that striking such a balance 
between the religious and the secular was of paramount concern for the Shestov 
as a prose writer. 
 
Shestov’s goal is no more gratuitous (and ultimately no less religious) than 
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Dostoevsky’s. It is to challenge what he sees as the despotic governance of 
rationalism over thought: the pretensions of science to exclusive rights to truth 
and the tendency of philosophy to accept them. His methodological recourse to 
literary criticism in revolt against the philosophical mainstream is a further means 
of undermining the authority of the objectivising rationalist mode (its language, 
methods, values) over individual will, caprice and creativity. Shestov is well 
aware that his critical method, like Dostoevsky’s fictional method before him, 
implies an undermining of the structure of philosophical discourse:  
Vous n’êtes pas habitué à de tels arguments; vous êtes même offensé peut-être 
qu’en parlant de la théorie de la connaissance je cite ces passages de 
Dostoïevsky. Vous auriez raison si Dostoïevsky n’avait pas soulevé la question 
de droit. Mais deux fois deux quatre, la raison avec toutes ses évidences ne 
veulent justement pas admettre qu’on discute la question de droit.380  
Shestov’s philosophical approach to Dostoevsky is thus perhaps a less significant 
innovation than his ‘literary’ approach to philosophy, which, rooted in Russia’s 
non-academic tradition and informed by Nietzsche, represents a challenge to 
disciplinary boundaries that were arguably still more institutionally entrenched in 
French than Russian discourse at this time. 
 
This aspect of Shestov’s writing seems to have made an impression. An 
unpublished letter from G. Bessière to Shestov in 1925 writes of the influence his 
critical method has had on his own: “Votre critique est toute nouvelle, et captive 
autant que les oeuvres dont vous parlez. Je ne peux pas vous cacher qu’elle 
m’influence beaucoup.”381 Shestov’s anti-rationalist, existential interpretation of 
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Dostoevsky quickly began to make an impact. Its influence on Gide’s reading has 
been discussed in the previous chapter.382 Critics noted a resemblance between 
the readings of the two critics, which both seem to have appreciated.383  
 
The following year, in 1923, Shestov, along with his translator, close friend and 
philosophical follower Boris de Schloezer, was invited to Paul Desjardin’s 
Décade at Pontigny, an elitist ten-day conference on the question “Y a-t-il dans la 
poésie d’un peuple un trésor résérvé[sic], impénétrable aux étrangers?” 384 
Dostoevsky was naturally top of the agenda. Shestov’s correspondence with 
Eitingon recalls his amazement at the enthusiasm of his French contemporaries 
for Dostoevsky and for Russian culture: 
Поразило меня тоже отношение французов к русским и к русской 
литературе. Все знают, во всем чудесно разбираются – и как все любят. 
Я прислушивался к частным разговорам за столом или в отдельных 
группах и часто ушам своим не верил. Когда еще восхваляют 
Достоевского – куда ни шло.
385
 
Shestov described the Décade at Pontigny as his first genuine experience of 
“настоящий контакт с французами.”
386
 Shestov’s correspondence from this 
period, particularly with du Bos, sheds light on the number of influential French 
thinkers that responded favourably to his reading of Dostoevsky.387 For the next 
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five years Shestov would disseminate this reading through his teaching at the 
Institut des Études Slaves, the Université Populaire and the Sorbonne. His second 
significant commentary, La Philosophie de la tragédie: Dostoïevski et Nietzsche, 
would appear in French in 1926. This comparative and psychological study of 
Dostoevsky and Nietzsche’s thought had in fact appeared in Russian over 20 
years previously, in 1902, making it roughly contemporary to Gide’s ‘lettre à 
Angèle’ on the same topic (and of course, to L’Immoraliste) while the translation 
of Shestov’s study entered the French discourse more contemporaneously to 
Gide’s mature reading of 1923.  
 
The crux of Shestov’s ‘Philosophy of Tragedy’ is that the human condition, 
particularly individual mortality, is an irreducible effrontery to which the 
humanist tradition turns a blind eye. The expression of this indignation Shestov 
identified in the Dostoevskian underground (“ведь дважды два четыре есть уже 
не жизнь, господа, а начало смерти.”
388) and in Nietzsche’s anti-humanist 
revolt. The irremissibility of the death of the individual was for Shestov, as for 
Dostoevsky, the essence of the Absurd.  
 
The sharp contrast between Shestov’s comparison of Nietzsche and Dostoevsky 
and others such as Gide’s and Merezhkovsky’s is that Shestov’s firstly draws 
surprisingly little distinction between the two. This he achieves by utterly 
disregarding their moral dimensions, whether Dostoevsky’s Christian ethics or 
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Nietzsche’s infamous doctrines (through which most commentators to date had 
refracted the oeuvres). Shestov sees their ‘preachings’ – equally in both cases – as 
entirely extraneous to their thought. As with Shestov’s reading of Tolstoy, the 
more forceful these preachings become, the more they are revealed as a testimony 
of a struggle against the void. This is the most significant divergence between 
Shestov’s and Gide’s parallel treatment of Dostoevsky and Nietzsche: Gide, more 
in line with Merezhkovsky and Suarès, saw in Dostoevsky something of an 
antidote to Nietzsche.389  
 
A second divergence is that, while both La Philosophie de la Tragédie and the ‘6e 
Lettre à Angèle’ centre on pathology and revelation, Gide’s comparison is 
quintessentially modernist in its historicity, reading Dostoevsky and Nietzsche as 
heralds of a knew psychology, while Shestov’s existential reading of revelation is 
entirely individualistic and ahistorical. Moreover, Shestov recognises only 
negative (or absurdist) revelation. 
 
Sadly, little remains of the dialogue that took place between Gide and Shestov on 
the matter of Dostoevsky, and only second-hand accounts of Gide’s enthusiasm 
for Shestov’s interpretation. This is partly because Gide’s critical engagement 
with Dostoevsky ended entirely on the arrival of the émigré thinkers. Seely justly 
identified a “jealous possessiveness” in Gide’s approach to Dostoevsky in 
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relation to Copeau and Suarès.390 It is thus not improbable that Gide’s interest 
was dependent on a self-appointed role as France’s leading authority on 
Dostoevsky, to which his claim was lost when Russian intellectuals arrived in 
Paris. Fondane relates Shestov’s account of a pivotal encounter between the two 
writers in Conversations avec Léon Chestov:  
C’est un des hommes les plus intelligents que je connaisse, il devine tout; on 
ne peut rien lui cacher, Son livre sur Dostoïevski avait paru. Nous étions à 
Pontigny. Un jour, il me demandait ce que j’en pensais. Alors je lui ai dit que 
c’était très bien écrit, etc. Il a compris tout de suite. Il a changé de 
conversation. Mais depuis, il ne m’a jamais plus parlé…391  
Dostoevsky remained a crucial reference for Shestov, spanning his entire oeuvre. 
In Athens and Jerusalem, his final work, he gives an account of Dostoevsky’s 
existential thought wholly consistent with that of ‘Dostoïevsky et la lutte contre 
les évidences’:  
Греческая философия здесь осанавливается. Тут остановилась и 
Критика чистого разума. Но Достоевский чувствует, что тут 
остановиться нельзя, что здесь именно должна начинаться ‘критика’
392
 
Notes from Underground continues to form the basis of Shestov’s argument that 
since reason restricts thought, ‘free’ analysis cannot be rational:  
 
Thus to the end of his career Shestov never ceased to underline the importance of 
the underground man. In 1937 he was requested to select texts for the Dostoevsky 
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section of a Radio France series on Russian literature, which would be read on air 
(by Shestov’s daughter) and discussed. On his choice – Notes from Underground, 
Krotkaia and The Dream of a Ridiculous Man – Shestov wrote:  
Вы знаете, что обыкновенно никто не говорит об этих текстах. Ни Жид, 
ни другие, когда говорят о Достоевском, никогда не упоминают 
“Записки из подполья”
393
  
While these have now entered the canon (indeed, comprising the three 
Dostoevsky novellas in the Folio Bilingual series) they were little known in 
France into the late thirties, and of Notes from Underground in particular, little 
had been said in France prior to Shestov’s publications. If, by contrast, the 
subsequent generation of existentialist and absurdist writers was to draw 
extensively from Notes from Underground, it would seem that Shestov’s efforts 
were not in vein.  
  
 
 
Boris de Schloezer and La Voix souterraine  
 
Shestov’s initial article on Dostoevsky appeared in the NRF thanks to the 
recommendation of his close friend Boris de Schloezer. Schloezer played a 
decisive role in connecting Shestov to French intellectual circles and in 
disseminating his thought. Extensive research on their correspondence in the 
archives of the Sorbonne and the Bibliothèque Louis Notari has confirmed that 
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Schloezer was far more than Shestov’s translator; Schloezer was among 
Shestov’s closest philosophical followers.394 It was Schloezer who translated the 
bulk of Shestov’s oeuvre into French, including ‘Dostoïevski et la lutte contre les 
évidences’ in 1922 and La Philosophie de la tragédie: Dostoïevski et Nietzsche in 
1926. The significance of this is that Schloezer retranslated Notes from 
Underground into French in the same year under the clear influence of Shestov’s 
existential reading. Furthermore, it was the resultant ‘existential’ translation that 
became and remains the canonical French translation of the Bibliothèque de la 
Pléiade.  
 
Born of a Russian and Belgian parentage, Schloezer was entirely bilingual, with a 
remarkable gift for translation. His rendering of Dostoevsky’s texts is 
linguistically reliable enough to have been recently published in Gallimard’s 
Folio Bilingue collection.395 However, it is this assiduous fidelity to the original 
that makes his various modifications in the direction of Shestov’s existential 
interpretation all the more readily identifiable, particularly when compared in 
parallel with previous French translations of the work.  
 
That Schloezer was under the sway of Shestov’s thought is evident in many of his 
writings. Among his manuscripts in the archives of the Bibliothèque Notari in 
Monaco, are pages writing off the Diary of a Writer on account of unoriginality 
and exalting the philosophies of Ivan Karamazov, Kirilov, Pierre Verkhovensky) 
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as “beaucoup plus intelligentes, audacieuses, et originales que lui [Dostoïevski]” 
and they “nourrit toujours notre pensée.” In keeping with Shestov’s reading, 
Myshkins, Zossimas and Alyoshas are overlooked.396  
  
The choice of translation for the title, La Voix souterraine, immediately 
introduces a dissociation between the protagonist-narrator and his utterances. 
Dostoevsky had emphatically presented the work as the zapiski (notes, jottings) 
originating from a place (podpol’e) rather than an author. Harpéline-Kaminsky 
and Charles Morice’s choice of L’Esprit souterrain for their rendering of the 
near-untranslatable Russian title, clearly envisioned underground thought as the 
fruits of a mind deranged by isolation. Schloezer’s choice of “the underground 
voice” dissociates the reflections within the narrative from any specific 
consciousness, truer to Dostoevsky’s original. However, the evocation of a 
disembodied voice (in opposition to the original ‘zapiski’) lends these reflections 
an air of revelation concurrent to Shestov’s reading.  
 
As observed above, Shestov’s anti-rationalist reading of the Notes had hinged on 
his decision not to distinguish between the underground man’s treatment of 
rationalists and unthinking men of action (in that they are both “convinced in 
advance that they know what truth is”).397 This association, essential in Shestov’s 
philosophical writings, permeates Schloezer’s translation of Dostoevsky: 
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Original 
Известно, многие из этих 
любителей [человеческого 
рода], рано ли, поздно ли, под 
конец жизни изменяли себе, 
произведя какой-нибудь 
анекдот, иногда даже из 
самых неприличнейших.  
(As is known, many of these 
philanthropists sooner or later, 
towards the end of their lives, 
betrayed themselves, producing 
some ridiculous incident, even 
of the least respectable 
kinds.)398 
Initial translation 
[Entirely 
omitted]399  
Schloezer’s translation 
On sait que nombre de ces 
amateurs de sagesse 
finissent tôt ou tard par 
trahir leurs idées et se 
compromettent dans de 
scandaleuses histoires.  
 
(As is known, many of these 
lovers of wisdom end sooner 
or later in betraying their 
ideas and compromise 
themselves in scandalous 
incidents.)400  
Dostoevsky’s image of lovers of mankind letting themselves down has been 
replaced by philosophers betraying their doctrines. The suggestion of such a 
comparison was not entirely absent from the original; however, Schloezer’s 
liberal rendering clearly takes its cue from Shestov’s reading. Where Dostoevsky 
had thus placed equal stress on the ethical consequences of the fundamental 
irrationality of man, Schloezer follows Shestov in homing in on the 
epistemological stakes.  
 
With regards to anti-rationalist revolt the original and the two translations clearly 
operate within disparate ideological frameworks: 
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...вполне понимая свои 
настоящие выгоды, 
отставляли их на второй 
план и бросались на 
другую дорогу, на риск, 
на авось, никем и ничем 
не принуждаемые к тому, 
а как будто именно 
только не желая 
указанной дороги, и 
упрямо, своевольно 
пробивали другую, 
трудную, нелепую, 
отыскивая ее чуть не в 
потемках. Ведь, 
значит, им действительно 
это упрямство и 
своеволие было 
приятнее всякой 
выгоды...  
…sans se leurrer de leurs 
véritables intérêts, sans y 
être poussés par rien, 
pour se détourner 
exprès, dis-je, de la voie 
droite, en cherchant à 
tâtons, le mauvais 
chemin, des actions 
absurdes et mauvaises. 
C’est que ce libertinage 
leur convient mieux que 
toute considération 
d’intérêt réel......  
...tout en se rendant 
compte de leur intérêt, le 
rejettent au seconde plan, 
et s’engagent dans une 
toute autre voie, pleine 
de risques et de hasards? 
Ils n’y sont pourtant pas 
forcés; mais il semble 
qu’ils veuillent 
précisément éviter la 
route qu’on leur 
indiquait, pour en tracer 
librement, 
capricieusement, une 
autre, pleine de 
difficultés, absurde, à 
peine reconnaissable, 
obscure. C’est donc que 
cette liberté possède à 
leurs yeux plus d’attraits 
que leurs propres 
intérêts... 
(…fully understanding 
their own interests, they set 
them aside and launched 
out on another path, on a 
risk, on a perhaps, obliged 
by nothing and no-one, but 
precisely as if they simply 
did not wish [to walk] the 
path indicated to them, and 
stubbornly, willfully, [lit. 
‘self-willedly’] they beat 
out a different, difficult, 
absurd path, searching for 
it almost in the dark. 
 
Surely this means that this 
stubbornness and self-will 
was more pleasant to them 
than any interests…)401 
(…without deluding 
themselves as to their 
genuine interests, 
without being forced by 
anything, in order, I tell 
you, to turn away from 
the right road on 
purpose, groping their 
way along, they took the 
wrong path, of absurd 
and wrong actions. 
 
 
 
 
It is that this libertinage 
suited them better than 
any consideration of 
genuine interests…...)402 
. 
(…fully aware of their 
interests, did they not set 
them aside and engage 
themselves in an entirely 
different path, full of 
risks and dangers? They 
were not forced, 
however, but it seems 
they wanted precisely to 
avoid the route indicated 
to them, in order to 
freely, capriciously trace 
another, absurd route full 
of difficulties, barely 
recognisable, obscure. 
It is that this freedom 
thus possessed more 
attraction than their own 
advantage...)403 
 
Harpéline-Kaminsky and Morice’s rendering slides the original in the direction of 
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conventional romantic rebellion, which it in turn overtly condemns. Their 
underground speaker draws attention only to the fact that there have been cases 
when men have gone against the grain, choosing ‘the wrong path’ (note also their 
choice of the definite article, completely at odds with Dostoevsky’s ‘drugaia 
doroga’) of ‘libertinage’ where the same section in the original had referred to a 
‘different,’ ‘difficult’ path, suspending moral judgement on either path. 
Schloezer’s translation slides the text in the opposite direction. His rebels stray 
‘freely and capriciously’ from the beaten track (where Dostoevsky’s had strayed 
stubbornly and ‘self-willedly’ (svoevol’no, with its Kantian overtones) 
superimposing positive connotations on the original. Where Dostoevsky’s rebels 
had (lit.) ‘thrown themselves on a risk’ Schloezer’s ‘engaged themselves on a 
path full of risks’, thus lexically implicating the rebels in a ‘mission’; while 
Dostoevsky’s throw themselves somewhat arbitrarily ‘at a perhaps’ in 
self-affirmation, Schloezer’s seem to have another, unspoken objective: they are 
not on ‘their own’ paths of self-will, but rather engaged in a somewhat predefined 
alternative path ‘full of risks’.  
 
Schloezer’s consistently higher register and more confident expression than the 
voice Dostoevsky had consigned to the underground man, is evidenced in the 
above example in Schloezer’s addition of a rhetorical question and a semi-colon 
(where Harpéline-Kaminsky and Morice had lowered the tone, and consequently 
the content’s gravity, with the addition of an interjected ‘dis-je’). This is another 
means by which Schloezer systematically raises the text to the philosophical 
manifesto of Shestov’s reading. The underground man’s famously idiosyncratic 
tone has been significantly refined throughout Schloezer’s translation. Though 
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the translator is even strikingly faithful to the original syntax in most aspects, 
time and again he freely omits an expression of uncertainty, a kak by, a mozhet 
byt’, a tak skazat’, or a kak-to even a whole “nu, i... nu khot’ by dazhe i”404 
adding a causal car, or a parce que.405 Commas are systematically upgraded to 
colons; ellipses to periods; periods to exclamation marks.406 Discrete and indeed 
permissible alterations these may be; however, they are not inconsequential. 
These subtle but systematic alterations serve to significantly polish the 
underground man’s rhetoric, where Dostoevsky had taken pains to confer to his 
character a relatively grotesque linguistic persona. Just as Shestov had extended 
the character’s argument towards philosophical discourse, so Schloezer has edged 
his language towards a philosophical register. Thus France’s most authoritative 
translation of Notes from Underground was impregnated with Shestov’s 
existential worldview. If Marcadé was correct in considering Shestov’s 
penetration into French intellectual history to run deeper than that of his fellow 
émigré writers,407 Picon was perhaps more justified than he knew in suggesting 
that his francophone followers such as Camus, Marcel, Ionesco, could not have 
been reached without Schloezer.408 
 
Following the key publications surrounding Dostoevsky’s centenary, the twenties 
saw a second wave of translations, in which Schloezer played a significant role, 
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bringing out the first French version of La Confession de Stavroguine (1923) and 
retranslating Le Mari éternel (1923) Les Frères Karamazov (1929) followed by 
the Les Possédés (1933), all of which (with the exception of the Les Frères 
Karamazov) entered the Bibliothèque de la Pléiade alongside his La Voix 
souterraine (later retitled Le Sous-sol).409 Picon recalled that Schloezer’s role in 
the dissemination of Russian literature and of Dostoevsky in particular, was 
consequential in France:  
Il y eut, à partir des années trente, et continûment, un épanchement du roman 
russe dans la littérature française. Cela va de Gide à Camus (le Camus de la 
Chute) en passant par le Malraux de La Condition humaine, le Soleil de 
Satan, le Sang noir, le Voyage au bout de la nuit, La Nausée. J’entends par là 
une dislocation de la forme romanesque, sous la pression des interrogations 
métaphysiques et éthiques [...] un peu partout, il y a une lecture de la Voix 
souterraine, que Schloezer traduit en 1926.410 
Picon’s observations are of consequence for the current study: he implies that 
Schloezer was to some extent an intermediary between Russian and French 
existential currents in literature. The fact that Camus would adapt The Devils for 
the French stage using Schloezer’s translation suggests that Picon’s observation 
was not incorrect. 
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Nicolas Berdyaev and L’Esprit de Dostoïevsky  
 
Like Shestov, Berdyaev was of the generation of Russian thinkers that ‘grew up 
on’ Dostoevsky.411 The foreward to Mirosozertsanie Dostoevskogo, his most 
significant work on Dostoevsky’s thought, leaves no doubt that he considered the 
novelist to be the single most significant influence on his philosophical 
development, particularly with regards to his conception of Christ and that of 
freedom. 412  Berdyaev further asserted this throughout his autobiography. 413 
Commentators from Barrett to Evlampiev have argued that Shestov and 
Berdyaev’s similarity stems from a shared inheritance of Dostoevsky’s existential 
thought.414 More importantly, however, this ‘inheritance’ of Dostoevsky was 
cultivated in the climate of the Silver Age, and coloured by its values.415  
 
Berdyaev and Shestov have often been bracketed together under the ‘religious 
existential’ rubric, a labelling they both accepted; however, on analysis, 
antagonisms between their philosophies at crucial points seem to outweigh 
parities. Their well-known intellectual friendship was indeed a fruitfully 
dialectical one: Pierre Pascal recalls their heated ‘duels’ as the highlight of 
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Berdyaev’s salon.416 These tensions are particularly noticeable on comparison of 
their respective studies of Dostoevsky. Such comparison is facilitated greatly by 
the fact that Berdyaev’s essay makes both direct and indirect commentary on 
Shestov’s reading throughout, particularly as far as concerns the place of Notes 
from Underground in Dostoevsky’s thought.417  
 
The first divergence between Berdyaev’s and Shestov’s readings of Dostoevsky is 
their approach to his problematic ‘idealism’. Dostoevsky himself had highlighted 
the paradox in his ‘idealistic realism.’418 Shestov recognised in Dostoevsky no 
such paradox: the only ‘authentic’ aspect of Dostoevsky’s thought was the wilful 
rejection of ideals voiced by his various antipathetic characters, while the 
Christian ideals expressed through his various holy fools were disregarded as 
‘annotation’. 419  While Gide had succeeded in incorporating the religious 
doctrines such as Zosima’s into his reading of Dostoevsky by focusing on the 
immanentism therein, Berdyaev sees Dostoevsky ultimately as a transcendentalist 
with an immanentist (novelistic) method, drawing comparisons to Plato, to which 
Shestov certainly would have objected.420 This disparity stems from disparate 
conceptions of the idea. Shestov’s polemics draw remarkably vague distinctions 
between idealism, rationalism and positivism insofar as all fundamentally hinge 
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on transcendentalism and necessarily lead to dogmatism,421 for which reason 
Shestov has so often been labelled a sceptic – most famously by Berdyaev 
himself.422 Berdyaev’s conception of idealism, on the other hand, follows a 
Platonic tradition that equates the highest ideal to God. 
 
While Berdyaev employs the term ‘tragedy’ with reference to the form and 
content of Dostoevsky’s novelistic thought, his reading hinges on a rudimentarily 
moralist method that does not take aesthetics into account. Berdyaev’s reading 
strategy essentially consists in examining how Dostoevsky’s plots punish sinful 
characters. Such a reading undermines the complexity of tragic downfall as a 
device that does not necessarily serve as indication of authorial judgement on the 
virtue of a protagonist. In Berdyaev’s reductive reading, however, Stavrogin, 
Kirilov and Raskolnikov are duly punished for venturing down the path of 
self-will to the instruction of the reader: “Гибель их светоносна для нас. 
Трагедия их есть гимн свободе.”
423
  
 
For Berdyaev, in the 1920s, this ‘tragedy of freedom’ is the unquestionably 
central theme of Dostoevsky’s oeuvre. 424  Following Shestov and Ivanov, 
Berdyaev sees Dostoevsky’s as a “philosophy of tragedy” which he conceives 
thus: 
Свободное же добро, которое есть единственное добро, 
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предполагает свободу зла. В этом трагедия свободы, которую до 
глубины исследовал и постиг Достоевский. В этом скрыта тайна 
христианства. Раскрывается трагическая диалектика. Добро не 
может быть принудительным, нельзя принудить к добру. Свобода 
добра предполагает свободу зла. Свобода же зла ведет к 
истреблению самой свободы, к перерождению в злую 
необходимость.425 
Berdyaev’s conception of the tragic in the human condition, as depicted in 
Dostoevsky’s fiction, is thus radically opposed to Shestov’s. Indeed, Berdyaev’s 
reasoning on ethics here evokes a neo-Kantian opposition between negative and 
positive freedoms. In his autobiography, Berdyaev places Kant alongside 
Dostoevsky as principle influences on his conception of freedom.426 Ultimately, 
Berdyaev’s conception hinges on the intuition that freedom to choose evil and 
freedom to choose good are fundamentally distinct and opposed freedoms; the 
latter liberating and the former enslaving.427 Following Kant (and on the basis of 
intuition rather than argumentation) Berdyaev’s reading of Dostoevsky attaches 
positive freedom to reason and negative freedom to irrationalism: “существует 
не одна, а две свободы, первая и последняя, свобода избрания добра и зла и 
свобода в добре, или свобода иррациональная и свобода в разуме.”
428
 This 
association informs Berdyaev’s reading of Ivan Karamazov: his ‘revolt’ is 
conceived of and described as ‘irrational’ on account of its wilful rejection of 
God, and thus (by a purely structural reference) of the Good and of Reason. This 
is precisely the structural assumption prevalent in both Christian and secular 
moral philosophy that Shestov’s oeuvre attempts to deconstruct. 
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For Berdyaev the concepts of freedom, love and truth seem to overlap. Freedom 
is not merely imbued with religious significance: it becomes, as Pattison 
observed, “virtually synonymous with the religious aspect of human 
existence.”429 This is the source of the contradiction in Berdyaev’s interpretation: 
while Berdyaev repeats that freedom is the ‘centre’ of Dostoevsky’s thought, 430 
this freedom is preconceived within a moral framework (thus pre-divided into 
positive and negative freedoms). Berdyaev’s reading is that of a moralist rather 
than an existential philosopher, since freedom is subordinate to moral universals. 
In Shestov’s more radical reading, freedom is indivisible and transcends the 
sphere of ethics, to the result that morals lose any claim to universality. Berdyaev 
seems to have come to a realisation of the contradiction in his stance by the 1930s. 
In a paper given at the Religious Philosophical Academy in Paris in 1931, the 
manuscript of which remains in RGALI, Berdyaev now writes of Dostoevskian 
freedom not as the essence of man but as divine stipulation: 
Человек подвергается опасности, образ его затемнен и потрясен. 
Достоевский, который был и великим метафизиком, сознавал 
необходимость новой антропологии. Тема о человеке и было тема о 
Боге. Тема о человеке преходящем через все испытания свободы, 
было для него так же темой о кризисе гуманизма ... Бог, а не человек 
требует свободы.431 
This more accurate reading of Dostoevsky in the 30s seems to have left behind 
the heady radical relativism, typical of both Silver Age decadentism and the 
Années folles, to return to traditional Christian anthropology in the face of the 
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looming culmination of the ‘crisis of humanism’. The fact that Shestov made no 
such alteration, remaining stubbornly faithful to his conceptions while the ethos 
of the 1930s became increasingly wary of celebrating the crisis of humanism, 
contributed to a slump in his career in the 1930s.432 It is Shestov’s unwillingness 
to make such a compromise in his conception of freedom to ethics that rendered 
his thought at once the most “integral” – in Pattison’s words – of existential 
philosophies but, as such, the least useful.433  
 
Berdyaev’s notion of freedom is far more elastic, which leads to a further paradox 
in his interpretation of Dostoevsky. Berdyaev claims that freedom, in the works 
of Dostoevsky, does not need to be tested. This assertion is clearly at odds with a 
substantial element of Dostoevsky’s fictional project. Berdyaev turns a blind eye 
to the fact that in Dostoevsky’s oeuvre, while there are certain innately meek 
characters driven by a natural will to righteousness, a significant number of his 
characters have an utterly irresistible desire to transgress, to dare to test 
individual freedom. Such characters as Raskolnikov may perhaps find salvation – 
but only via transgression, guilt and repentance. Father Zosima’s biography, in 
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which his conversion follows the beating of his servant, serves as Dostoevsky’s 
final word on the foundations of righteousness in transgression and guilt, the 
theme first posited by Raskolnikov’s revolt and confession. 
 
The notion of revolt is essential to the readings of both Shestov and Berdyaev. 
However, both thinkers understand this in very different ways. While Shestov had 
venerated the revolt of Job as a state of being, Berdyaev states that self-will can 
only bring violence and undermine freedom. Again, Berdyaev’s Kantian subtext 
maintains that freedom to choose evil reduces the superior freedom to choose 
good. In the ‘capricious’ freedom venerated by Shestov and the underground man, 
Berdyaev sees necessarily a road to evil: 
Свобода как произвол и своеволие, свобода безбожная не может не 
породить "безграничного деспотизма". Такая свобода заключает в 
себе величайшее насилие. […] Бунтующая свобода привела к 
отрицанию самой идеи свободы, к невозможности постигнуть тайну 
мира и тайну Бога в свете свободы.
 434
 
Berdyaev is thus in opposition to Shestov, insofar as Berdyaev’s is a domesticated 
freedom that bends to ethics, and as such a non-freedom from any perspective 
preclusive of the “mystery” of divine will. Berdyaev sheds light on this when he 
writes in his autobiography: “Unlike my friend Leo Shestov, who engaged in the 
undoing of philosophy for the sake of liberating man (he did so, however, by 
means of philosophy!), I discovered in philosophy a source of freedom.”435 What 
Berdyaev has misinterpreted is that Shestov was battling not for the liberation of 
man via philosophy but for the liberation of philosophy from an established 
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narrow definition. For Berdyaev such an endeavour was unnecessary, insofar as 
he was at ease with bending reflections into line with his intuitions and religious 
dogmatism, seeing no need to defend such a stance from secular critique. 
 
In their correspondence, Berdyaev criticised the secularism inherent in Shestov’s 
psychological reading strategy:  
Ты упорно не желаешь знать, что безумие Паскаля, как и апостола 
Павла, было безумием во Христе. Благодать ты превратил в тьму и 
ужас. Опыт ап. Павла, Бл. Августина, Паскаля, Лютера не имел ни 
малейшего смысла вне христианства, вне бесконечно серьезного 
принятия христианских реальностей.436  
Berdyaev continues in a subsequent letter. 
Это мое главное возражение против Тебя. Ты роковым образом 
обречен на непонимание Паскаля, поскольку Ты сам не находишься 
внутри христианского опыта. Никакой ум, никакой талант, никакая 
душевная изощренность тут не поможет. Ты слишком умно, слишком 
тонко, слишком психологично пишешь о Паскале. Для Тебя 
раскрывается Паскаль лишь со стороны психологического, а не 
религиозного опыта. Верующий есть для Тебя лишь психологический 
эксперимент.
437
 
Thus from the perspective of Berdyaev, Shestov was mistaken in reading 
Christian thinkers from an agnostic, epistemological position exterior to Christian 
experience. This was Berdyaev’s main issue with Shestov’s epistemological 
searchings and the reason for his famous dubbing of Shestov as a sceptic.438 
Arjakovski has commented that Shestov has no deffence against Berdyaev’s 
critique: 
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[Chestov] veut permettre à l’homme souterrain de boire son thé. Or il a les 
mains nues. Il ne peut et ne veut rien expliquer. La seule arme dont il dispose 
et qui permet d’esquiver toutes les attaques de Berdiaev est son talent 
littéraire.439  
Indeed, if Shestov’s stance is indefensible from Berdyaev’s perspective, the 
reverse is equally true, a fact which no doubt accounts for the perpetual debate 
built into their tempestuous friendship. 
 
A final critical divergence between the two thinkers’ readings of Dostoevsky is 
that Berdyaev’s, like so many before it, hinges on the notions of cultural and 
historical relativism observed in the ‘modernist’ readings of the previous chapter, 
while Shestov’s existential reading is radically ahistorical. In keeping with the 
overarching historicity of Berdyaev’s worldview, Dostoevsky’s thought is 
interpreted as a turning point in intellectual history and the beginning of a new 
era in the history of Christianity. This he conceives as a transition from 
transcendentalism to immanentism, and as the historical end of humanism.440 
 
Typical of previous modernist readings, historicity comes hand in hand with 
cultural relativism. Berdyaev’s thought is underpinned by the subtext of the 
‘Russian idea’ inherited from Romantic discourse. Berdyaev shares Dostoevsky’s 
idea that the Russian soul is inherently other to its European counterpart. 
Typically this opposition is equated to geographical expansiveness, and notes that 
the ‘more astute’ minds of Europe are aware of this.441 
                                                   
439
 Antoine Arjakovski, "Léon Shestov et Nicloas Berdiaev: une amitié orageuse," in Léon 
Chestov: Un philosophe comme les autres?, Cahiers de l'émigration russe (Paris: Inst. des études 
slaves, 1996), p. 145. 
440
 Berdiaev, Filosofiia tvorchestva, kul'tury i iskusstva, II, p. 49. 
441
 Ibid., II, p. 105. 
162 
 
Достоевский исследовал бесконечные возможности человеческой 
души, формы и пределы души западно-европейской, ее культурная 
связанность и рациональная затверделость были бы препятствием для 
такого рода исследований. Вот почему Достоевский мыслим только в 
России и только русская душа может быть материалом, над которым 
он совершал свои открытия.442  
Berdyaev thus retained certain Romantic assumptions regarding Russian culture. 
Shestov was highly critical of this.443 If Shestov’s thought penetrated more 
deeply in France than the more widely-read Berdyaev, as Mercadé has argued,444 
it is doubtlessly due to the comparative cosmopolitanism and ‘secularism’ of his 
religious existential enquiry: dogmatic in essence, Berdyaev’s reading is 
accessible only to those already on his side. 
 
What this comparison has brought to light is that such fundamental differences 
exist between Shestov’s and Berdyaev’s readings of Dostoevsky, that the question 
arises as to whether they may indeed be meaningfully bracketed together as 
‘existential’. The most significant novelty of the existential reading in relation to 
earlier romantic readings lay in its conception of the ‘void,’ the psychological 
trauma associated with a rejection of objectivity; the resultant loss of the absolute 
and of certainty per se: the ‘death of God’ that Nietzsche’s madman had 
proclaimed. Most other aspects of existential thought, literature and criticism, 
intertwine closely with the tenets of romanticism. Berdyaev’s reading interacts 
with no such void: a priori moral values remain for him supreme and indubitable. 
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As Zenkovsky rightly observed:  
Гносеология и метафизика очень гибки у него – они послушно следуют 
за его чувствами, а в чувствах своих он прежде всего и больше всего 
моралист.
445
 
Berdyaev’s reading, like his philosophy, remains that of a romantic moralist, for 
all his recourse to a more fashionable existential vocabulary. Ultimately, 
Valevičius was not unjust in contrasting the novelty of Shestov’s subjectivist 
existential reading of Dostoevsky, to Berdyaev’s reduction of the novelist to 
conventional Christian anthropology.446  
 
The work was successful and widely read in France: Berdyaev was among the 
most thoroughly integrated of Russian émigré thinkers in the French milieu and 
his study of Dostoevsky went to numerous editions 447  Berdyaev’s 
correspondence in the archive at RGALI contains a number of elucidating private 
critiques of his study by key French intellectuals. Maritain, in an undated letter, 
also offered criticism of Berdyaev’s moralist reading of Dostoevsky: 
Ce livre sur Dostoïevski me semble très important pour comprendre votre 
conception du monde. Il est plein de ---- [mots?] admirables et 
merveilleusement stimulants. C’est sur le chapitre concernant la liberté 
que j’ai le plus de réserves à faire. Cette dialectique dostoïevskienne de la 
liberté est certainement chrétien [sic.], mais d’un christianisme qui se 
pense grâce à une idéologie hégélienne. Je crois que si Dostoïevski avait 
eu de l’acte surnaturel une conception plus explicite, il n’aurait pas 
transporté ainsi dans la trame de la nature et si j’ose ainsi parler 
métaphysiqué la doctrine paulinienne de la loi et de la liberté (car c’est 
toujours à cela qu’on revient.)448  
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A letter from Charles du Bos describes re-reading L’Esprit de Dostoïevsky during 
a “crise de foie,” suggestive that Berdiaev’s prose has more potential for soothing 
than stimulation for the Christian reader.449 Schloezer, as a partisan of Shestov’s 
thought, wrote critically of Berdiaev’s reading.450 Berdyaev defended his book 
from Schloezer’s attack in a letter to Shestov:  
Шлецер, твой переводчик, единомышленник, написал в Соврем. 
Записки рецензию о моей книге о Достоевском. Заметь, что то, что он 
говорит обо мне и против меня, он мог бы сказать против всякого 
верующего человека, всякого христианина. Он не принимает самого 
факта веры.
451
 
Jean Wahl, French existential philosophy’s academic exponent, writes to 
Berdyaev in an unpublished letter that “Aucun écrivain n’a pour moi un plus 
grand interêt [que Dostoïevski]”.452  Wahl’s principle issue with Dostoevsky 
coincides with Nietzsche’s: Dostoevsky’s conception of humility and abnegation 
(though Wahl does not specify whether this is a repugnance for an implied slave 
psychology or slave morality). “C’est là ce qui m’éloignerait d’une partie de 
l’oeuvre de Dostoïevski,” writes Wahl, in line with Shestov’s removal of this 
theme from his reading of Dostoevsky. Wahl goes on to question Berdyaev’s 
ethical universalism, again in parallel to Shestov’s and also Gide’s ‘Nietzschean’ 
readings:  
Si je me permettais de poser une interrogation ce serait celle-ci: le bien et 
le mal sont-ils toujours aussi séparés pour Dostoïevski qu’il semble 
d’après vos pages? N’ont-ils pas tous deux leur principe réel? ---- [Dieu?]? 
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Ne valent-ils pas l’un par l’autre? Et le pêché n’est-il pas d’après les 
paroles de Zossime que vous citez la ressemblance de l’amour dévoué? Et 
l’amour dévoué ne transfigure-t-il pas tout ou plutôt ne conserve-t-il pas 
tout? La boue resplendit dans le soleil; l’âme basse a un puits infini;- et les 
---- [gens?] des ------- n’ont-ils pas donc un aspect de --- ------------? - 
Peut-être par çà aussi Dostoïevski se rapprochait il de certaines sectes 
gnostiques?453 
The most interesting reaction for the current study would have been that of 
Marcel. Sadly little remains of his correspondence with Berdiaev, despite their 
well-known affiliation. What does, however, remain in the archive at RGALI is a 
letter clearly indicating that Marcel took efforts such that the work might be 
republished. 454  The correlations between the two thinkers have received 
insufficient critical attention, despite Wahl having observed long ago that 
Berdiaev and Marcel stood apart from other philosophers of existence in France 
in that they identified a genuine possibility for communication between the self 
and the other (the ‘I’ and the ‘thou’).455 If Marcel was unique among French 
existential thinkers in this regard, the fact that his reading of Dostoevsky and 
Ivanov hinges on this notion invites further, in-depth research into both his 
historical and conceptual connection to Berdiaev and to Russian émigré thought 
at large.  
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Gabriel Marcel, Dostoevsky and Russian thought 
 
The contribution of Gabriel Marcel, France’s highest profile religious existential 
philosopher, to the existential interpretation of Dostoevsky in France, was 
particularly marked by his close involvement in Russian émigré circles. Marcel 
was as a participant at the Studio Franco-Russe (see below) an attendant at 
Berdyaev’s salon, a close friend of Schloezer, an enthused reader of Ivanov and 
Shestov. 
 
In an early essay on Pushkin in 1923, Marcel offers an insight into his initial, 
cosmopolitan approach to Russian culture: “nous autres qui occupons une 
position excentrique par rapport au slavisme, la Russie est tout autre chose: c’est 
une note singulière de la gamme universelle, une note à la fois pure, plaintive et 
très légèrement désaccordée.”456 Following the war, Revolution and the arrival 
of the émigrés, national stereotypes were increasingly coming into question, 
being discussed and gradually unravelled. In 1924, Marcel’s first essay on 
Dostoevsky hinges refreshingly little on the Russianness that had been of such 
importance to previous commentators (with the exception of Shestov). Marcel 
offers a sober and insightful psychological reading, pre-emptive of aspects of 
what he would later term inter-subjectivity: a crucial aspect of his existential 
philosophy.   
 
Marcel’s essay, a review of Schloezer’s translation of The Eternal Husband, on 
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one level resembles Gide’s treatment of the same work (the previous year) in its 
focus on Dostoevsky’s modernism and his radical expansion of existing 
psychological categories. However, Marcel penetrates considerably further than 
Gide towards an understanding of the workings of this new psychology. Marcel’s 
conception is inter-relational rather than individualistic. As such Marcel moves a 
step away both from Gide’s and from Shestov’s readings, towards his developing 
concern for inter-subjectivity. For Marcel, the Dostoevskian relationship is an 
“être qui existe par lui-même, qui commande les actes des personnages entre 
lesquels elle s’est créée et dont ils sont au fond incapables de prendre tout à fait 
conscience.”457  Such a conception of relationships as agents ‘commanding’ 
participant-subjects subverts Cartesian conceptions of the individual 
agent-subject. This marks a significant transition between individualist readings 
of Dostoevsky such as Gide’s and Shestov’s, towards later, post-modern readings 
such as Girard’s, in emphasising inter-subjectivity.  
 
Marcel’s reading also resonates with Bakhtin’s in recognising this 
inter-subjectivity as the quintessence of Dostoevsky’s aesthetic and psychological 
innovation, and also as an inalienable aspect of the human condition historically 
misrepresented in Western thought.458 Marcel draws comparison to Proust as the 
epitomy of [French] individualist psychology and its corresponding aesthetics of 
the novel:  
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Nos catégories sont ici en défaut, mais surtout sans doute ce monadisme 
spontané dont l’œuvre de Proust est peut-être l’expression la plus 
rigoureusement cohérente. Pour un Proust il n’y a rien, il ne peut rien y avoir 
entre des êtres; ce mot entre est ici absolument vide d’application; pour 
Dostoïevski c’est, semble-t-il, le contraire qui est vrai; et peut-être ce qui est 
en moi n’est-il concevable qu’en fonction de ce qui est entre moi et les 
autres.459  
Marcel’s perspective has the potential to be highly productive: Dostoevsky’s 
impassioned characters are no longer victims of their passions; rather they 
respond to a matrix of contending, often internally dysfunctional relationships. 
The intersecting love triangles of Brothers Karamazov, for example, are clearly 
an exploration of this. 
 
There is a definite ‘dramatological’ aspect to Marcel’s perception of Dostoevsky’s 
psychological innovation - as was the case with Ivanov and Bakhtin. From 
Marcel’s perspective, Dostoevsky’s outlandish plots, rejected by so many 
previous critics, are plausible insofar as actions are driven by relation rather than 
character. Such an approach to the psychological workings of The Eternal 
Husband is justified by the very title. ‘Eternal husband’ designates a character 
type, coined by Velchaninov to describe Trusotsky. The term proves insufficient 
when the characters’ relationship develops beyond its initial boundaries, positing 
an insufficiency of ‘character’ as determinant of action, or more precisely, to the 
subordinance of character to relation; of subjectivity to inter-subjectivity.  
 
In this initial essay of 1924, Marcel has chosen one of Dostoevsky’s most secular 
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works of fiction for analysis, and relationships are understood from a secular 
perspective. This would change by Marcel’s next essay on the Russian novelist. It 
was not until 1929 that Marcel (and a curious cross-section of French modernists) 
converted to Catholicism.460 From around this time, inter-subjectivity took on a 
decidedly more religious slant in Marcel’s philosophical writings.  
 
In 1932, Marcel read Ivanov’s Dostoevsky: Tragedy – Myth – Mysticism upon its 
publication in German translation. 461  Marcel’s reaction appeared in Italian 
translation just a year later. Marcel’s intention had been to initiate (and preface – 
presumably with the French original of the Italian article) the publication of 
Ivanov’s influential study in French.462 Ivanov’s reading of Dostoevsky dates 
from the first wave of proto-existential interpretations of the Silver Age. It seems 
to have resonated significantly with Marcel, to the extent that when reading his 
article it is difficult to disentangle Ivanov’s reflections from Marcel’s. 
 
The metaphysical focus of Ivanov’s reading strategy corresponded to Marcel’s. 
Both see in Dostoevsky’s novels “un certo misterioso messaggio, riferentisi alla 
più intima struttura della realtà.” (a certain mysterious message referring to the 
most intimate structure of reality).463 Ivanov’s reading, while expressed in the 
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lexicon of symbolism with its reference to archetypal myths, hinges on a 
conception of the Self and Other that Marcel and other existential thinkers would 
reiterate:  
Проникновение есть некий transcensus субъекта, такое его состояние, 
при котором возможным становится воспринимать чужое я не как 
объект, а как другой субъект. […] ‘Ты еси’ — не значит более ‘ты 
познаешься мною, как сущий’, а ‘твое бытие переживается мною, как 
мое, твоим бытием я снова познаю себя сущим’. Es, ergo sum.”464 
Marcel found the essence of Dostoevsky’s conception of human existence in 
Ivanov’s notion that the recognition of the other as a fellow subject represents 
both an affirmation and negation of the self: 
Da cui la formula paradossale e per un cartesiano radicalmente 
inintelligibile: Es, ergo sum. L’idealismo che dichiarandola impensabile 
sopprime la priorità del Tu sei di fronte all’Io sono, di regola finisce nella 
solitudine, nella disperazione, nell’odio. La tragedia dostoievskiana mette 
in luce la dialettica catastrofica che ha origine da un irrealismo del Tu; se 
io mi limito a sognare l’altro, tutto mi è lecito; il sogno non ha diritti sul 
sognatore, che è libero ma di una libertà distruttrice, non creatrice; io 
posso uccidermi e assieme col mio io posso uccidere un mondo che ha 
stanza solo in me – e non io, certamente, ho le radici in quel mondo. 
(Hence, the paradoxical formula that is radically unintelligible for a 
Cartesian mind: Es, ergo sum. The idealism that outrules the possibility of 
this conception suppresses the priority normally given to the ‘you are’ in 
favour of the ‘I am’, and usually ends up in loneliness, desperation, hate. 
Dostoevsky’s tragedy highlights the catastrophic dialectic that originates in 
the unrealism of the ‘you’; if I limit myself to dreaming the other, 
everything is legitimate; the dream has no rights over the dreamer, who is 
free but whose freedom is destructive, not creative; I can kill myself and 
together with my ‘I’ I can kill a world that is real only for me, and it is not 
me, of course, who has roots in that world.)465 
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Marcel’s words are pertinent to the discussion of Sartre’s thought below, in which 
the possibility of an individualist solution to the problem of the Absurd is 
contrasted to religious and inter-subjective models.466 It is in this contrast that 
Ivanov and Marcel identify the crux of Dostoevsky’s indictment of humanism:  
L’umanesimo avrà […] preparato l’avvento di una società che sarà invero 
solo una super-animalità, e che si distinguerà per la sua forza di 
accentramento, di subordinazione. 
(Humanism will have […] prepared the advent of a society that is indeed 
nothing but a super-animality, distinguishable for its force of centralisation 
and subordination).467 
In Dostoevsky’s fiction, Marcel follows Ivanov in positing the development of a 
conception of man radically opposed to individualism: 
  
Infatti la personalità ha, agli occhi di Dostoievski, una natura antinomica. 
Indubbiamente, come sostanza, essa è una, malgrado tutte le possibili 
divisioni interiori di cui è suscettibile; è una, perchè riflette o esprime a 
suo modo un’unità superiore e infrangibile; ma nello stesso tempo non 
forma un mondo chiuso; anzi, proprio dal fatto di essere fondata su di un 
principio d'unità assoluta, essa trae il potere di singolarizzarsi nel senso 
metafisico di questo termine, di isolarsi, di tagliare i legami che la 
uniscono alle altre personalità. 
(Each personality has, according to Dostoevsky, an antinomical nature. 
Undoubtedly, in essence, it is one, despite all the possible interior divisions 
that it is susceptible to. It is one because it reflects or expresses in its own 
way a superior and unbreakable unity. Nevertheless, it does not form a 
closed world; in fact, due to being founded on a principle of absolute unity, 
a personality takes its power from its ability to exist singularly (in the 
metaphysical sense of the word); to isolate itself; to cut the ties that bind it 
to other personalities.)468  
Citing Dostoevsky’s Diary of a Writer on the impossibility of delineating Self 
from Other, Marcel comments:  
                                                   
466
 See pages 195-198 of the current thesis. 
467
 Ibid., p. 279. 
468
 Ibid., p. 275. 
172 
 
Vi è qui, oso affermarlo, una concezione straordinariamente profonda, che 
anticipa le più recenti e ardite dottrine filosofiche. Dostoievski ha visto 
con inaudita chiarezza che l'idea di una specie di delimitazione oggettiva 
delle personalità […] contradditoria.  
(Here I find an extremely profound conception that, in my opinion, 
anticipates the most recent and courgeous philosophical doctrines. 
Dostoevsky has seen clearly that the idea of an objective delimitation of 
personalities [...] is contradictory per se.)469 
This notion takes on metaphysical purport insofar as the embodied subject comes 
into being in a necessarily peopled world: a world which presents itself to the 
subject via the other. This conception takes on a mystic quality in his writings, as 
Being can only be conceived as a unity by reference to the unity of divine Being, 
such that, in Pattison’s words, “God is […] conceived in the language of 
ontology.”470 Inter-subjectivity thus also takes on a religious significance, which 
resonates closely with the Silver Age discussion of sobornost’, a key aspect of 
Berdyaev’s and Ivanov’s readings of Dostoevsky.471  
 
Marcel was critical of philosophical stances that conceived of individual 
being-in-the-world prior to the consideration of the other (since the world 
presents itself to the I as a Thou). His mystic and ‘harmonious’ conception of 
inter-subjectivity is opposed to the antagonistic self-other relations in the 
understanding of atheist existentialism (such as Sartre’s dissociable être pour soi 
and être pour les autres). Dostoevsky’s fiction had explored the disparity between 
these stances at length. The Self, if alienated from Christ, Dostoevsky conceived 
as capable of only an antagonistic relation to the Other. For Dostoevsky, this was 
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the inescapable paradox of secular humanism. 
 
In Dostoevsky’s thought there exists a similar notion to sobornost’, comparable 
to Ivanov’s or Berdyaev’s and to Marcel’s inter-subjectivity. The key to this, 
contrary to later religious thinkers, was guilt, as per Zosima’s doctrine: “всякий 
из нас пред всеми во всем виноват, а я более всех.”
472
 To this sobornost’ 
Dostoevsky opposed vsemstvo: secular collective consciousness, the source both 
of rational thought and of the cynicism that precludes the unconditional love of 
the other. It is this secular and Cartesian conception of the other that Marcel 
criticised in Sartre’s L’Etre et le néant.473 Sartre had presented human relations 
as power struggles and manipulations, flights and chases, leading down the dead 
end of “l’enfer, c’est les autres.” 
 
The crux is that in Marcel’s existential reading of Dostoevsky, Being is not an 
ontological given, but an ontological exigency: not merely existence but a 
complex of existence and subjective experience of existence, necessarily 
coloured by the mystery of an urge to exist for.474 This mysterious exigency to 
exist for could, of course, have been conceived and expressed as the revelation of 
an absence of a comprehensible ontological motive. From this perspective, 
Marcel can be observed to use the positive vocabulary of ontology to express the 
same absence that Shestov expressed in the negative vocabulary of absurdism. 
The unpublished correspondence of Schloezer and Marcel makes reference to the 
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initial allure of Shestov’s stance to Marcel. An undated letter addressed simply to 
“cher ami” contains a wealth of Schloezer’s reflections on the author of 
“Positions et approches concrètes du mystère ontologique” (thus Marcel, late 
1933–early 1934). Schloezer’s commentary again echoes the thought of Shestov. 
Explicitly, he writes: 
En vous lisant, j’ai pensé parfois à quelqu’un que vous n’aimez pas 
beaucoup, je crois, mais que j’aime, et pour qui, pour de multiples raisons 
dont je vous parlerai peut-être un jour, j’ai une immense reconnaissance, 
c’est Chestov. Je lui passe votre livre.475 
Marcel’s response is indicative of the influence Shestov had on his own 
intellectual development: “Quant au rapprochement avec Chestov – [ce] qui me 
porterait à penser que vous avez raison c’est la très vive émotion, l’énergie de 
choc que j’ai ressenti lorsque j’ai pris contact initialement avec sa pensée.”476 
 
The disparity between the conclusions reached by each philosopher in his thought 
parallels the conclusions of their readings of Dostoevsky. Marcel’s article 
concludes on Ivanov’s reading of Aliosha’s sermon by the grave of Iliusha:  
Il ricordo di Iliusha, in quanto egli resta vivo nell'intimo di ognuno, li 
preserverà dalla disperazione, permetterà loro di resistere allo Spirito di 
Negazione; ognuno conserva in sè la presenza di Iliuscia come un tesoro 
personale e che non si può perdere. Ma dietro questa presenza ce n’è 
un’altra, che è la vera Presenza – quella del Cristo. 
(The memory of Iliusha, insofar as it remains alive in each of them, will 
save them from despair, and will allow them to resist the Spirit of 
Negation; each of them conserves in himself the presence of Iliusha as a 
personal treasure that cannot be lost. Behind this presence, however, there 
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is another one, the real Presence: that of Christ.)477 
It is fitting that Marcel chooses to grant the final word to Aliosha’s sermon since 
this was the closing argument of Dostoevsky’s fiction (the final chapter of his 
final novel), which had for so long been removed from the French version of the 
text in Harpéline-Kaminsky’s translation/adaptation. However, much like the 
dislocated publication of the sermon as Les Précoces, Marcel alters the meaning 
of the sermon by removing it from the context of the plot. His reading focuses on 
the memory and a resultant ‘presence’ of the deceased Iliusha as a foundation for 
the boys’ spiritual communion. However, this interpretation undermines the 
importance of sin and guilt in this episode and indeed in Dostoevsky’s thought. 
The significance of Aliosha’s sermon by the grave is not Iliusha’s presence but 
his absence: what the children experience, and what binds them together is a 
haunting experience, intrinsically connected to their own complicity in Iliusha’s 
death. Thus sobornost’ is founded on guilt. One religious existential thinker who 
did appreciate this aspect of Dostoevsky’s worldview was Rachel Bespaloff, 
writing in 1938: “Dans le monde de Dostoïevski, seul la passion sans limite du 
repentir peut scruter l’abîme de la cruauté.”478 Inversely, at the other end of this 
spectrum, Bespaloff places Stavroguine: “Chez Stavroguine, ‘le défi orgueilleux 
du coupable au destin’ est ancré dans l’indéracinable connaissance du péché.”479 
So as Gide had understood Dostoevsky’s fiction along the axis of pride and 
humility (an individualistic axis) so Bespaloff interprets it along the axis of 
cruelty and guilt (an inter-subjective axis).480 
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Marcel is perhaps the only existential interpreter of Dostoevsky to turn a blind 
eye to Ivan’s infamous theodicean revolt. As he worte in his Journal 
Métaphysique: 
La théodicée, c’est l’athéisme. Mais ceci implique-t-il (en un sens 
quelconque) que l’on doive penser Dieu comme étant par-delà le bien et le 
mal? Il n’y a pas d’expression plus ambiguë que celle-là.481 
While this interrogation is similar to Dostoevsky’s in Brothers Karamazov, 
Marcel’s conclusion (that theodicy is atheism) is incongruous to Dostoevsky’s, 
who famously proclaimed that his Hosana had been tempered by the fires of 
doubt.482 Marcel is also here in opposition to Shestov, for whom doubt – up to 
the revolt of Job – was an essential element of meaningful faith. While Shestov 
found meaning in the confrontation of reason and revelation, Marcel refused to 
allow religious experience to be confronted by the ‘Euclidian mind’, as his 
writings on Dostoevsky and Ivanov express:  
le verità religiose non diventano costrittive per la mente, se non quando 
degenerano in principi astratti, cioè se perdono il loro carattere 
fondamentale. Qui siamo vicinissimi alla filosofia di un N. Berdiaev, quale 
si esprime, per esempio in Spirito e Liberta. La ragione euclidiana e tutta 
formale, e si potrebbe forse dire che essa si riferisce solo ai possibili. 
(religious truths become constrictive for the mind only when they 
degenerate, transform themselves into abstract principles. That is when 
they lose their fundamental principle (character). Here we are very close to 
Berdyaev’s philosophy, as explained in Spirit and freedom. Euclidian 
reason is all formal and one could maybe say that it refers only to the 
possible.)483 
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Simone Weil, another thinker who has on occasion been situated in the margins 
of the religious existential tradition, read Ivan’s theodicy sympathetically:  
Discours d’Ivan dans les Karamazov: “Quand même cette immense fabrique 
apporterait les plus extraordinaires merveilles et ne coûterait qu’une seule 
larme d’un seul enfant, moi je refuse.” J’adhère complètement à ce 
sentiment.484 Aucun motif, quel qu’il soit, qu’on puisse me donner pour 
compenser une larme d’un enfant ne peut me faire accepter cette larme. 
Aucun absolument que l’intelligence puisse concevoir. Un seul, mais qui 
n’est intelligible qu’à l’amour surnaturel: Dieu l’a voulu. Et pour ce motif-là 
j’accepterais aussi bien un monde qui ne serait que mal, qu’une larme 
d’enfant.485 
Weil, along with Berdyaev, seems in line with Marcel’s stance that: “Religion is 
only for the person who surrenders himself to it.”486 Religious experience cannot 
interact with reason. Dostoevsky had fictionalised this very interaction, but 
ultimately came to the same conclusion with his famously audacious 
proclamation that if Christ were proven to lie outwith truth he would choose 
Christ over Truth.487 Shestov’s writings likewise brought faith and reason into 
conflict, but unlike other religious existential thinkers he rejected any such 
‘choice’ as Dostoevsky’s, any consolation that would reduce the conflict, finding 
the meaning of faith rather in the conflict itself. 
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Dostoevsky at Le Studio Franco-Russe 
 
In 1929 the Studio Franco-Russe was established to foster and develop existing 
intercultural dialogue between French and Russian-émigré literary elites. The 
Studio's monthly debates, which continued until 1931, centered on questions 
pertaining to contemporary intercultural exchange, often with a strong religious 
slant. These debates brought together such high profile thinkers and writers as 
Berdyaev, Schloezer, Adamovitch, Tsvetaeva, Teffi, Marcel, Bernanos, 488 
Crémieux, Valéry, Mauriac and Malraux.489 The transcripts, originally published 
by Péguy in the Cahiers de la Quinzaine, have recently been republished with an 
informative introduction by Leonid Livak (2005). As observed with the Décades 
at Pontigny, Dostoevsky was top of the Studio’s agenda, especially emerging 
‘modern’ and proto-existential conceptions of the novelist’s religious thought. 
 
The inaugural meeting, held on the 29 Oct 1929, was a heated debate on the 
question of “l’inquiétude dans la littérature contemporaine.” The controversial 
proposition that post-WWI French intellectual culture, for better or worse, shared 
a certain anguish and uncertainty with a predating Russian tradition set the tone 
for the meetings to follow. The topic was a hot one: Adamovich had already 
posited in 1925 that the post-war climate in French literature meant Russians no 
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longer held the “monopoly” on angst.490 Perhaps an easier claim to defend would 
be that intellectuals were increasingly aware of ‘modernity’ as a common 
European experience, and that, in the Franco-Russian context, Dostoevsky 
became something of a common language. The following meeting (26 Nov 1929) 
on French-Russian and Russian-French literary ‘influence’, centred so heavily 
around Dostoevsky that the need to hold a separate meeting on the subject of the 
novelist became clear, which took place on 18 Dec 1929. A later meeting on the 
subject of Gide (25 Mar 1930) also focused heavily on his relation to Dostoevsky. 
The following discussion will examine the transcripts of these three meetings in 
terms of the place of Dostoevsky in each debate.  
 
 
‘Influence’ 
 
The first occasion for detailed debate on Dostoevsky, on the extremely broad 
theme of intercultural literary influence, was an enlightening disaster. Jean 
Maxence opened with the age-old anti-cosmopolitanist arguments of Vogüé’s 
early opponents, asserting the danger of cross-cultural contamination in the 
literary sphere:  
Rien ne défigure en effet une littérature et une pensée comme l’influence 
qu’elle peut prendre à l’étranger […]. Aussi faut-il soigneusement nous 
garder des interférences subtiles de la compréhension française et de la 
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vision slave du monde.”491  
Note the typical opposition of French ‘comprehension’ (connoting reason, 
objectivity, accuracy) to a Slavic ‘vision’ (connoting the mystic and subjective). 
Significantly, in order to depict the fundamental difference between the national 
character of France and Russia, Maxence refers to the French reception of 
Dostoevsky:  
Il suffit pour s’en apercevoir de mesurer toute la distance qui sépare des 
interprétations russes de Dostoïevski, celles de Chestov par exemple et de 
Berdiaev – pourtant opposée en tant de points – de l’interprétation française 
que tente d’en donner M. Gide.492 
Personal and historical factors are utterly removed and national intellectual types 
alone remain.  
 
Contact with the Russian novel, Maxence asserts, has had a lamentably 
denaturing influence on French intellectual life, turning the French against their 
own values: “Il n’en est pas qui ait mieux aidé les Français à mépriser leur 
patrimoine intellectuel et à méconnaître les lois profondes de leur génie 
propre.”493 To the ‘profound laws’ of French aesthetics, Maxence opposes the 
‘chasms’ of Dostoevsky’s fiction, again making use of the established lexicon 
dating back to Vogüé. When comparing Romain Roland to les Russes, Maxence 
states “[Celui de Rolland n’a rien en] commun avec l’œuvre de Dostoïevski. On 
n’y trouve pas les gouffres, les abîmes d’un Ivan Karamazov, ni les élans d’un 
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Aliocha.”494  This ‘chasmic’ reading of Dostoevsky seems to have become 
entrenched by the end of the 1920s, to the extent that probing this ‘abyss’ and 
identifying its workings was deemed futile from the outset. Maxence tellingly 
expresses his preference for Suarès’s interpretation over the developed readings 
of Gide’s or Shestov’s.495 As observed in the previous chapter, Suarès had 
contributed positively nothing to the understanding of Dostoevsky’s work or 
thought, but merely regurgitated second-hand truisms concerning l’âme russe.  
 
The debate that followed was somewhat shambolic. Discussants on either side of 
the cultural divide, having fumbled around an impossibly vast and vague topic, 
fell back on the old national stereotypes. Michel Dard proclaimed that:  
Jusqu’à présent, on n’a pas abordé dans le débat le fond de la question, car il 
s’agit en fait de deux pays qui sont profondément étrangers l’un à l’autre: ‘La 
Russie représente jusqu’à nos jours la soumission au destin; la France 
représente la lutte de la volonté contre le destin.496  
The stenographer records at this point a reassuring guffaw from Gabriel Marcel. 
The debate then descended into tragi-comedy as leading intellectuals grappled 
with an impossible topic. Marcel emerged as a voice of critical insight:  
Il ne suffit pas de découvrir chez Mauriac le sens du péché pour affirmer 
qu’il a été influencé par Dostoevski. Il est dangereux de chercher une 
influence de chaque écrivain étranger sur un écrivain français sensible à 
l’atmosphère générale de son époque.497 
He chastised the sweeping judgements and general lack of critical rigour of 
prevalent approaches to questions of influence in the 1930s. 
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‘Dostoevsky’ 
 
The following meeting opened with a paper by Kiril Zaitsev offering a fairly 
typical émigré reading, reverent of Rozanov’s seminal Silver Age 
interpretation,498 and echoing the tones of Shestov’s existential reading. Again, a 
‘chasmic’ lexicon dominates, militating against critical engagement with 
Dostoevsky’s aesthetics:  
[S]’il vous arrive de plonger votre regard, ne fût-ce que pour un instant, dans 
le gouffre, dans le néant de Dostoïevski, vous en recevez un choc inoubliable 
et dont les traces sont ineffaçables.499  
Dostoevsky, he continues, must be understood not alongside novelists but 
religious philosophers such as Plato, Pascal and Nietzsche.500 Zaitsev’s choice of 
fairly ambiguous ‘religious philosophers’ again evokes Shestov’s reading and the 
Silver Age. Zaitsev further emphasises the theme of revolt against God as a path 
to religious truth, again concurrent with Shestov’s existential thought:  
La différence entre Dostoïevski et Platon, Pascal ou Nietzsche ne se confine 
pas dans la forme romancée de la philosophie […]. Dostoïevski n’est pas une 
recherche, ni un hymne, une affirmation logique, une angoisse, une 
aspiration, une terreur, une négation de Dieu; c’est la révolte titanique contre 
Dieu qui, sous l’influence de l’amour du Christ, se transforme en ‘hosannah’ 
retentissant.501  
Despite these echoes of Shestov in Zaitsev’s paper, he concludes on a critical note 
towards an unnamed, recent, ‘entirely negative’ commentator (most likely 
Shestov), stressing the final victory of faith in Christ over atheism in 
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Dostoevsky’s life and works.502  
 
René Lalou’s paper saw Dostoevsky’s thought as a sustained attack on western 
values.503 He suggests that France’s initial enthusiasm for Dostoevsky was based 
on a misuderstanding: 
Devant certains personnages de Dostoïevski, nous avions l’habitude de nous 
écrier: ‘Comme ils sont Russes!’ Quelle surprise que d’entendre à présent 
Stavroguine nous répondre: ‘Rien ne m’attache à la Russie.’ De même, nous 
avions admiré Ivan Karamazov. Nous voyons maintenant qu’il n’existe que 
pour se faire écraser. Donc, il nous fallut sur plusieurs points faire machine 
en arrière, admettre que le vrai héros pour Dostoïevski était Aliocha.504  
He nonetheless concludes on the value of French Ivan-centric readings, for all 
their distance from Dostoevsky’s authorial intention: “Français, je constate un tel 
enrichissement dans ces diverses images de ‘notre’ Dostoïevski, que je demande 
la permission de les garder toutes, avec leurs contradictions.”505  
 
Once again, the debates that followed were heated. Vladimir Pozner was highly 
critical of Zaitsev, for following the Silver Age tradition of reading Dostoevsky as 
a metaphysician and prophet rather than as a novelist. Pozner goes as far as to 
lament that psychologists and theologians have presumed the right to interpret 
Dostoevsky rather than leaving this business to literary critics:  
La critique littéraire n’est pas un prétexte à des conversations sur des sujets 
philosophiques à propos d’un livre donné. […] Un théologien, qui 
n’admettrait jamais qu’un historien de la littérature fit des théories sur la 
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Divinité d’après l’oeuvre romanesque d’un écrivain, se croit autorisé à faire 
des incursions dans un domaine qui lui est étranger506 
While Pozner’s exclusionist stance is extreme, he does highlight a deficiency in 
the dominant interpretations of Dostoevsky of the period: their failure to 
incorporate aesthetics into their readings. Berdyaev’s study, for example, had at 
no point meaningfully engaged with Dostoevsky’s literary aesthetics.507 
 
Much of the discussion centred on Dostoevsky as a moralist. R.P. Léon Gillet, a 
French orthodox priest, comments that many Frenchmen have turned to the 
Orthodox church, inspired by Dostoevsky, and that for them, Aliosha is not only 
the protagonist of the Brothers Karamazov, but a way of life.508 Gaïto Gazdanov, 
like Shestov, rejects any moralist reading:  
En ce qui concerne cette éternelle question: ‘comment faut-il vivre?’ 
Dostoïevski ne nous a rien dit de positif, et, d’ailleurs, il est tout à fait 
évident que le phénomène de Dostoïevski est quelque chose qui se trouve de 
l’autre côté de la vie pratique. […] Dire que le chemin de Dostosïevski est 
celui qu’il faut suivre, c’est le voir sous une lumière absolument fausse.509  
The conclusion reached by K. Zaitsev is that while the debate surrounding 
Dostoevsky’s fiction was a heated one, the divisions and affiliations that it 
revealed did not relate to the nationalities of the participants:  
Il y a ici des Français qui étaient avec moi et des Russes qui approuvaient M. 
Lalou. […] [N]otre réunion d’aujourd’hui démontre que cette différence 
échappe à nos origines nationales. C’est une observation très précieuse, et 
qu’il faut marquer comme un pas essentiel dans le rapprochement intellectuel 
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entre Russes et Français.510 
This conclusion is indeed of purport, as it prooves that Dostoevsky served 
successfully as a platform for meaningful intercultural communication.  
 
 
‘André Gide’ 
 
The question of the connection between Dostoevsky and Gide was a key one for 
the participants of the Studio Franco-Russe. In his discussion of ‘influence’, 
Maxence had judged that:  
[O]n ne retrouve dans aucune des œuvres de Gide une influence vraiment 
authentique de Dostoeïevski […]. Aucun [de ses personnages] ne vit de cette 
vie des profondeurs qui donne aux héros de Dostoïevski une si étrange 
puissance humaine.511  
Maxence gives little indication of what an ‘authentic’ influence might constitute 
other than an achievement of the “étrange puissance” of Dostoevsky. Maxence’s 
approach was thus to assess whether Gide ‘measured up’ to Dostoevsky (in the 
vaguest of terms) rather than examining how Gide’s novels were in dialogue with 
Dostoevsky’s. Maxence is highly representative in this respect: most of the 
subsequent discussion of the two novelists focused on whether or not Gide had 
passed the Dostoevsky test. Once more, the debate was naïve and polarised. 
However, once again the polarisation was often along refreshingly non-national 
lines in comparison to previous discussion of Dostoevsky in France. Adamovich, 
for example, addressed Gide's unpopularity in Russia, which he accounts for as a 
                                                   
510
 Ibid., pp. 119-120. 
511
 Maxence, "L'Influence de la littérature russe sur les écrivains français," p. 77. 
186 
 
non-adherence to stereotypes Russian readers expected from French literature.512 
He also spoke of a superiority of Gide’s fiction to Dostoevsky’s, in terms of the 
personal authenticity of experiences conveyed.513 
 
The significance of the Studio Franco-Russe, as the transcribed debates attest at 
every page, is that they brought all of the cultural and national stereotypes 
discussed in the previous two chapters to the surface where their deconstruction 
could begin. Dostoevsky was crucial to this insofar as he split participants along 
non-national lines.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has highlighted that Russian Silver Age thought in emigration and 
France’s developing religious existential movement were in dialogue in the 1920s 
and 30s, and that Dostoevsky was both a common source of inspiration to both 
and a meeting ground. Pattison warns against the tendency to interpret the history 
of religious existentialism as “a progressive domestication of the 
nineteenth-century experience of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Dostoevsky.” 514 
He adds, however, that such an interpretation would nonetheless be “much more 
plausible” than the commonly held notion that religious existentialism was a 
second-order, pious counterpart to Sartre and Heidegger’s projects. 515  My 
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analysis has clearly shown that the existential readings of Dostoevsky, such as 
Shestov’s and Schloezer’s, were far from “domestications,” but rather 
radicalisations of existential motifs in Dostoevsky’s thought. Berdyaev’s more 
romantic reading attempted to reunite this experience to Christian dogma. Marcel, 
drawing from Dostoevsky’s fiction through the lens of Russian philosophical 
commentary, homed in on the concepts of inter-subjective religious experience. 
The analysis of the discussions of Dostoevsky at the Studio Franco-Russe has 
suggested that national stereotypes continued to pervade and at times obstruct 
intercultural dialogue. However, in the case of Dostoevsky, a common ground 
was achieved: Dostoevsky did divide discussants, passionately, but along 
non-national lines; an experience that participants themselves recognised as an 
important step towards meaningful, cosmopolitan intercultural exchange.  
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Chapter 4: Dostoevsky and the French existentialist novel 
 
Proto-existentialist readings such as Shestov’s and Gide’s had dissociated the 
Christian humanism of Dostoevsky’s fiction from his subversive, anti-humanist 
representations of atheist thought. From the late 1930s the latter became 
increasingly important to the thinkers and writers associated with France’s 
non-religious existentialist movements as they came to the fore. The backlash that 
‘modern’ interpreters like Gide had launched against Vogüé and his generation 
had been remarkably successful. André Malraux recalled:  
Nous avons d’abord connu Dostoïevski par des traductions élémentaires, des 
œuvres amputées de murs entiers, des préfaces qui l’éclairaient à contre-jour 
en le présentant comme un Dickens russe.”516  
Mistrustful of initial readings and translations for their humanitarian bent, they 
embraced the modern reading, refracted through Gide and Shestov, despite this 
being equally slanted in the opposite direction. The resultant existentialist 
readings of Dostoevsky have the same focus on existential revolt and 
(secularised) theodicy as the religious forerunners. However, they differ crucially 
from the readings of Gide, Berdyaev and Marcel with regard to the concepts of 
abnegation and intersubjectivity. The focus remains on Ivan Karamazov, Kirilov 
and, of course, the Notes from Underground. 
 
I have chosen to restrict analysis to three authors – Jean-Paul Sartre, Louis-René 
des Forêts and Albert Camus – not only in light of their extensive intertextual 
engagement with Dostoevsky’s oeuvre, but also their parodic intertextual 
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dialogue with each other via the Dostoevskian hypotext. Through their respective 
‘rewritings’ of Notes from Underground and the dialogue that takes place 
between these works, a multifaceted image emerges of the significance of 
Dostoevsky’s Notes to the French existentialist tradition. Firstly, the point of 
contact between Dostoevsky’s and Sartre’s fiction is demonstrated via an 
intertextual reading of La Nausée, Erostrate and Dostoevsky’s Notes from 
Underground. Forêts’s Le Bavard is then analysed as a parody at once of 
Dostoevsky’s Notes and of Sartre’s La Nausée. Camus’s rewriting, La Chute, is 
then observed to critique Sartre’s existentialism by reconfronting it with the 
Dostoevskian hypotext. Comparative analysis permits an assessment of the 
significance of their intertextual dialogue surrounding Dostoevsky’s work as a 
contribution to existentialist interpretation of Dostoevsky’s fiction. 
 
Discussion of the existentialist reception of Dostoevsky necessitates 
contextualisation within the complex intellectual history of the interchange of 
ideas between prominent French, Russian and German existential movements 
spanning the first half of the century. Boscetti has observed that alongside the 
more well-known intermediary roles of Koyré and Kojève in the reception of 
German philosophy in France at this time, the thought of Shestov and Berdyaev 
in many respects prepared the terrain for existentialism.517  Meanwhile, the 
Studio Franco-Russe was among the very earliest incubation grounds for 
discussion of Kierkegaard in France.518 Shestov was also among the first to 
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introduce the thought of Husserl to France.519 
 
What has often been viewed as a bilateral exchange between German and French 
thinkers could thus be reconsidered as a triangular exchange in which Russia’s 
existential movement in literature and religious philosophy played an active role. 
The influence of Russian émigré thought on the development of French 
existentialism has rarely received due attention. Boschetti’s work is an exception 
to this, underlining the émigré influence on the works of Gabriel Marcel in the 
late 20s and early 30s and stressing, at the roots of Sartre’s philosophy, “the 
collective labour rooted in an imported train of thought”.520 
 
Dostoevsky has often been omitted from discussions of the history of 
existentialism. As observed in the introduction, this has primarily been because 
he was not a philosopher in the strict sense of the institutionalised discipline. 
However, the very fact that French existentialism constituted such an irrefutably 
synthetic literary-philosophical movement begs a reassessment of the place in 
this history of Dostoevsky and the philosophical literary criticism of Russian 
émigré philosophy, especially since it is perhaps above all in this transmodality 
that French existentialism distinguished itself most distinctly from its German 
counterpart, as represented by Heidegger and Jaspers. The significance of this 
merging of literary and philosophical discourses in the context of the intellectual 
history of an emerging post-modernity is of no small purport. Existential and 
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existentialist movements represented a crucial transition towards a more 
genuinely philosophical literature and genuinely literary philosophy, Bataille and 
Ricoeur, for example, drawing directly from the existential tradition of Shestov 
and Dostoevsky.521 
 
The difficulty in situating Dostoevsky’s fiction within the history of French 
existentialism arises from the fact that by the 1930s, as a direct result of the 
publications discussed in the previous two chapters, the author had been firmly 
established as a modern classic. It would therefore be a more difficult task to 
identify French authors that did not read and actively engage to some extent with 
Dostoevsky’s oeuvre around this period.522 In the years when WWII unfolded, 
Dostoevsky’s representation of a fundamental incompatibility between 
rationalism and human experience again came to the fore. As Malraux wrote:  
Comme tous les écrivains de ma génération, j’avais été frappé par le passage 
des Frères Karamazov où Ivan dit: ‘Si la volonté divine implique le supplice 
d’un enfant innocent par une brute, je rends mon billet.’523  
Thus, while the religious conclusions of Dostoevsky’s thought were far removed 
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from those of the secular thinkers discussed in this chapter, the importance of 
ideas expressed through Dostoevsky’s novels in the formulation and expression 
of existentialist thought in France cannot be overlooked.  
 
 
 
Jean-Paul Sartre 
 
Sartre announced, in ‘L’Existentialisme est un humanisme’ (1945): “Dostoïevski 
avait écrit: ‘si dieu n’existait pas, tout serait permis.’ C’est là le point de départ de 
l’existentialisme.”524 It is thus in his conception of the human condition, and 
specifically the interrogation of the limits of human freedom, that Sartre’s 
thought drew from the tradition of Dostoevsky and the religious existential 
thinkers that had fed more directly from Dostoevskian roots. Though Sartre’s 
subsequent ethical systemisations would take him in a very different direction, in 
his earliest works of fiction a dialogue with Dostoevsky’s thought is distinctly 
manifest, and has already attracted a degree of scholarly attention. 525 
Comparison of Sartre’s first novel to Dostoevsky, indeed, preceded its 
publication: Brice Parain, an editor at Gallimard, on reading the draft of La 
Nausée campared it immediately to Dostoevsky.526  
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Since first publication, La Nausée has been recognised as a radical departure 
from the French tradition of the philosophical novel, in which questions of mœurs 
were discussed within the strict confines of the novelistic form. This is not the 
tradition to which Sartre adheres: the form and conception of the novel is 
remodelled around its philosophical subject matter, something on which all critics, 
sympathetic or otherwise, seem to have agreed.527  Paul Nizan’s review in 
particular stressed that Sartre’s fiction bore no resemblance to the frivolity of the 
genre as it existed from Voltaire to the twentieth century.528 The ‘new literatures 
of the North’ were often cited by critics observing this innovation – most often 
with reference to Kafka, as in Nizan’s above cited review. The name of 
Dostoevsky and his contribution to the development of the modern philosophical 
novel is more rarely raised, no doubt owing to the marked aesthetic disparities 
discussed below and, of course, the religious-atheist opposition between 
Dostoevsky and Sartre. Pinning down historical connections between Sartre and 
Dostoevsky is further problematised by the fact that, unlike Gide, Marcel or 
Camus, and despite his extensive critical oeuvre, Sartre offered no significant 
critical analysis of Dostoevsky’s oeuvre.529 Nonetheless, Sartre’s early fictional 
output is in dialogue with Notes from Underground with regard to the questions 
of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, freedom and human motivation. 
 
This dialogue is opened by the second paragraph of Roquentin’s journal: 
Je ne pense pas que le métier d’historien dispose à l’analyse psychologique. 
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Dans notre partie, nous n’avons affaire qu’à des sentiments entiers sur 
lesquels on met des noms génériques comme Ambition, Intérêt. Pourtant si 
j’avais une ombre de connaissance de moi-même, c’est maintenant qu’il 
faudrait m’en servir.530 
Roquentin’s enquiry into the workings of his own consciousness is thus expressly 
set out in opposition to totalising, rationalising theories of human motivation. 
‘Interest’ was the precise target of the underground man’s offensive. He pitted a 
subversive subjectivist theory of human behaviour against utilitarianism and 
theories of historical progress: 
[Х]отеть же можно и против собственной выгоды, а иногда и 
положительно должно (это уж моя идея). […] вот это-то все и есть та 
самая, пропущенная, самая выгодная выгода, которая ни под какую 
классификацию не подходит и от которой все системы и теории 
постоянно разлетаются к черту.
531
 
Notes from Underground thus postulates that the individual can, does and must 
oppose personal and collective advantage, being at least equally motivated by 
entirely irrational impulses. It is the extremity of this conception of the human 
condition that La Nausée investigates. 
 
Both texts, having established an opposition to scientific perspectives on human 
action and interaction, develop their arguments to radically challenge any 
presumed correspondence between objectivising, universalising perspectives and 
the experience of the individual human subject. As observed in the previous 
chapter, Dostoevsky’s text expressed this as a rejection of 2x2 = 4, perceived as 
an effrontery to human dignity, and this argument had become a pillar of the 
religious existential thought that arrived in Paris during the twenties. The 
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subsequent Heidegger-informed, atheist branch of existentialism that Sartre’s 
novel heralded did not inherit this polemic directly in as much as it did not 
reproduce it in the polemical terms of his religious forerunners. However, the 
argument is no less present despite being expressed in a more integrated aesthetic 
mode. La Nausée contests objective truth, by means of poetics that highlight an 
insurmountable division between subjective experience and facticity. 
 
This is achieved at the level of perception and at the moment of perceiving. 
Where Dostoevsky’s protagonist – and following him, Shestov – had polemicised 
overtly against empiricism, Sartre’s novel embodies this argument aesthetically 
on two levels. Firstly, Roquentin’s voice, his subjective consciousness, is pitted 
against his own body, his objective existence. Meanwhile, perceptions (sensory 
data collected by the body) are presented in a pre-rational suspension, subverting 
the empirical process: 
Je domine les deux colonnes de toute la tête et je vois des chapeaux, une mer 
de chapeaux. La plupart sont noirs et durs. De temps à l’autre, on en voit un 
qui s’envole au bout d’un bras et découvre le tendre miroitement d’un crâne; 
puis, après quelques instants, d’un vol lourd, il se pose.532  
Estrangement here surpasses poetics: it represents a dissociation between 
perceived sensory data and knowledge insofar as it rejects the process of 
rationalisation that connects them. Herein lies the link between the 
phenomenological component of the existentialist thought of the 1930s and 40s 
and the anti-rationalist polemics of Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard and Shestov that 
preceded it.  
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The above quotation also raises the question of the problematic relation to the 
body that such a conceptualisation of perception implies. In La Nausée, this 
ambivalence stems from an antagonistic conception of the relation between 
consciousness and body where the rationalising step of the empirical process has 
been rejected. The condition of the Nausea itself can thus be read as the 
narrativisation of a traumatic encounter between subjective consciousness and 
embodiment within an objective world. Roquentin makes various attempts to 
shelter himself from these attacks of existential Nausea. His principal consolation 
from the Nausea is the jazz record Some of these days, which he listens to in the 
café. The singing voice that comes forth from the record has the capacity to stave 
off an attack of the Nausea. The consoling effect is directly related to what 
Roquentin perceives as the immateriality of the music, which he in turn perceives 
in contrast to facticity. Everything and everyone in the café, including 
Roquentin’s own body, is described as being “de la même matière […] d’une 
espèce de souffrance moche”533 while the music alone differs. The recorded 
voice has escaped from the degrading realm of the ephemeral and, as such, has 
achieved a degree of comparative ‘necessity’. It is the enviable necessary quality 
of the disembodiment of the voice of the record that eventually inspires 
Roquentin to attempt a similar transcendence: the disembodiment of his own 
subjective voice through the act of writing a novel.  
 
A key disparity is herein evident between religious existential and atheist 
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existentialist thought. Atheist existentialists like Sartre, particularly in his early 
work, retained a deep nostalgia for the immutable and the necessary. The fact that 
man was indisputably unneccessary was an affrontery. With the humanist myth 
overthrown, man and his temporary bodily existence belonged only to the realm 
of the arbitrary. Existential thinkers like Shestov and the underground man did 
not see the creative act as a naive attempt at transendence, but as a subjective 
outcry against the injustice of the human condition. 
 
In both cases, however, the target is the myth of humanism. Roquentin’s 
ambivalent relationship to his own factitious body is indivisible from his 
ambivalence to every-body (experienced factitiously as expressed in the first 
quotation). This misanthropic aspect connects him to his Dostoevskian 
predecessor and his tirade against vsemstvo (omnitude), understood at once as 
collective consciousness and the rational-empirical worldview it favours. Like the 
underground man, Sartre’s protagonist sets his will against this. I his case, this 
takes the form of a sophisticated act of will set against the contingent status of his 
own embodiment. 
In a central passage, Roquentin narrates an act of self-harm.534 The act is 
provoked by a particularly linguistic bout of the Nausea. The narrator stabs his 
hand with a knife in an attempt to interrupt the gushing forth of words that is his 
consciousness. To his satisfaction, blood spills onto the page beneath four lines of 
writing. Critics have questioned the paradox of the spontaneous present-tense 
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narration of this sequence (which implies simultaneous writing and cutting) as a 
lapse in verisimilitude, since it requires four hands.535 As they have observed, the 
narrative thus undermines its own veracity. However, what they overlook is that 
the paradox, together with the clear image of spilt blood on the page, clearly 
implies that the act of self-harm is the act of writing. Writing itself becomes a 
wilful act of violence committed by the subjective voice against the body; an act 
of defiance precisely because it disembodies the voice. Immediately following 
this act of revolt, Roquentin goes to the cafe and listens to the jazz record: 
La voix, grave et rauque, apparaît brusquement et le monde s’évanouit, le 
monde des existences. Une femme de chair a eu cette voix, elle a chanté 
devant un disque dans sa plus belle toilette et l’on enregistrait sa voix. La 
femme: bah! elle existait comme moi […] mais il y a ça.536 
The implication is that while subjective being is undermined by the arbitrariness 
of factitious existence, i.e. while l’être pour soi is bound to and dominated by 
l’être en soi, subjective sincerity is beyond reach. However the disembodiment of 
the subjective voice implicit in the recording of words, on a disk or on paper, is 
suggested to entail a potential for subjective transcendence.537  
Un livre. Un roman. Et il y aurait des gens qui liraient ce roman et qui 
diraient: “C’est Antoine Roquentin qui l’a écrit, c’était un type roux qui 
traînait dans les cafés”, et ils penseraient à ma vie comme je pense à celle de 
cette négresse: comme à quelque chose de précieux et d’à moitié 
légendaire.538 
This conception of the possibility for subjective transcendence contains the crux 
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of the fundamental oppositions between religious and atheist branches of 
existential philosophy. The former, particularly as represented by Dostoevsky, 
Berdyaev and Marcel, takes the search for intersubjectivity as point of departure 
and of arrival, whereas the atheist existentialism of Sartre, beginning with the 
notion of the transcendence of the Ego, struggles eternally for any meaningful 
reconnection to the other.539 A comparison of the conclusions of the Notes and of 
La Nausée illustrates this disparity. Sartre’s ray of hope lies at once in the 
separation of consciousness from body (following the jazz singer’s example and 
disembodying consciousness by writing) as a means of subjective transcendence, 
and also in the notion that through the resultant literary statement, the novel, the 
author might validate his existence in the eyes of the other, thus achieving, 
through transcendence, recognition and privileged memorial as opposed to 
reintegration. Roquentin’s desire is thus not to communicate meaningfully with 
the collective, but to transcend it and his situation within it.  
 
Dostoevsky had already pre-empted this conclusion in Notes from Underground. 
The underground man’s confessional monologue to Lisa fails because the 
protagonist’s insurmountable spite towards the other ultimately militates against 
genuine communion, regardless of the sincerity of the content of his 
confession.540 His consequent act of writing down the event is also presented in a 
satyrical light, implying that this too is an affected and thus futile gesture, 
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permitting neither communion nor transcendence: 
Но довольно; не хочу я больше писать “из Подполья”... Впрочем, здесь 
еще не кончаются “записки” этого парадоксалиста. Он не выдержал и 
продолжал далее. Но нам тоже кажется, что здесь можно и 
остановиться.
541
 
Dostoevsky seems to have preempted Sartre’s hope of a secular, individualist 
route out of alienation from the collective via literature. For Dostoevsky, 
fraternity without religious faith was an impossibility. The religious, abnegatory 
road to intersubjectivity that Dostoevsky’s monastic characters advocated, and 
that Gide’s reading had stressed, was alien to Sartre particularly at this stage in 
the development of his thought. However, he reached a greater understanding of 
the abnegatory prerequisite to intersubjectivity during the war. His Carnets de la 
drôle de guerre recount an experience during which Sartre came to an 
understanding of this abnegation and relate it to Dostoevsky and Gide.542 
 
This illustrates out the fundamental tension between the two conceptions of the 
individual self and the collective that are inherent to existential thought and 
existentialism respectively. Berdyaev developed this opposition in the essay 
‘Sartre et le destin de l’existentialisme,’ expressing his fear that Sartre’s thought 
threatened to eclipse the established tradition of existential thought to which 
Shestov, Dostoevsky and he belonged.543 It is significant that Berdyaev here 
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identified La Nausée as Sartre’s best work, undoutedly because it resonated most 
closely with existential thought: “Il y pose déjà le problème de l’activité créatrice 
de l’homme, issue d’une existence basse et écoeurante.”544 However, Berdyaev 
raised the opposition with regards to the inherent Cartesianism in Sartre’s 
worldview.545  It was in this that Berdyaev identified the disparity between 
Russian existential thought and that of Sartre: “Il ne saurait y avoir, dans la 
pensée russe, un existentialisme du type de Heidegger et de Sartre. Nous sommes 
enfants de Dostoïevski.”546 
 
The fundamental distinction is not, however, as Berdyaev suggests, rooted in an 
inherent rationalism of the latter, nor is it in stylistic expression. Rather, the key 
disparity lies in the fundamental experience of the self and the collective. An 
intertextually significant motif in La Nausée serves to highlight this distancing 
from Dostoevsky’s representation of the human condition in Notes from 
Underground. Roquentin, observing the spectacle of the Sunday promenade from 
an exterior perspective (“mais, après tout, c’était leur dimanche et non le 
mien”547) narrates: 
Les négociants et les fonctionnaires marchaient côte à côte; ils se laissaient 
coudoyer, heurter même et déplacer par de petits employés à la mine pauvre. 
Les aristocraties, les élites, les groupements professionnels avaient fondu 
dans cette foule tiède. Il restait des hommes, presque seuls, qui ne 
représentaient plus.548 
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This precise image features prominently in Notes from Underground. The 
protagonist (also a ‘shabby looking clerk’) goes out of his way to bump into an 
officer on the Nevsky Prospect, in a feeble attempt to avenge a past humiliation. 
Several crucial differences distinguish the two events. In Notes from 
Underground, the instigator of the crucial bump is the spiteful narrator himself, 
longing at once for revenge and to forgive and be forgiven, to ‘unite’ fraternally 
with the six-foot tall officer who had previously casually moved [perestavil] him 
from his position to another in a tavern.549 The act of colliding in the street is 
intended to redress the inequality that separates him from his physical and social 
superior. The protagonist becomes utterly obsessed by the idea of carrying out the 
collision, and tries and fails numerous times, having dressed with dignity for the 
fateful occasion when the courageous bump will finally be accomplished.550  
 
It is significant that Dostoevsky had used this image as an intertextual reference 
to Cherneshevsky’s Chto delat’ in parody of the latter’s socialist New Man, 
Lopukhov and his epithet: “turn aside for nobody except women” which he put to 
violent practice.551 Sartre, employing the same image but from the perspective of 
a detached spectator, accentuates Roquentin’s alienation from the social 
interactions of the collective. In Sartre’s representation of the act, the social 
structure that gives the gesture pertinence in Dostoevsky has emphatically 
“melted away,” at least from the detached perspective of the narrator, for whom it 
holds no sway. Such petty offences and interactions as the underground man’s 
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have become meaningless to Roquentin. 
 
This key motif of bodily collision returns in Sartre’s short story ‘Erostrate’ in his 
next significant work of fiction, the collection Le Mur. The protagonist here 
experiences collisions not as the offence of a specific officer but as the assault of 
the crowd at large, a hostile mass of humanity:  
Il y en a eu qui me guettaient depuis longtemps: les grands. Ils me 
bousculaient dans la rue, pour rire, pour voir ce que je ferais. Je ne disais rien. 
Je faisais semblant de ne pas avoir compris.552  
As such, Hilbert’s obsessive act of vengeance is against the crowd at large. The 
entirety of the crowd is the enemy of the individual, and his loathing indignation 
is directed against it in its entirety: an extremity of misanthropy has been reached. 
The significance of ‘Erostrate’ in understanding Sartre’s commentary on 
Dostoevsky’s representation of an individual will set against humanity does not 
end here.553 The underground conception of the self and the collective (“Я-то 
один, а они-то все”554) has evolved to a new level. The underground man had 
proclaimed: 
Да я за то, чтоб меня не беспокоили, весь свет сейчас же за копейку 
продам. Свету ли провалиться, или вот мне чаю не пить? Я скажу, что 
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свету провалиться, а чтоб мне чай всегда пить.555 
‘Erostrate’, like Notes from Underground, consists structurally of two planes: an 
anti-humanist diatribe and a confession of a misanthropic act of arbitrary 
aggression. Hilbert’s letter to the humanist writers of his day is strikingly 
resonant with the underground man’s tirade against “мудрецы и любители рода 
человеческого”.
556
 The premise of Hilbert’s argument is that the humanist’s 
innate fondness of man has no rational foundation, and that the misanthropy of 
the protagonist is equally innate and equally valid, if arbitrarily detested by the 
cultural mainstream: 
[V]ous aimez les hommes. Vous avez l’humanisme dans le sang: c’est bien 
de la chance. […] Vous avez le goût […] pour ses mains surtout: ça vous 
plaît qu’il ait cinq doigts à chaque main et qu’il puisse opposer le pouce aux 
autres doigts. […] Mais ce qui vous attire en eux me dégoute. […] Quand il 
mâche en gardant la bouche close, les coins de sa bouche montent et 
descendent, il a l’air de passer sans relâche de la sérénité à la surprise 
pleurarde. Vous aimez ça, je le sais.557 
Hilbert’s case is set out with the same scathing sarcasm as that of the 
underground man: 
Какая каменная стена? Ну, разумеется, законы природы, выводы 
естественных наук, математика. Уж как докажут тебе, например, что от 
обезьяны произошел, так уж и нечего морщиться, принимай как есть. 
Уж как докажут тебе, что, в сущности, одна капелька твоего 
собственного жиру тебе должна быть дороже ста тысяч тебе подобных и 
что в этом результате разрешатся под конец все так называемые 
добродетели и обязанности и прочие бредни и предрассудки, так уж так 
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и принимай, нечего делать-то, потому дважды два - математика. 
Попробуйте возразить.558 
Both thus argue that the mere existence of the human (exploiting Darwinism and 
the absurdity of human facial expressions in both cases to ironic effect) is 
insufficient grounding for a theoretical humanism. Having debased humanism, 
the polemicists go in different directions. Dostoevsky’s ultimately defended the 
right of the individual to free irrational will, and not to arbitrary action, the 
intelligent man being conceived as incapable of action (as in the above “Свету ли 
провалиться, или вот мне чаю не пить?”); Sartre’s protagonist goes a significant 
step further, to instigate direct anti-humanist action: 
Vous serez curieux de savoir, je suppose, ce que peut être un homme qui 
n’aime pas les hommes. Eh bien, c’est moi et je les aime si peu que je vais 
tout à l’heure en tuer une demi-douzaine.559 
However, Hilbert eventually finds himself in the same dead-end situation as the 
underground man: he is incapable of the ultimate act of will, that of suicide (or 
indeed of killing as cool headedly as intended) and finds himself surrendering in 
a café toilet to the mercy of the society he had imagined himself in transcendence 
of. 
 
There are likewise significant parallels within the confessional texts (‘По поводу 
мокрого снега’ in Dostoevsky’s novella; the narrative-proper in Sartre’s). Both 
characters represent social recluses, the modernist inverted and introverted 
flâneurs that Precilla Ferguson associated with the arrival of modernity.560 They 
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cut themselves off from society and confine themselves to small spaces: the 
former to his underground ‘corner’, the latter to his 6th floor balcony. Hilbert’s 
love of high places (the Eiffel tower, the Sacré Cœur etc.) is representative of his 
presumed superiority, in contrast to the underground man’s self-perceived moral 
inferiority which he similarly expressed through the ‘underground’ as a spatial 
metaphor, further associating himself with an insect and a mouse.561 Hilbert’s 
height metaphor in turn refers his thought to Nietzsche’s rapturous writings 
concerning high altitude and moral superiority in Zarathustra, his “book of the 
air and the heights.”562 Hilbert narrates: “Au balcon d’un sixième: c’est là que 
j’aurais dû passer toute ma vie. Il faut étayer les supériorités morales par des 
symboles matériels, sans quoi elles retombent.”563 Sartre thus uses Nietzsche’s 
metaphor periodically: aristocratism is suggested to be as unfounded as 
humanism. Erofeev was thus mistaken in concluding that Hilbert’s philosophy 
was dogmatic in opposition to Dostoevsky’s protagonist’s anti-dogmatic 
approach:564 Sartre makes clear from the first page that his protagonist is aware 
that his thought stems from sentiment and that it can be conceived as a moral 
superiority only entirely arbitrarily.  
 
A Nietzschean reworking of the underground is a more fruitful approach to 
Erostrate. This is not to say that the Will to power was absent from Dostoevsky’s 
text: Hilbert’s domination of prostitutes was not without precedent in the 
underground man’s treatment of Lisa. However, the egotistical and sadistic 
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component is drastically augmented in Sartre’s text. Hilbert’s murderous 
ambition can also be read as an anti-humanist rewriting of Raskolnikov. The 
nineteenth-century predecessor had used humanism (Raskolnikov’s presumed 
future Napoleonic works) to justify careerist killing, while the twentieth-century 
rewriting murders unambiguously and overtly in the name of anti-humanism. 
However, the argument is unchanged: atheist humanism, as Sartre and 
Dostoevsky agree, cannot guarantee the value of human life as it has no guarantor. 
It is in light of this that Sartre will later state, echoing Ivan and Alesha 
Karamazov’s famous debate, that: “L’existentialiste, au contraire, pense qu’il est 
très gênant que Dieu n’existe pas, car avec lui disparaît toute possibilité de 
trouver des valeurs dans un ciel intelligible.”565   
 
Ultimately, the conclusions of both the Notes and Erostratus suggest that the 
misanthropic urge of the individual is more forced, more affected, and ultimately 
more limited than the protagonist imagines. On encountering a corpse in the 
street, Hilbert attempted to transcend all empathic responses but found himself 
fainting and being resuscitated by doctors (society). This personal failure 
anticipates his eventual failure to kill entirely arbitrarily (he shies away from 
killing a family with young children) and his failure to kill himself, landing him 
in prison, again at the mercy of society: the individual proves incapable of 
transcending society. This is precisely Raskolnikov’s conclusion. Hilbert’s 
decision not to kill the two children echoes Raskolnikov’s saving of the children 
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from the fire, while his eventual surrender to the collective, not through 
repentance but by inability to do otherwise, is precisely the ‘blunder’ of 
Raskolnikov. Both supermen can indeed turn their hand against human life, but 
they are mistaken in theorising that in so doing they might transcend the 
definition of man that they have rejected: both remain all too human despite their 
attempts to transcend humanism. 
 
Misanthropic perversion of the humanist ideal is romanticised in none of the 
three texts, but rather it is presented as an illness. In Notes, as in Nausea, 
consciousness itself, or at least the perverted consciousness of the protagonists, is 
perpetually in antagonistic relation to its object, particularly the other.566 It is in 
this aspect that existential novels go beyond their romantic roots: subjectivist 
conceptions of truth are equally problematic and equally satirised. In Notes, the 
subjective realm receives a brutally parodic treatment. The podpol’e or 
“underground” of the title is a symbolic inversion of transcendence, and a further 
anticipation of Sartre’s novel’s ultimate return to romantic idealism. The 
underground, fraught with paradox, uncertainty and destructive irrational impulse, 
while ostensibly defended by the narrator, is caustically satirised throughout the 
work and eventually denounced for an unattainable third option:  
Конец концов, господа: лучше ничего не делать! Лучше сознательная 
инерция! Итак, да здравствует подполье! […] Эх! да ведь я и тут вpу! 
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Вру, потому что сам знаю, как дважды два, что вовсе не подполье лучше, 
а что-то другое, совсем другое, которого я жажду, но которого никак не 
найду! К черту подполье!567 
Thus there is no attainable mode of being that would present an alternative to a 
perpetual longing for truth in recognition of the absurdity of such a state of 
affairs: the underground cannot be reconciled to objectivity and narrative 
becomes an expression of the resultant exasperation.  
 
In Notes from Underground, as in Nausea, the narrative culminates in an 
unsuccessful gesture of outreach on the part of the misanthropic individual to a 
female other. The former, to Lisa, is immediately perverted; the latter, to Annie, is 
rejected. Both protagonists then turn to writing, as a further attempt at outreach. 
The former is disparaged semi-diegetically by the ‘editorial’ narrative voice 
discussed above. The latter, undirected and reflexive, seems unlikely to succeed. 
Sartre later, in Les Mots, rejected this conclusion to his youthful novel: writing 
was not enough to imbue existence with meaning.568 His later output would 
pursue this question relentlessly, straying from attempts to systematise 
existentialist ethics to Marxism and back. In this process, he would again find 
occasion to speak of Dostoevsky. Following his visit to the Soviet Union in the 
1950s, Sartre published five articles in Libération (15-20 July 1954) discussing 
aspects of contemporary Soviet society.569 The second of these, “De Dostoïevsky 
à la littérature contemporaine”, constituted a brief discussion of Sartre’s 
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impression of the contemporary Soviet reception of Dostoevsky.570 He expressed 
his own enthusiasm for the writer and his view that his writings had not lost their 
relevance, but explained that the issues of the day for contemporary Soviet man 
were not those of Dostoevsky (nor, implicitly, those of either nineteenth-century 
Russia nor contemporary France).571  
 
It is clear that while Sartre’s interest in Dostoevsky endured, his perception of the 
pertinence of the Russian author’s representation of the human condition was 
transitory, or rather, historical. Dostoevsky’s depiction of the irreconcilability of 
reason and experience coincided with Sartre’s interests in the 1930s and into the 
40s. However, his subsequent output was a search for a means to overcome this 
condition. His writings on returning from the USSR speak of a new man and a 
new culture, innately collectivist and, as such, inherently immune to the Nausea 
of the initial, negative period of his creation.  
 
 
 
Louis-René Des Forêts 
 
Forêts’s Le Bavard (1946) represents an important literary example of 
intermingling between the receptions of Notes from Underground and La Nausée. 
It constituted a simultaneous parody of the two works, though it has never yet 
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been analysed as such.572 The scholarly corpus addressing Le Bavard is limited, 
and most commentators have followed Blanchot’s seminal reading.573 Blanchot 
approached Le Bavard as an outburst of gratuitous language. For Blanchot, the 
monologue, in acknowledging its own gratuity (as bavardage), negates its own 
literary enterprise and, by extension, undermines literature per se. What this 
reading deliberately overlooks, however, is that the content of Le Bavard is not as 
monological nor as arbitrary as the narrator himself professes. Richly intertextual 
and parodic, the bavard’s monologue is dialogical; the negation it implies is 
directed toward particular intertexts, and predominantly Notes from Underground 
and La Nausée.574 Blanchot was not blind to the connection between Forêts and 
Dostoevsky, though he downplayed it: 
Nous ne sommes pas non plus en présence d’un de ces personnages de 
Dostoïevski, parleurs invétérés qui, dans un désir de confidence provocante, 
se donnent à tout instant pour ce qu’ils sont afin de mieux le taire, encore que 
la force exténuante des Mémoires du souterrain surgisse souvent ici à 
nouveau.575 
If Blanchot was eager to differentiate between Dostoevsky’s and des Forêt’s 
narration, the reason is that Le Bavard’s intertextuality fatally undermines 
Blanchot’s reading, since its bavardage, if read in the context of an intertextual 
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dialogue, can no longer be deemed gratuitous. Indeed, as this section will argue, 
it becomes polemical. 
Le Bavard establishes Notes from Underground as an intertext by means of a 
near-direct quotation: “Je suis un bavard, un inoffensif et fâcheux bavard, comme 
vous l’êtes vous-même”576 which corresponds, in Schloezer’s translation, to: “Je 
ne suis donc qu’un bavard inoffensif, un fâcheux, comme nous tous.”577 The 
quotation implicates the ‘bavardage’ of Dostoevsky’s narrator as a specific object 
of parody. Le Bavard goes on to mimic his narrative voice. However the 
polemical dimension of the underground man’s diatribe is conspicuously absent 
in Le Bavard, leaving only a grotesque linguistic surplus. The famous 
dialogicality of Dostoevsky’s interrupted monologue is also parodied. The 
narrator of Le Bavard repeatedly reminds his readers (“messieurs”) that he 
requires no more from them than feigned attention and silence, begging them not 
to interrupt: 
Et notez que je ne vous demande pas de me lire vraiment, mais de 
m’entretenir dans cette illusion que je suis lu: vous saisissez la nuance? Alors 
vous parlez pour mentir? – Non, monsieur, pour parler, rien de plus […] 
Mais suffit. Que mon lecteur me pardonne si je n’aime pas qu’on me 
bourdonne aux oreilles quand je parle.578  
This subvertion of the interrupted monologue, like the whole of Le Bavard, is a 
parodic comment on a radical subjectivism feigning intersubjectivity by means of 
a narratively contrived dialogism: “j’ai moins besoin de complicité, d’aprobation, 
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de respect, d’intérêt que de silence”.579 And again: “On ne peut me demander de 
rester dans mon coin, silencieux et modeste, à écouter se payer de mots des gens 
dont j’ai bien le droit de penser qu’il n’y a ni plus d’expérience ni plus de 
réflexion que moi-même.”580 
 
Speech, in Le Bavard, is gratuitous and self-indulgent rather than communicative, 
as Blanchot stressed. However, Blanchot did not recognise that this very gratuity 
is in dialogue with the Dostoevskian hypotext. The central event of Le Bavard’s 
uneventful narrative is a crise de bavardage that seizes the protagonist before a 
female listener in a night club. The diatribe is a self-gratifying confession:  
Je parlais et c’était une sensation magnifique. Il me semblait qu’en faisant 
ainsi étalage de ce que j’osais tout juste m’avouer à moi-même, je me 
déchargeais d’un fardeau très lourd […] je me vidais lentement, c’était un 
plaisir aussi bouleversant que la plus réussie des voluptés érotiques.581  
The account continues: “sans oublier ce qu’une telle érection verbale pouvait 
avoir d’enivrant – mon corps était littéralement en transe, j’avais la foudre dans la 
gorge – ni la volupté positive, mais plus vulgaire”.582 Around ten pages are 
dedicated to this suggestive account of the bavard’s scandalous confession; 
however, the actual content of his speech is conspicuously omitted. All that 
remains is a meta-bavardage: an extended description of the voluptuousness 
experienced during the confession. 583  This confession is a parody of the 
underground man’s outpourings to Lisa. The bavard’s confessor is also suggested 
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to be a prostitute. 584  Like Lisa (as well as Sonya) the bavard’s 
prostitute-confessor receives his confession with disbelief and confusion; 
however, in the case of the parodic hypertext, this is due to a language barrier 
(the hispanophone listener has limited knowledge of the unspecified local 
language, presumably French). Ultimately, where Lisa had collapsed in tears at 
the twisted but profound sincerity of the underground man’s confession, that of 
Le Bavard is “inondé de larmes” of mocking laughter at the confession’s 
pomposity and vulgarity.585 The existential confessional novel is thus likened to 
a grotesque linguistic masturbation, and parody is presented, through the image 
of the laughter of the listener, as a just retribution for such indulgence:  
j’étais tenté de voir dans ce rire un châtiment pour m’être trop 
complaisamment abandonné à des confidences que, si agréable qu’eût été 
l’allégement éprouvé sur le moment, j’allais avoir à payer d’un rude prix.586  
The protagonist then speaks of his “aversion insurmontable pour les maniaques 
de la confession”.587 Le Bavard then ironically signals its stylistic connection to 
this confessional tradition: “Ajoutez à cela que mon style naturel n’est pas celui 
du confessionnal, rien d’étonnant s’il ressemble à une foule d’autres, mais je n’ai 
pas la prétention, vous êtes avertis.”588 
 
Whilst clearly parodying Notes from Underground, Le Bavard simultaneously 
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attacks Sartre’s La Nausée, implicating both (and the parodic text) as a generic 
tradition. The representation of the protagonists’ bavardage as attacks (crises) is 
in direct reference to La Nausée, as is clear from an intertextual reading of the 
conditions under which these occur:  
Ce fut donc vers la fin d’une après-midi de dimanche où j’éprouvai une 
sensation d’ennui particulièrement déprimante que je me décidai 
brusquement à quitter ma chambre et à aller piquer une tête à la plage voisine. 
[…] Je ne m’attendrais pas si longuement sur l’état d’euphorie où je me 
complaisais si je n’avais eu lieu de croire, une heure après, qu’il fut le 
prologue et en quelque sorte la source de la première manifestation de mon 
mal sous sa forme active.589 
Roquentin’s first bout of the Nausea had begun:  
Samedi les gamins jouaient aux ricochets et je voulais lancer, comme eux, un 
caillou dans la mer. À ce moment-là, je me suis arrêté, j’ai laissé tomber le 
caillou et je suis parti. […] Ce qui s’est passé en moi n’a pas laissé de traces 
claires. Il y avait quelque chose que j’ai vu et qui m’a dégouté, mais je ne 
sais plus si je regardais la mer ou le galet.590  
The resolution of both crises is likewise brought about in a public garden, sitting 
on a bench under a tree, where the bavard first achieves “un véritable sentiment 
de détente et de sécurité”, a parodic reference to Roquentin’s famous public 
garden revelation.591 So as Roquentin realised that the Nausea is consciousness, 
Le Bavard suggests that consciousness is bavardage.  
 
The representation of this bavardage as an illness Forêts now parodies, 
implicating Dostoevsky and in Sartre alike in their respective representation of 
consciousness as an illness. Le Bavard thus deconstructs existential 
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hyperconsciousness as an aesthetic stance and a slight of hand: 
Or à présent, inexplicablement délivré d’une telle hantise et toutes choses 
cessant de m’apparaître sous un angle tragique, rien ne m’empêchait de jouir 
en toute tranquillité d’un lieu où je ne me sentais plus traqué ni menacé et 
que l’évocation de tout un passé dont il était le cadre douait d’un 
bouleversant prestige en raison de ce qu’il lui conférait de lointain et de 
printanier.592 
There is a clear suggestion that existential angst is an aesthetic perspective, a 
mere perversion of romantic aesthetic rapture. The parodic enters into play when 
the narrator confesses to the falseness of this contraption:  
Sans doute, il m’est trop habituel de tenir mes faiblesses pour des maladies 
insolites sur lesquelles aucun traitement n’a de pouvoir, et dont je dois me 
contenter de suivre l’évolution avec une curiosité impuissante (…) En fait, 
c’est presque ridicule, cette obstination à me croire gravement atteint quand 
j’ai le cafard, quand une sombre jalousie me dévore, quand une nouvelle 
révélation de mon insuffisance me donne l’envie de me fourrer sous terre.593 
Much has already been made of the fact that the actual content of the 
protagonist’s central outburst of gratuitous bavardage has been omitted from the 
novel. Post-modern critics were keen to read this as a telling silence, 
representative of emptiness inherent to language.594 However, the content is not 
so absent as the post-modernists wished it to be. The content is clearly and 
repeatedly described as a confession, and a scandalous confession, which no one 
would wish to hear.595 Confessional monologues are then discussed at great 
length as a lack of “hygiène mentale” and attempts to disguise this as an illness 
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are brutally derided.596 The intertextual existential malady in question is not a 
nausea but a linguistic incontinence. 
 
In Le Bavard, Sartre’s contraption of Roquentin’s diary as documentation of a 
crisis is parodied throughout: “si j’ai bien promis d’étudier consciencieusement et 
sans détours tout le mécanisme de mes crises, je n’ai pas l’ambition de tout 
rapporter.”597 The notion of documenting changing states of mind is further 
problematised by the fact that the protagonist-narrator of Le Bavard later 
confesses to having embelished or invented many if not all of these. The 
speaker’s discourse is further coloured by reminders of his state of enibriation.598 
In the closing pages he finally confesses to having falsely represented his own 
gratuitous desire to speak as a malady: “mes dissertations sur le caractère clinique 
de mon vice que je me déclarais pleinement satisfait; quelqu’un a pu sans rire 
m’entendre parler de ce que je qualifie pompeusement de crise?”599 If the direct 
parody of the novel of existential crisis were not clear enough, the narrator 
continues:  
La vérité, c’est qu’à court d’imagination et pourtant peu désireux de me taire, 
je n’ai rien trouvé de mieux que de révéler mon escroquerie à ceux qui en 
étaient les victimes, et vous avez vous que je n’étais guère disposé à vous 
faire grâce d’aucun détail [...] je parlais, je parlais, quelle jouissance! Et je 
parle encore.600 
Of course, this parody extends to Le Bavard itself: it does not lie outwith the 
tradition that it parodies. Kaufman has asserted that:  
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Le Bavard might be considered as a roman à thèse that marks a notable 
departure from the Sartrean model. Rather than staging characters as 
mouthpieces for specific philosophical positions, Le Bavard depicts a central 
character who is of philosophical significance not for what he says but for 
the way he says it.601  
While Kaufman’s reading of Le Bavard is correct, her reading of La Nausée is 
mistaken: as the above discussion has stressed, the phenomenological stance that 
Roquentin’s narrative represents is revealed precicely through novelistic poetics. 
Le Bavard writes specifically into the self-same tradition as La Nausée and Notes 
from Underground, using intertexual references in order to subvert the novel of 
existential crisis from within.  
 
Le Bavard can also be read as a parody of the representation of perception of La 
Nausée. The narrator tells that:  
la double action de regarder et d’écouter s’accompagnant depuis longtemps 
pour moi d’une émotion très spéciale […] Aurait-on alors cherché à 
m’arracher au doux vertige que me procurait une telle contemplation, 
peut-être aurais-je réagi violemment par instinct de défense et répondu aux 
questions les plus inoffensives par des paroles ou des gestes blessants.602  
Modernist poetics of perception such as that of Sartre’s novel are here being 
clearly parodied. The passage is followed by a sequence of ironic misperceptions, 
when the bavard diagnoses himself with acute depression on noticing his own 
tears following a physical beating; with “anguish and desolation” on perceiving 
himself to be groaning, etc. 603  The protagonist then describes voluntarily 
cultivating these misinterpreted feelings of melancholy and anguish by 
contemplating the “ruisseau nauséabond de mon péché” before claiming that the 
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aesthetic rapture experienced on hearing his favourite pieces of music is the way 
he can achieve his personnel summit.604  
Assis seul dans un café à trois violons et un mauvais piano exécutent un 
morceau en vogue […] il m’arrive d’être envahi par un délire de tristesse ou 
de joie auquel je ne puis honnêtement donner mon approbation […] Aussi 
me suis-je exercé à demeurer sourd à ce qui, sous couleur d’exalter ma 
sensibilité, ne faisait de moi qu’un absurde pleurnicheur, mais hélas! j’ai la 
tête trop chaude605  
Roquentin’s aesthetic rapture at popular music seems to be referenced here. The 
added suggestion of drunkenness further undermines the revelations of Le Bavard. 
Alcohol was far from absent in La Nausée. However, in Le Bavard this 
connection between the chemically altered state of consciousness and the 
existential revelation (in the parody, bavardage) becomes overt to the point of 
ridicule.606 This is part of a much larger ideological disparity underpinning the 
three novels. In Sartre’s novel, the subjectivity of the narrator supersedes 
objectivity, as in the description of the sea of hats above, or of the enstranged face 
in the mirror. In Le Bavard this is constantly parodied. The narrator describes his 
own subjective experience. However, objectivity is constantly round the corner 
waiting to discredit this. Drunkenness serves this purpose, as do the narrator’s 
constant vain lies.607 
 
Le Bavard’s primary parodic method is thus to confront subjectivism with 
objectivity. Such a parody of the existential novel is somewhat naïve. It operates 
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by confronting perception with reality and equating subjective experience with 
lies or delusions. As such, Le Bavard’s workings as a parody of subjectivism can 
perhaps be better informed by Ivanov’s theory of the novel-tragedy as opposed to 
the Blanchotian anti-novel. Ivanov’s conception of the novel-tragedy, which he 
identified as Dostoevsky’s break from the European tradition, departed from the 
grounds that the European novel, from Quixote to Karenina, was ideologically 
driven to dramatise the disunity between the individual and the collective; 
between subjective experience and objective reality. 608  Ivanov identified 
Dostoevsky as a historic, innovative deviation from this ideology in that, in 
Dostoevsky, it is not objectivity but inter-subjectivity that transcends and presides 
over the subjective. Forêts’s Le Bavard can thus be read as a parodic backlash 
from the camp of the quixotic ideology that Dostoevsky (and, following him, the 
existential novel) was subverting. Le Bavard constantly confronts the reader with 
an unproblematic disparity between the subjective experience and the objective 
world, the narrator’s lies and dilusions being parodically transparent.  
 
The fact that Le Bavard constitutes such a direct parody of Notes from 
Underground and La Nausée indicates that the two works were by this stage 
received at least to some degree as a unified novelistic tradition. It is also 
indicative of the status of Notes from Underground as a text to contend with and a 
historical force that it provoked direct parodic attention. In neglecting Le 
Bavard’s intertextual dimension and its positionning within the context of 
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existential fiction, post-modern critics falsified numerous elements in their drive 
to (post-)modernise the text. Avni could not have been further from the mark in 
seeing in Le Bavard a post-modern, Heidegger-informed conception of truth as a 
becoming rather than an existant.609 The fact is that the ideology of the text is the 
opposite, a step back from existential discourse on inter-subjectivity to a 
predating conflict of reality and interpretation that serves to affirm the former by 
constantly parodying the latter. 
 
The anti-novel that Bataille and Blanchot so appreciated in the work is no less 
pertinent for the fact that its negation is directed rather than entirely reflexive, or 
rather, is reflexive towards a tradition rather than only to itself and fiction in 
general. The closing pages of the work reveal that the text itself was an example 
of an extended crise de bavardage and furthermore an entirely untruthful one.610 
This final confession is affected by the reminder that it too is not impervious to 
the same denunciation, ad infinitum. The narrator’s reminders of the possibility 
that his narrative is comprised of lies is not the “silence parlant” that Blanchot 
chose to see in it, since internal suggestions of non-verity by no means nullify a 
narrative. What such disclaimers do achieve is a further problematisation of Le 
Bavard’s already slippery status as parody. In so doing, Le Bavard also takes the 
issue of narrative authenticity beyond previous ‘romantic’ existential fiction, 
towards a more post-modern, ironic and paradoxical conception of authenticity, 
as irresolvable and unattainable, the novel ending: “telle est ma puérilité que je 
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me réjouis à l’idée que ma revanche consistera à le laisser toujours ignorer si je 
mentais encore quand je prétendais mentir. Que pourrais-je encore dire?”611 
 
 
 
Albert Camus 
 
Albert Camus’s La Chute is the next in the cycle of French existentialist 
rewritings of Notes from Underground. A number of comparative studies have 
been dedicated to Camus’s interaction with Dostoevsky. Camus’s active and 
productive contemplation of the Russian novelist spanned his entire adult life.612 
As early as 1937, he directed a production of Jacques Copeau’s Frères 
Karamazov with the Théâtre de L’Équipe, staged the following year, Camus 
himself performing the role of Ivan. He later recalled this as the favourite role of 
his career, adding: “je m’exprimais directement en le jouant.”613 As observed 
above Copeau’s adaptation had somewhat accentuated Ivan as an enigmatic 
romantic hero.614 It shall be shown that Camus’s conception of justice was 
directly influenced by Ivan’s discourse. At the other extremity of Camus’s career, 
his final work prior to his death, is a stage adaptation of Dostoevsky’s Devils. 
Dostoevsky’s fiction thus literally frames Camus’s oeuvre. Camus’s two major 
philosophical works both contain substantial sections dedicated to Dostoevsky’s 
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fiction, while his major novels have all been duly discussed by numerous critics 
in terms of their intertextual dialogue with Dostoevsky.615 Among them, La 
Chute, Camus’s final novel, has proved the richest terrain.616 What remains to be 
achieved, however, is to integrate Camus’s La Chute into the broader intertextual 
discourse between Dostoevsky and the French novel of existential crisis that 
concerns this chapter, and to assess the Camusian reading of Dostoevsky in the 
broader context of Dostoevsky’s French reception, particularly the points of 
contact between Camus’s readings and those of his predecessors. 
 
Gide, Shestov and Berdyaev were all factors in the development of Camus’s 
reading of Dostoevsky. Camus speaks of loving Gide “boundlessly” and of 
Shestov as a major influence, while Berdyaev’s writings on Dostoevsky are 
quoted in his Carnets.617  Sartre’s La Nausée and Le Mur have also been 
identified as major influences on Camus’s thought and writing.618  It is in 
Camus’s La Chute, his final novel, that all of these threads come together, making 
it the most pertinent of his texts in terms of the intertextual discourse analysed in 
the current study. It is also noteworthy that Blanchot posited Le Bavard as a 
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further key hypotext to La Chute.619 
 
 
Dostoevsky and La Chute 
 
 
It is clear from the frequent references and observations in Camus’s Carnets that 
Russian thought, literature and politics were a preoccupation for him in the 30s 
and 40s. That Camus’s thought was interrogating specifically that of Dostoevsky 
during the writing of La Chute cannot be doubted: his Carnets cite towards the 
end of 1948: “Un homme conscient, dit Dostoeïevski, peut-il se respecter tant soit 
peu?”620 This question, so fundamental to Dostoevsky’s fiction and central 
specifically to Notes from Underground, would constitute the interrogation of La 
Chute, published the following year: both works are bleak interrogations of the 
possibility of humanism from the perspective of the self-aware individual. 
 
Irina Kirk has made the convincing case that Camus’s La Chute’s parodic relation 
to existentialism was parallel to Notes from Underground’s relation to 
Chernyshevsky.621 Both Notes from Underground and La Chute share a slippery, 
parodic, but nonetheless polemical drive, directed against rationalist, 
progressionist and humanist theories. In Notes from Underground the utilitarianist 
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and socialist thinking of the 1850s was the target, while in La Chute it was 
Sartre’s increasingly Marxist existentialism. As Girard has observed, both Notes 
from Underground and La Chute represent watersheds in the intellectual 
biographies of the two authors: a violent and scathing overcoming of an ideology 
once held.622  More specifically, both authors had already been shunned as 
reactionaries by the movements they now parody.623 As Gambert asserts in her 
recent study of the two works:  
Camus vu par les Sartriens, Dostoïevski par les Occidentalistes radicaux, 
chacun de nos deux confessions met donc en œuvre un travail polyphonique 
de désintégration de l’image d’un Moi nécessairement spéculaire, réfléchi 
dans le regard de l’Autre-juge.624 
The significance of this parallel for the current thesis lies in Camus’s return 
specifically to the Dostoevskian hypotext in order to highlight where Sartre’s 
thought has turned away from the existential track and back towards the 
rationalist humanism it had originally set out against. 
 
Camus opens this polemic via another important intertext: the thought of 
Descartes. La Chute’s Dutch setting expressely brings existential polemics to the 
land of Descartes’ refuge. Clamence refers to himself, in passing, as a Cartesian 
Frenchman and notes that Descartes’ Dutch residence now houses an insane 
asylum.625  In addition to this, Davison and Kirk have interpreted Camus’s 
Amsterdam as a self-conscious surrogate for Dostoevsky’s St Petersburg, with its 
grimy taverns, misty canals, its uncanny, demonic, stagnant and stifling 
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atmosphere.626 Amsterdam was also notably Peter the Great’s prototype for St 
Petersburg. The contrast in setting to Camus’s other, Mediterranean novels is 
striking. Camus indeed saw the urbanisation of literature as a Dostoevskian 
innovation: 
On cherche en vain les paysages dans la grande littérature européenne depuis 
Dostoïevski. L’histoire n’explique ni l’univers naturel qui était avant elle, ni 
la beauté qui est au-dessus d’elle. Elle a donc choisi de les ignorer. Alors que 
Platon contenait tout, le non-sens, la raison et le mythe, nos philosophes ne 
contiennent rien que le non-sens de la raison, parce qu’ils ont fermé les yeux 
sur le reste. La taupe médite.627  
The meditating mole, recalling Dostoevsky’s hyper-conscious subteranian 
‘mouse’, represents modernity’s previously mentioned movement indoors, into 
isolation, and introspection.628  Camus situated this turning point in literary 
history specifically at Dostoevsky. This is significant when considering the 
connection between philosophical thematics and their spacial representation in La 
Chute, in relation to its Dostoevskian, Nietzschean and Sartrian hypotexts. As 
observed of Hilbert in Sartre’s ‘Erostrate’, a Nietzschean valorisation of altitude 
distinguishes Clamence from the underground man: 
Oui, je ne me suis jamais senti à l’aise que dans les situations élevées. Jusque 
dans le détail de la vie, j’avais besoin d’être au-dessus. Je préférais l’autobus 
au métro, les calèches aux taxis, les terrasses aux entresols.629  
Rapturing on heights and vertigo, Clamence, establishing his past self (even 
explicitly) as a “surhomme,”630 states that: “Les soutes, les cales, les souterrains, 
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les grottes, les gouffres me faisaient horreur.”631 Spatially, this places Clamence’s 
discourse on the same ‘vertical’ structural axis as Dostoevsky and Nietzche’s. The 
‘fall’ of the title thus takes on a further intertextual nuance in addition to its 
obvious biblical one: a fall from Nietzsche’s vertiginous heights to Dostoevsky’s 
underground. 
 
This is presented as a choice. Clamence has wilfully opted for a particular 
landscape, the ‘infernal’ circles of canals and a city below sea level against his 
more Nietzschean instincts:  
La vérité est que je me force à aimer les canaux. Ce que j’aime le plus au 
monde, c’est la Sicile, vous voyez bien, et encore du haut de l’Etna, dans la 
lumière, à condition de dominer l’île et la mer.632  
The narrator thus professes a Nietzschean predilection to physically transcend the 
landscape yet chooses to make his home in a city below sea-level. Like Hilbert, 
Clamence becomes a pathetic rendering of the Nietzschean superman. Clamence 
has the same need of the other as the underground man. The crucial narratological 
disparity between Notes from Underground and La Chute concerns the presence 
of the interlocutor and consequent orality of the latter. Like Dostoevsky and 
Forêts, Camus’s narrative employs the device of professed bavardage (“Je suis un 
bavard, hélas!”633). The diegetic orality of Clamence’s discourse is counteracted 
by stylistic bookishness (the narrator employs the imperfect subjunctive from the 
first page, observing dietegically the wince of his interlocutor-reader,)634 while 
the written ‘notes’ of the underground man employ ellipsis, repetition and 
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exclamation in imitation of orality. This ambiguity brings to the fore the 
ambiguous relationship between narrating voice and reader as listener. 
 
La Chute thus enters into existential debate with Notes from Underground on the 
same narratological plane as La Nausée and Le Bavard: that of the self and the 
other. Narrative in each constitutes an act of confessional outreach. Le Bavard 
was observed to parody the dialogical aspect of Dostoevsky’s interrupted 
monologue, while La Nausée’s monologism is indicative of Roquentin’s 
irrevocable dissociation from the other. La Chute is a narratological step in the 
opposite direction: a literal rendering of Dostoevskian dialogism, insofar as the 
formal interlocutor of the Notes is here vaguely diegetically embodied. In 
Dosoesvky’s novella, the abstract interlocutor and interrupter of his monologue is 
the rational voice of vsemstvo. In Camus’s text, the interrupter represents a 
singular rather than a collective reader, and represents no particular stance.635 
However, Clamence subverts this in the closing section of the novel by revealing 
that he constantly seeks out and lures listeners into this narrative compliance. 
 
La Chute, like Le Bavard, is also a direct parody of La Nausée. The image of the 
disillusioned humanist-cum-‘penitent judge’ is, as Camus affirmed, a parodic 
representation of Sartrian existentialism and the paradox contained in any notion 
of value systems founded on phenomenological ontology: “L’existentialisme chez 
nous about it à une théologie sans dieu et à une scolastique don't il était inevitable 
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dialogue enveloped in a monologue, but a doubly problematised one: “ses confidences ne confient 
rien, de même que l’interlocuteur vers qui il est tourné est un mur de brouillard dans lequel ses 
paroles s’enfoncent, sans avoir été entendues et comme si elles n’avaient pas été prononcées. Que 
reste-t-il? L’ironie.” See Blanchot, L’Amitié, p. 229. 
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qu’elles finissent par susciter des régimes d’inquisition.”636 Camus’s choice to 
attack this by returning to the Dostoevskian hypotext is not arbitrary, as he stated 
in the same interview:  
Si les prémisses de l’existentialisme se trouvent, comme je le croit, chez 
Pascale, Nietzsche et Kierkegaard ou Chestov, alors je suis d’accord avec ells. 
Si ses conclusions sont celles de nos existentialists, je ne suis pas d’accord, 
car ells sont contradictoires aux premises.637 
La Chute is thus explicitly an attack on the contemporary existentialist movement 
in France, from the perspective of existential thought. The significance of the 
protagonist’s self-imposed exile to a Northern European port-town setting again 
becomes clear. Camus’s most Dostoevskian (and most existential) novel 
reconfronts Sartrian existentialism with the fundamental problem at the origins of 
existential thought. This is the problem of the absurd, represented in La Chute by 
the disembodied laughter. This follows Clamence as a praying reminder of an 
intuitively sensed indignity inherent to an absurd human existence. 
 
The connection between this disembodied laughter and suicide is the absurd 
problematic that Camus developed in Le Mythe de Sysiphe. The ‘Fall’ from 
humanist naivety is a representation of the disillusionment associated with the 
revelation of the absurd. Fruitful comparisons may be observed between La 
Chute and Dostoevsky’s own reworking of the myth of the Fall in Dream of a 
Ridiculous Man. In the Dostoevskian version, the myth is embedded as a dream 
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 Albert Camus, "Derrnière interview" in Oeuvres completes, IV, p. 662. It may be observed that 
Berdyaev said almost the same thing: “I regard my type of philosophy as ‘existentialist’, even 
though one should qualify this by pointing out that true existentialist philosophy is represented by 
St Augustine, Pascal, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche rather than Heidegger, Jaspers or Sartre” (see 
Berdyaev, Dream and Reality: an essay in autobiography, p. 93). 
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in a framing narrative in which the protagonist is transformed from cynicism to 
holy ridicule by a brush with suicide, the dream itself and an encounter with a 
destitute child. The novella concludes “А ту маленькую девочку я отыскал... И 
пойду! И пойду!”638 The Camusian text involves the suicide of another, to 
which the protagonist bears silent witness, resulting in his fall from humanism to 
cynicism (the inverse trajectory of the Dostoevskian protagonist of Dream of a 
Ridiculous Man). The centrality of the problem of suicide (the subjective 
potential decision as to whether life is worth living) in Camus’s conception of 
humanism is comparable to the problem of the suffering child in Dostoevsky’s 
thought.639 The crucial difference is that Camus’s is a reflexive, rational value 
judgement of one’s own life, in isolation from the other. As such it is ego-centred 
while Dostoevsky’s response takes a supra-rational inter-subjective empathy as 
its foundation. 
  
The absurd had been the starting point of Camus’s philosophical engagement 
with Dostoevsky with Le Mythe de Sisyphe in 1942, the essay famously 
commencing: “Il n’y a qu’un problème philosophique vraiment sérieux: c’est le 
suicide.” Camus’s initial ground of enquiry is the same as Dostoevsky’s: human 
mortality implies subjective meaninglessness.640 The crucial distinction is that 
for Dostoevsky, this constituted a proof of human immortality while for Camus it 
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 Dostoevskii, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, XXV, p. 119. 
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 It is noteworthy that Camus spoke of inheriting the theme of child suffering directly from 
Dostoevsky, and that were it not from Dostoevsky, this would have been absent from his thought 
(see Camus, Œuvres complètes, IV, p. 547). 
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 Ibid., I, p. 230. It is noteworthy that this essay on Dostoevsky was added to the volume 
initially in replacement of an essay on Kafka that was unpublishable under the occupation. The 
idea that the two studies might be ‘interchangeable’ is in itself of interest. Camus subjected both 
writers, along with Kierkegaard, to a similar existential reading. 
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is the inescapable condition of the Absurd.641 In face of the potential conclusion 
that life is indeed not worth living, Camus raises Kirilov’s self-destruction to the 
status of an event (albeit fictional) of genuine historical significance.642 Camus’s 
reading follows Gide’s insofar as Kirilov’s act is seen as a genuine surpassing of 
the human condition, its ironic and grotesque side downplayed, or rather, 
rehabilitated from the perspective of the Absurd. Camus, however, goes a 
significant step further than Gide in seeing in Kirilov’s act a genuine starting 
point for a paradoxical nihilistic humanism. Gide’s Kirilov had killed himself in 
order to surpass his own humanity; Camus’s does so in order that others might do 
so.643 What Dostoevsky intended as a grotesque parody of atheist humanism, 
reductio ad absurdum, Camus’s absurdist humanism re-appropriates. Kirilov is 
thus reinstated as a prophet of modern nihilism: the liberating force that permits 
the subsequent “everything is permitted” of Ivan.  
 
This absurd humanism follows Ivan Karamazov’s sentimental validation of 
justice over God, understood in Camus as the authority of both dogma and fact: 
“La lutte de la justice contre la vérité est ouverte ici pour la première fois.”644 
Absurdist humanism recognises neither rational nor dogmatic approaches to 
ethics. This irrationalist reading of Ivan’s revolt (as a sentiment of justice in 
revolt against truth) differs radically from Gide’s reading of Ivan as a 
representative of intellectualism. It also contains the seed of the dispute that 
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 “А высшая идея на земле лишь одна и именно — идея о бессмертии души человеческой, 
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would eventually divide Camus and Sartre. Revolt, for Camus, is the essence of 
freedom. It is for this reason that in Kant he recognised only negative freedom, 
freedom from.645  
 
Dostoevsky’s conception of the existential predicament, as expressed in his letters, 
differed from Pascal’s ‘thinking reed’ in recognizing reason itself as a source of 
suffering rather than a source of dignity.646 Sartre and Camus both follow this 
conception, of the overdeveloped consciousness as an illness. Camus, unlike 
Sartre, retained a degree of hope in the unthinking, the sensory and the 
pre-rational, that which Sartre had portrayed in such a negative light in La 
Nausée. 
 
Camus’s departure from Shestov and existential thought was set out in Le Mythe 
de Sisyphe. He termed “suicide philosophique” the turn from the revelation of the 
Absurd to God. Dostoevsky’s, Kierkegaard’s and Shestov’s leaps of Absurd faith 
(“если б кто мне доказал, что Христос вне истины, и действительно было 
бы, что истина вне Христа, то мне лучше хотелось бы оставаться со 
Христом, нежели с истиной.”
647) Camus rejected. The rubric he applied to 
Shestov, the “admirable monotonie” has remained attached to the Russian 
philosopher henceforth. It is of significance that this dates from Camus’s Carnets, 
as an observation concerning a host of religious thinkers and texts.648 Prior to 
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 Blaise Pascal, Pensées (Paris: Seuil, 1962), p. 67. 
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 ‘Pis’mo H. D. Fonvizinoi, ian-fev 1854’ in Dostoevskii, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, XXVIII, 
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this, it dates to Gide’s ‘6ème lettre à Angèle.’649 
  
With La Chute, Camus realines his thought, on a fundamental level, with the 
existential interrogations of Dostoevsky’s underground man, those of Shestov and 
those of Nietzsche. Blanchot’s essay ‘La Chute: La Fuite’ brings these concerns 
to the fore:  
Mais que fuit-il? Qu’est ce que cette fuite? Le mot est mal choisi pour plaire. 
Le courage est pourtant d’accepter de fuir plutôt que de vivre quiètement et 
hypocritement en de faux refuges. Les valeurs, les patries, les religions et ces 
certitudes privées que notre vanité et notre complaisance à nous-mêmes nous 
octroient généreusement, sont autant de séjours trompeurs que le monde 
aménage pour ceux qui pensent se tenir ainsi debout et au repos, parmi les 
choses stables.650 
This rejection of refuge, of the comfort of 2x2=4 in Dostoevsky’s text, is also a 
rejection of Sartre’s early ideal of transcendence and his later ideal of 
engagement. 
 
Camus’s rift with French Existentialism had begun with L’Homme révolté – his 
attempt at a conceptual history of Revolt – and its conclusion regarding the 
famous pensée de midi. Camus’s vision of a conciliation, however tense, between 
the rational and the irrational alienated him from both existential and 
existentialist camps. His discussion of Dostoevskian revolt is of particular interest 
in this regard: it was in Ivan Kramazov that Camus pinpointed Dostoevsky’s 
“vrai progrès” with regards to the history of revolt, identifying in Ivan’s discourse 
and demise the question “peut-on vivre et se maintenir dans la révolte?”651 Like 
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Sartre, Camus homes in on Ivan’s “tout est permis” as a historical event, which 
he identifies this as the origin of contemporary nihilism.652 For Camus, Ivan is in 
a sense trapped in his revolt:  
La lutte de la justice contre la vérité est ouverte ici pour la première fois; elle 
n’aura plus de cesse. Ivan, solitaire, donc moraliste, se suffira d’une sorte de 
don-quichottisme métaphysique.653 
The quixotic aspect Camus here refers to is that Ivan’s battle is essentially absurd: 
in the face of universal injustice, subjectively experienced, he can do positively 
nothing of consequence. What served as a fairly unproblematic atheistic starting 
point for Sartre’s humanist existentialism is for Camus far more conceptually 
complex. Camus, unlike Sartre, does not turn a blind eye on Ivan’s recognition of 
the fundamental paradox between his simultaneous acceptance and rejection of 
the world and creator.654 Where Sartre’s character had famously declared that 
“L’enfer, c’est les autres”, Camus proclaimed in his Carnets, in much more 
Dostoevskian terms, that, “L’enfer, c’est le paradis plus la mort”, clearly in 
reference to the same inherent injustice of mortal existence that Russian 
existential thought from Dostoevsky to Shestov had grappled with.655 Camus’s 
understanding of the Ivan and Alyosha’s debate is elucidated by a later assertion 
in the Carnets that: “cela m’ennuierait beaucoup que l’on me force à choisir 
absolument entre saint Augustin et Hegel. J’ai l’impression qu’il doit y avoir une 
vérité supportable entre les deux.”656  
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Through his final parody of La Chute, Camus had dramatized his dispute with 
existentialism by returning to its existential, Dostoevskian origins in Notes from 
Underground. Camus’s life was to end abruptly just two years after this final 
novelistic tribute to Dostoevsky, but not before yet another, theatrical tribute: his 
adaptation of Les Possédés in 1959. Les Possédés occupies a special place in the 
oeuvre of “Camus-adapteur,” as Ouadia has discussed, insofar as it is his only 
project of theatre adaptation taken on entirely by his own initiative and following 
many years of gestation, whilst all the rest were “né au hazard”.657 Indeed, 
Camus wrote of Dostoevsky’s Devils in 1959: “je m’en suis nourri et […] je m’y 
suis formé. Il y a près de vingt ans en tout cas que je vois ses personnages sur la 
scène.”658  Camus also said that, unlike most of his work, he adapted Les 
Possédés motivated by desire and personal pleasure.659 
 
It is curious to note that, in response to the question as to why he adapted 
Dostoevsky’s novel for the stage, Camus answers by explaining why he did not 
adapt Tolstoy.660 While greatly appreciating both, he reads the two writers in the 
same dualistic terms as his predecessors. In response to the question, during an 
open debate, as to whether Dostoevsky can be called the father of contemporary 
French literature, Camus stated: 
le problème de l’influence est toujours un problème délicat à traiter parce 
qu’on ne sait pas où elle commence ni où elle s’arrête. […] Eh bien, je crois 
pouvoir dire que si une œuvre est vivante aujourd’hui parmi nous, c’est celle 
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de Dostoïevski.661 
Camus expressly saw his Les Possédés as a dramatisation of the same reading of 
Dostoevsky that he had presented in L’Homme révolté.662 His justification of the 
project, and generally of the interest in Dostoevsky in the 1950s, was largely 
political: Dostoevsky was seen to have prophesised Stalinism.663 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is clear that by the 1930s and 40s aspects of Dostoevsky’s underground had 
been knitted deep into the fabric of France’s existentialist literary tradition. La 
Nausée engaged subtly with the underground man’s polemics, fusing a 
simultaneous critique of rationalism and romanticism with modernist poetics of 
perception. Sartre, however, returned, in the conclusion of La Nausée, to the 
romantic transcendence the underground had refuted and, in his subsequent 
technical writings, to rationalist ethics. Le Bavard was observed as a parody of 
Notes from Underground and La Nausée, targeting directly the dialogical poetics 
of the former and the subjectivist poetics of perception of the latter to confront, in 
turn, both radical subjectivism and inter-subjectivism with cold hard objectivity, 
and, as such, to re-confront the roman-tragediia with quixotic ideology. La Chute 
was then analysed as the concluding word in this cycle of parodies, reconfronting 
Sartrian existentialism with the shared Dostoevskian hypotext by means of 
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intertextual reference. Camus, through La Chute and all of his oeuvre, fused as it 
was with Dostoevskian ideas and motifs, ultimately challenged the dogmatism 
inherent in Sartrian existentialism’s rationalistic approach to ethics, to return to 
an Ivan Karamazov-informed ethics of sentiment, beginning with indignation and 
revolt, and ending in a suprarational fraternalism.  
 
From this analysis, two principal oppositions between religious existential 
thought and atheist existentialism have emerged. The first disparity pertains, of 
course, to the meaning of human existence. In the former, as represented by the 
underground man and Shestov, this is a mystic and supra-rational possibility lying 
beyond reach: beyond the stone wall of abstract reasonning. In Marcel and 
Berdiaev this supra-rational possibility is found in intersubjectivity; in Camus, 
the same indication is also present, if in a secular sense, though this possibility is 
– as with Shestov and the underground man – beyond reach. In Sartre’s La 
Nausée the opposite conclusion is reached: authorship of a text is seen, 
over-optimistically, as authorial transcendence of contingency and embuing of the 
individual self with the aspect of the necessary.   
 
The second disparity between existential thought and existentialism emerged 
from their approaches to the problem of the self in relation to the other. Marcel 
and Ivanov’s thought, and particularly their reactions to Dostoevsky’s, stressed 
intersubjectivity and sobornost’ as the only road out of the destructive impass of 
radical subjectivism.  Contrarily, Sartre’s fictional and philosophical writings 
explored the same predicament but maintained an antagonistic conception of the 
relationship between self and other. Camus’s La Chute and des Forêt’s Le Bavard 
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continued this discussion through their narrative exploration of dialogism, 
exploiting Dostoevsky-informed interrupted monologues to highlight the 
impossibility of intersubjective communication.  
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis set out to trace the reception of Dostoevsky in France from initial 
translations and critical responses to the existential and existentialist dialogues of 
the 1930s and 1940s via the modernist and proto-existential readings from the 
turn of the century. Derély’s first translation of Crime and Punishment was 
analysed in parallel to both the original and a later French translation, revealing 
that key, subversive themes of the original had been normalised and sanitised in 
translation, altering Raskolnikov’s murder motive from the theoretical to the 
sociological. Hunger and the resultant desire to rob the pawnbroker were 
emphasised while Raskolnikov’s greater motive, that of testing his aristocratic 
theory, was downplayed. Initial critics made the same modification, including 
Vogüé’s highly influential reading. For the following two decades, Vogüé 
dominated the reception of Russian literature in France, playing a significant role 
in the way in which works were translated and disseminated, and how they were 
read. He contributed significantly to the development of more cosmopolitan 
readings of Russian literature in France. However, Vogüé reduced Dostoevsky to 
his earliest works, writing off his far more subversive, mature fiction on account 
of its cumbersome philosophical deviations: the novel was no place for 
philosophising and these works were moreover deemed of dubious utility in 
terms of providing moral instruction.  
 
A subsequent, modern generation of readers, spearheaded by André Gide, 
reassessed this initial reading and rejected it violently. This generation had 
encountered Dostoevsky before reaching intellectual maturity. Significantly, they 
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were also fervent readers of Nietzsche. Increasingly, stress came to be placed on 
Dostoevsky’s later, more morally ambiguous novels, creating an ‘immoralist’ 
Dostoevsky in opposition to Vogüé’s ‘moralist’ reading. Post-Nietzsche and 
Post-Freud, Dostoevsky’s investigation of madness became a talking point among 
his defenders rather than his detractors. Meanwhile, what previous detracters had 
seen in Dostoevsky’s novelistic aesthetics as barbaric formlessness, modernist 
readers such as Gide and Rivière identified as an aesthetics of complexity to be 
drawn from and integrated into the French tradition. 
 
Gide admired Dostoevsky’s ability to achieve a narrative dissolution of the self 
into multiple opposed ethical stances of his characters. His literary output often 
explored the same themes as his various critical works on Dostoevky. An initial, 
‘immoralistic’ stage centered around the impossibility of an ethics of self-will, in 
the ‘6e lettre à Angèle’ and L’Immoraliste. A second stage represented a backlash 
against Vogüé’s “religion de la souffrance” as a reduction of Dostoevsky’s 
thought. Gide launched this directly in the brief reception history that opens his 
‘Dostoievski d’après sa correspondance.’ He then continued it intertextually with 
Les Caves du Vatican: a parody not so much of Crime and Punishment as of 
Vogüé’s reading of it – evidenced by Vogüé’s characterised appearance in the 
novel as well as Gide’s rewriting of Dostoevsky’s ending, on which Vogüé’s 
reading had hinged. Following the Great War and Russian Revolution, Gide’s 
final, mature reading of Dostoevsky was influenced both by his own spiritual 
awakening, as described in Numquid et tu… and by his encounter with Shestov’s 
philosophical interpretation. Ultimately, Gide’s reading concluded where it 
started, with his innovative reformulation of the riddle of Kirilov: a riddle that 
241 
 
stimulated Gide for three decades before finally finding its fictional rewriting in 
Boris and La Perouse of Les Faux-Monnayeurs.     
            
Russian émigré readings arrived around the time Gide’s reading reached maturity. 
Émigré readings, cultivated in the climate of the Russian Silver Age, focused on 
Dostoevsky as a religious critique of positivism. Shestov’s reading, from 1921, 
was the first in France to suggest Notes from Underground as the central pillar of 
Dostoevsky’s thought – a statement Gide would soon reiterate. Shestov’s 
‘Dostoievski et la lutte contre les évidences’ homed in on proto-existential, 
antirationalist aspects of Dostoevsky’s work. This led to Shestov’s translator, 
friend and philosophical follower Boris de Schloezer undertaking a retranslation 
of the novella. The resultant translation, with its existential shading, went on to 
enter the Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, attesting in part to its quality, in part to the 
positive reception of a more existentialist Dostoevsky. 
 
Berdiaev’s was a more traditionally romantic Christian reading, which did not 
belong to to the existential tradition of Shestov’s or Schloezer’s. Heated debates 
as to the meaning of Dostoevsky’s work and its place in both Russian and French 
litearary history animated the Studio Franco-Russe, bringing about meaningful 
intercultural exchange via the platform of Dostoevsky’s fictional world. Gabriel 
Marcel, immersed in this intercultural dialogue, and an enthused reader of 
Berdiaev, Shestov, and Ivanov, wrote a little-known essay on the representation of 
the self and other (I and Thou) in Ivanov’s reading of Dostoevsky: a dialectic that 
proved essential to Marcel’s developing existential philosophy.      
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Finally, French existentialist fiction from Sartre’s La Nausée to Camus’s La 
Chute continued to dialogue intertextually with Dostoevsky’s fiction and 
particularly with existential readings of Notes from Underground. Through their 
intertextual dialogue with and surrounding the Dostoevskian hypotext, they 
employ Dostoevsky-informed monological form to explore the possibility of 
meaningful communication. In La Chute, and particularly Le Bavard, this is fused 
with an ironic pessimism that bridges Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground and 
developing post-modern accounts of dialogue.664  
 
Through this analysis, a number of overarching themes have been identified, 
which warrant further indepth research. The first is the refracting role of 
‘orientalism’ in the early reception of Dostoevsky as an exotic, barbaric, Asiatic 
artist. Given that Russian literature is, to this day, shelved in the Bibliothèque 
Nationale de France under ‘Littératures Orientales et Arts’ rather than ‘Littérature 
Étrangère’ (the latter being reserved for literature authored in Western European 
languages), a detailed assessment of how France’s perception of Russian culture 
has evolved as European, Oriental or otherwise, would be a crucial contribution 
to developing an understanding of these constructs as factors dominating the 
nineteenth and twentieth century reception of Russian cultural output in France.  
 
A further research theme that this study has uncovered is that of the interwoven 
nature of Dostoevsky and Nietzsche’s reception, both in France, from Gide’s ‘6e 
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letter à Angèle,’ through Merezhkovksky’s and Shestov’s writings, through to 
Camus’s reception of Dostoevsky. The significance of Nietszche in the 
transformation of Dostoevsky from a ‘moralist’ to an ‘immoralist’ novelist has 
been evidenced in the current study. What remains to be assessed is the extent to 
which Dostoevsky’s reception also refracted Nietszche’s, as was clearly the cases 
of Gide and Suarès. Future study could shed light on whether other key 
interpreters of Nietzsche in France read his work through that of Dostoevsky, as 
was certainly the case of the Russian reception of Nietzsche during the Silver Age 
and into the culture of the post-revolutionary Russian diaspora. 
 
The current thesis carried out detailed translation analyses of two different French 
translations of Crime and Punishment and two of Notes from Underground. This 
showed clearly that early translaters attempted to normalise subversive aspects of 
Dostoevsky’s fiction, justifying this as mediation between French and Russian 
tastes, often referring to Dostoevsky as a barbarous, even confused author in need 
of improvement and clarification. The remaining translations of Dostoevsky in 
French from this period will doutlessly yield further interesting fruits if subjected 
to modern translation analysis, as, with the exception of early studies from the 
50s to 70s (methodologically focussed on assessing the ‘fidelity’ of translations 
as opposed to the specific implications of modifications) this has not been carried 
out. The current thesis also identified in Schloezer’s canonical 1926 translation of 
Notes from Underground a clear and significant influence of Shestov’s existential 
reading of the Russian author. Further study specifically into the wave of 
retranslations in the 1920s could establish whether this was an isolated example 
or whether this broader wave also took on an existential colouring. 
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The most significant finding of the current study is the extent to which Russian 
émigré writings on Dostoevsky did clearly contribute to the French understanding 
of the novelist in the 1920s and 30s, and the extent to which Gabriel Marcel, 
broadly recognised as one of the first French philosophers associated with the 
existential movement, was steeped in the intellectual culture of the Russian 
diaspora. Further research into intercultural dialog surrounding the Studio-Franco 
Russe, the Decades at Pontigny, Berdiaev’s salon and other such spaces of 
intercultural dialogue will be essential in dispelling the myth that Russian émigré 
thought continued seamlessly, in the diasporic bubble, from the Silver Age and 
back into the Russian culture of the 1990s, when, in fact, this diasporic cultures 
existed in dialogue with host cultures.     
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